JUNE 1956

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

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

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IN FORTHCOMING ISSUES OF

COMMENTARY

Israel in the Levant *Walter Zander*

An authority on Israeli affairs, writing from London, advances the thesis that Israel, if she wishes to live at peace with her neighbors, must show understanding for the legitimate national aspirations of the one-time colonial countries of Asia and Africa.

Jung and the "Aryan Unconscious" Ludwig Marcuse

The sorry record of the association of the well-known Swiss psychoanalyst, Dr. Carl G. Jung, with a Nazified international psychiatric organization and its journal at the time of the Third Reich, and of his subsequent anti-Germanism, is laid bare by a philosopher who is also at home in the field of psychology.

Jewish Surnames—An Etymological History *Benzion C. Kaganoff*

This is a companion piece to Rabbi Kaganoff's widely appreciated history of Jewish first names that appeared last November.

Liberalism and "The Quiet American" *Diana Trilling and Philip Rahv*

In an exchange, two distinguished literary critics argue politics and literature in connection with Mr. Rahv's review of the Graham Greene novel in last month's COMMENTARY. In the department "On the Horizon."

Academic Freedom Today *Ralph G. Ross*

Taking off from the recent history of academic freedom by Richard Hofstadter and Walter P. Metzger, and Robert M. MacIver's *Academic Freedom in Our Time,* Professor Ross attempts to define the nature of academic freedom and to weigh the extent to which it is menaced today.

Virginia's Creeping Desegregation *James Rorty*

An on-the-spot report of the progress of school desegregation in the Old Dominion, following up the author's study of Virginia's Prince Edward County in the May issue.

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COMMENTARY

THE "NEW RECONSTRUCTION" IN THE SOUTH

Desegregation in Historical Perspective

C. VANN WOODWARD

TWO short years have passed since the Supreme Court's decision of May 17, 1954 declaring segregation in the public schools unconstitutional. An event that is invariably described as "historic" has indeed begun to take its place as a landmark in American history. Two years' time, however, is not much perspective, as historical views go, in which to attempt to assess the probable meaning and importance of a Court decision of the first magnitude. The historian recalls with a shudder what a perspective of a mere two years would have revealed to him about the historic meaning and importance of such earlier landmarks as the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, the Dred Scott Decision of 1857, the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1875, the Fourteenth Amendment of 1867, or, for that matter, the Volstead Act of 1919. Such laws and decisions—all of which were in some degree nullified by events or public sentiment—also remind one of how precarious are the fortunes of American statesmanship when it operates against the mass opposition of a significant section of the country.

If in spite of these warnings one nevertheless persists in trying to assess the Court decision of 1954 in the perspective of history, there is one particular landmark with which a comparison is unavoidable: that one, looming out of the remote distance, is called Reconstruction. Long veiled in clouds of myth that obscured its real nature, Reconstruction is not a single towering peak, as it might seem, but a whole mountain range beginning with a sharply defined escarpment called the Emancipation Proclamation of 1862, continuing through the Civil Rights Acts, the Reconstruction Acts, and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and then declining into the tableland represented by the Compromise of 1877.

Reconstruction affords the most extreme example in our history of an all-out effort by the majority to impose its will upon a recalcitrant and unwilling minority region.

THE desegregation crisis is here put into much needed historical perspective by an eminent scholar whose special field is the South. C. VANN WOODWARD is professor of American History at Johns Hopkins and author of *Tom Watson: Agrarian Rebel* (1938), *The Battle for Leyte Gulf* (1947), *Reunion and Reaction* (1951), *Origins of the New South* (1951), and last but far from least, *The Strange Career of Jim Crow* (1955). Born in Vanndale, Arkansas, in 1908, Professor Woodward got his B.A. from Emory University in 1930, and went on to an M.A. at Columbia and a Ph.D. at the University of North Carolina. Before coming to Johns Hopkins, he taught at, among other places, the universities of Florida and Virginia. This is his first appearance in COMMENTARY.

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Like Prohibition, in which the South and West tried to impose their moral ideas upon a recalcitrant Northeast, and like the present experiment in desegregation, Reconstruction followed hard upon a great war; but unlike them, it followed a war against the very region that was to be reformed. That war left the South virtually helpless for a time before the will of the conqueror. The victorious majority, filled with the moral idealism that had inspired its fight, was determined at all costs to fulfill its ideals and secure the moral fruits of victory in the defeated South.

In spite of the bad name Reconstruction has earned, an enormous amount of idealism and noble motives went into its making. It is comparable in this respect with the soaring ideals and lofty hopes that inspired some of the great revolutions in European history. The revolutionary architects of Reconstruction did not pause to quibble about state rights, and suffered from no scruples about the use of force. If the Constitution got in their way, they changed it or ignored it, and they treated the judiciary and the President the same way. As for the representatives of the states most concerned, they were not even admitted to Congress, much less consulted about their views, until the revolution was a *fait accompli* and a newly created electorate had sent representatives who accepted it.

On the face of it, Reconstruction was a success. The laws and Constitutional changes which it gave rise to seemed to leave nothing to be desired in the way of assuring four million Negro freedman first-class citizenship and equal rights. After all, it is merely the reinterpretation of one of the products of Reconstruction lawmakers—the Fourteenth Amendment—that has caused all the stir ninety years later and furnished the foundation stone of the New Reconstruction of our own time. And yet we know that the original Reconstruction, in spite of the heritage of law that has renewed its vitality a century later, was in most fundamental respects a failure. In spite of the relative weakness and helplessness of the resistant South, in spite of the determined idealism of the Northern reformers, their willingness to use force, to ignore scruples, to brush aside Constitutional restraint and override opposition, the fact is that the great experiment ended in disillusionment and default. The gains made on paper were never fully implemented in practice, or they were eroded away by compromise, concession, and "interpretation." Apathy and indifference replaced the original idealism of the reformers. It was the will of the defeated, discredited, and, for a time, helpless South that prevailed in the end. Had it been otherwise there would probably have been no need for the New Reconstruction now taking place in the middle of the 20th century.

The failure of the Old Reconstruction naturally raises serious doubts about the future of the New Reconstruction. All the more so as the South now possesses formidable weapons of resistance. Far from being disfranchised, it has more than a hundred representatives in Congress who are capable, as recent events prove, of mobilizing and uniting to resist desegregation. It has a powerful voice in one of the major political parties, and can no longer be completely ignored by the other. Moreover, all but a few of the reformers deprecate talk of coercive measures and the use of force. Gradualism, defined by the Supreme Court as "deliberate speed," is the approved approach, and the Court has left the responsibility of planning and initiating the desegregation procedures to the local Southern school authorities. None of these circumstances would seem to bode well for the New Reconstruction.

True, the present Court has consistently, unequivocally, and unanimously held against segregation. But Americans have developed over the years a curious usage of the law as an appeasement of moralists and reformers. Given sufficient pressure for a law that embodies moral values of acknowledged reputability, the citizens will go to great lengths to gratify the reformers; they will even go so far as to unlimber the cumbersome machinery of Constitutional amendment. But having done this much, they are

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inclined to regard it as rather tedious of the reformers to insist upon literal enforcement. Under these circumstances the new law is likely to become the subject of pious reference, more honored in the breach than in the observance, a proof of excellent intentions rather than the means of fulfilling them. Much of the history of the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Eighteenth Amendments illustrates this usage.

WILL the history of the New Reconstruction repeat that of the Old? For a time after the decision of May 17, 1954, there seemed to be considerable grounds for thinking it would not. The restrained tone of the Southern press and the Southern leaders was the subject of wide comment and congratulation. There were no sensational explosions. The comment of the Nashville *Tennessean* on the day following the decision was not at all unique: "It is not going to bring overnight revolution," said the editorial. "But the South is and has been for years a land of change. Its people—of both races—have learned to live with change. They can learn to live with this one. Given a reasonable amount of time and understanding, they will." That summer Governor Frank G. Clement of Tennessee, a moderate on the race question, decisively defeated two candidates for the Democratic gubernatorial nomination who flagrantly exploited the segregation issue. Scattered localities in the border states signified their intention to abolish segregation in schools. The late Howard W. Odum of the University of North Carolina, a distinguished sociologist who spoke with authority on the subject of race relations, predicted that "the South is likely to surprise itself and the nation and do an excellent job of readjustment."

The history of Southern race relations in the ten years before the Court's school decision seemed to give a good deal of support to such a prediction. The crisis of bitterness between the races had been reached and passed during the war years. The direful predictions of postwar violence that would exceed the blood-letting following the First World War had not been fulfilled. The return of large numbers of Negroes to the polls after a half century of disfranchisement, and after the courts had ruled out white primaries, was accomplished quietly. The increasing appearance of Negroes on school boards, juries and grand juries, in police uniforms, and in white-collar jobs and managerial positions, raised few cries of Negro domination. A series of Supreme Court decisions culminating in the two important opinions of 1950 breached the wall of segregation around public institutions of higher learning in all but five of the Southern states. By the summer of 1954 more than a thousand Negro students had squeezed through the breach onto formerly all-white campuses. There they were accepted by white students without any of the ugly incidents that had been expected and predicted. White Southerners had "moved over" to make room for colored Southerners in various professional associations, collegiate and professional athletic teams, in interstate carriers, dining cars, and Pullman cars. Southern white draftees drilled, ate, and shared barracks with Negro draftees in all the military services, and took orders from officers and sergeants of both races. On the big military reservations and posts in the South, their children went to the same schools. Was it not true, then, to say that the New Reconstruction had begun at least a decade before the Supreme Court's decision of 1954 banning segregated public schooling? And had not the South adjusted peacefully, if grudgingly, to each successive stage?

Surveying all these revolutionary changes in established Southern practices, changes few thought they would live to see, men of good will began to entertain hopeful expectations about the future. For by the middle of 1954 the New Reconstruction could be confidently claimed to have accomplished more genuine change in some aspects of human relations than the Old Reconstruction had done with all its blood and thunder and histrionics. And this estimate still left out of account the many advances accomplished by private, voluntary, and Southern efforts—

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the most momentous of which was the virtual elimination of the lynching crime. The Jim Crow system still stood, but its foundations had been shaken. Segregation was on the defensive; in some quarters it was in full retreat. If all this had been accomplished without bloodshed and the calling out of troops, reasoned the optimists, perhaps a new day had really dawned. Perhaps the South might eventually take the transition to unsegregated public schools in its stride as well.

Much would depend upon the nature of the Supreme Court's decree of implementation that was not to come until a year after the original decision. In the meantime neither the forces favoring compliance nor those for defiance showed their hand fully. There was neither any appreciable progress toward desegregation of the schools, save in the border states, nor did the segregationists mobilize for all-out resistance. It was a period of wait-and-see.

THERE were a few signs of what was to come. Mississippi came forward in her historic role as leader of the Southern racial reaction, just as she had come forward in 1875 to overthrow Reconstruction and in 1890 to disfranchise the Negro: the third Mississippi Plan took the form of the Citizens Councils, which were started in Indianola in July 1954 to wage an unremitting war in defense of segregation. Balancing these developments on the negative side, however, were the swiftly adopted and executed plans of public school desegregation in Baltimore, Washington, St. Louis, and other border cities. Voices counseling compliance and moderation continued to be lifted in the South, even in parts of the Deep South. Temporary silence on the part of some Southerners normally given to vehemence on race policy may have been due to shock. On the whole, however, during the first year that followed the Supreme Court decision of May 17, 1954, there was remarkably little of the hysteria that was to develop later.

Even the Supreme Court's decree of May 31, 1955 implementing the decision against segregated schools did not break the spell. In fact it was greeted in the South with expressions of relief, and even hailed as signifying the Court's acquiescence in indefinite postponement. The Court had indeed set no deadline for compliance. The decree referred sympathetically to the "solution of varied local school problems" which would require time, it placed the responsibility for solving these problems upon local school authorities, and it charged the Federal district courts with the duty of passing upon "good faith implementation."

It was the reference to the district judges and "their proximity to local conditions" that raised the hopes of pro-segregationists. The old four-handed American game between the South, the courts, the Negro, and the Constitution has been going on throughout our history, and the South knows all the gambits. For much the longest time, the courts have played into the hands of the South and the game has gone against the Negro. If now the Supreme Court had changed partners, one could still set one's hopes on the district judges, many of whom were natives of the states in which they sat. This hope was most explicitly voiced by Lieutenant Governor Ernest Vandiver of Georgia, who rejoiced that "they are steeped in the same traditions that I am. . . . A 'reasonable time' can be construed as one year or two hundred. . . . Thank God we've got good Federal judges."

In the months that followed, the segregationists watched with dismay while the judiciary ground out their answer. By January 1956, nineteen court decisions involving school segregation cases had been rendered, and in all of them the lower courts upheld the Supreme Court ruling that enforced segregation was a denial of equal protection of the law. Some of the decisions took a lenient view of the amount of time required to desegregate, but others stressed the "prompt and reasonable start" required by the Supreme Court's directive and set dates for compliance. School segregation laws were toppled in Florida, Arkansas, Tennessee, and Texas. On February 15, Federal

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District Judge J. Skelly Wright, Orleans-born and educated, smashed Louisiana's plan to preserve segregation in schools through state laws. Judge Wright admitted all the terrible difficulties involved in desegregation, as well as the need for "the utmost patience, understanding, generosity and forbearance" on the part of all. "But the magnitude of the problem may not nullify the principle," he declared in a ringing conclusion. "And that principle is that we are, all of us, freeborn Americans, with a right to make our way unfettered by sanctions imposed by man because of the work of God."

On top of these blows from quarters where comfort had been expected, came renewed attacks from within the South—from the Negroes themselves. No longer the familiar, submissive creatures whom Southerners thought they knew so well, Negroes realized that they at last had the law and the courts on their side. They were ready to assert their rights more forthrightly than they had for three generations. In the summer of 1955, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People filed petitions for desegregation signed by local Negroes with one hundred seventy school boards in seventeen states.

Something much like a panic seized many parts of the South, a panic bred of insecurity and fear. Resistance hardened up and down the line, and in places stiffened into open defiance. The Citizens Councils movement spread out from Mississippi into Louisiana, Alabama, Texas, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina; similar organizations appeared elsewhere. Signers of desegregation petitions in Mississippi, in Selma, Alabama, and in Orangeburg, South Carolina, were fired from their jobs and refused credit by stores and banks so as to compel them to withdraw their names. There were individual cases of violence against NAACP members and at least one murder. Leadership of the opposition was not limited to disreputable hate groups and rural demagogues. It was Senator Harry F. Byrd of Virginia who called upon the South for "massive resistance"; and it was the conservative leaders of his state who claimed the right of "interposition" of state authority against alleged violations of the Constitution by the Supreme Court, and who pointed the way toward the private-school plan as a means of preserving segregation.

In the first three months of 1956 the legislatures of five Southern states—Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia—adopted at least forty-two pro-segregation measures, mainly dealing with schools. Virginia's interposition plan, or some form of it, was taken over by these states. Alabama was the first actually to apply the fateful words "null, void, and of no effect" to the Supreme Court school decision. The resolution was endorsed by a voice vote in the Senate, and an 86-to-4 vote in the House. Georgia also adopted the "null and void" approach, adding a strongly worded declaration that it intended to ignore the Supreme Court decision. Mississippi declared the decision "unconstitutional and of no lawful effect," and created a State Sovereignty Commission "to prohibit . . . compliance with the integration decisions." Avoiding the word "nullification," South Carolina contented herself with "condemnation of and protest against the illegal encroachment of the central government."

All of these states devised some form of stand-by legislation to be brought into play once desegregation became an immediate threat. These plans took the form of substituting some form of private for public schools, permitting wide powers to local authorities in the "assignment" of students, or authorizing the sheriff to remove any student whose presence might lead to disorder. South Carolina was prepared to close any college that undertook to desegregate itself. Georgia was ready to close or lease any public school so threatened, or for that matter any public park, playground, golf course, or swimming pool.

The NAACP became the object of considerable legislative aggression. South Carolina made it unlawful for the state, county, school district, or municipality to employ

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members of the NAACP, asked the United States Attorney General to place it on the list of subversive organizations, and ordered an investigation of NAACP activities in a Negro college. Mississippi required teachers and other officials of publicly supported schools and colleges to list all organizations to which they belonged, and Alabama authorized two counties to fire any teacher belonging to an organization which advocated racial integration. The legislature of South Carolina requested the State Library to remove from circulation all books "antagonistic and inimical to the traditions" of that state.

Swept by the contagion of defiance, several states that had hitherto taken a moderate stand now switched over suddenly to the resistance. Under the leadership of Governor LeRoy Collins, Florida had professed an official policy of gradual acceptance of integration. In March of this year, however, Governor Collins joined the militants with the declaration that "we are just as determined as any Southern state to maintain segregation." In the same month Governor Orval Faubus of Arkansas, where there has already been some school integration, took a stand for segregation that won the praise of the executive secretary of White America, Inc. The governors of North Carolina and Texas have announced strong support for new segregation laws in their states. The segregation issue figured prominently in seven state primaries during the spring. Southern moderates in Congress were brought under such heavy pressure to sign the Southern "Declaration of Constitutional Principles" on March 12 that all the Congressmen of seven states participated. In all, 101 of the 128 members from eleven states signed the manifesto deploring the Supreme Court's "clear abuse of judicial power" and commending "the motives of those states which have declared the intention to resist forced integration by any lawful means."

No doubt, a good deal of this defiance can be dismissed as the bluster of political expediency. But it would be a grave mistake for the rest of the country to dismiss the whole resistance in those terms. Much of it is deeply felt and in deadly earnest. However hollow and antiquated the Constitutional arguments may seem to others, they are self-evident truths to a great many people in the South. *It is a real Constitutional crisis that we are facing, not a sham parade in ancestral costume.* The law of the land has been clearly defined by the Supreme Court of the United States, and that definition has been just as clearly rejected by responsible spokesmen of millions of our people.

It would also be foolish to underestimate the means of resistance, evasion, and delay available to leaders of defiance. Only a few of these devices have been mentioned here, and fewer still have been tested fully in court. There are no "teeth" in the desegregation ruling such as the Civil Rights Acts put in the Fourteenth Amendment during Reconstruction, or the Volstead Act put in Prohibition. The only person who can be jailed for disobedience is the state official who refuses to execute an order of the court specifically applying to him. State laws, it is true, can gradually be brought to test before the courts. But there are some eleven thousand local school boards in the segregating states to which the ball can be passed by the state, and they in turn can invent new troubles for the courts.

The possibilities are extensive. "There is no one way, but many," as John Temple Graves of Alabama pointed out. "The South proposes to use all of them that make for resistance. The decision tortured the Constitution—the South will torture the decision." The Court ruled against segregation on grounds of race or color only—not against segregation on grounds of health, morals, illegitimate birth, public welfare, "friction," achievement and aptitude tests, or gerrymandered districts. On grounds like these the Negro was for half a century denied the ballot that the Fifteenth Amendment plainly said he could not be denied on grounds of race or color. When all such pos-

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sibilities are exhausted, there still remain token compliance accompanying real evasion and all the devices of "voluntary" segregation which are effectively and quietly used in other parts of the country without any legal complications whatever.

THIS is admittedly a dark picture. Little wonder that the optimism of 1954 has given way to the prevailing pessimism of 1956. Many minds are haunted by the prospect that the New Reconstruction is doomed in the end to repeat the frustration and failure of the Old Reconstruction. Yet after making due allowance for all the discouraging evidence that would seem to point to failure, one can still draw a great deal of hope and encouragement from a long-range view of the two periods of Reconstruction:

1. In the first place, the Old Reconstruction had the effect of driving the Border states into the South's orbit and gaining their support. They became more "Confederate" after the Civil War than they had been during it. Lincoln's masterly work of detaching them from the seceding states was undone and reversed by his Radical successors. The New Reconstruction, on the other hand, has had just the opposite effect. The defection of the Border states from the cause of segregation is becoming more and more apparent. The struggle within Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri, and Oklahoma is far from won, but each month brings news of additional retreats along the segregation line. Not one of the Congressmen from Kentucky and Oklahoma, the Border states most closely identified with the South, signed the Southern manifesto in March. The struggle for the allegiance of the mid-South states, including Tennessee, Arkansas, and Texas, all of which have accepted some desegregation in their schools, is still being waged and the outcome is undecided. The prospect over the years, however, would seem to be for a steady enlargement of the reconstructed areas, a process of moving in gradually from the Southern periphery and tightening Reconstruction's hold around the die-hard states of the Deep South.

2. In both Reconstruction periods, the opposition sought to unite Southern resistance by appealing to race prejudice and white solidarity. The white supremacy campaign was extremely effective after the Civil War and is enjoying considerable success now. But there are significant counter-trends within the South today. The most important of these in the long run is a cleavage between generations. While no systematic general study of the subject is available, sample polls in Texas and Florida, and ordinary observation in many quarters, give evidence of a more liberal—or perhaps more indifferent—outlook on race among white Southerners who came of age during and after the Second World War than among their parents.

3. The Old Reconstruction tended to widen instead of close the sectional breach that had opened within the great national church organizations in the ante-bellum struggle over slavery. The opposite result has been achieved by the present movement for Negro rights. Virtually all of the major national churches, supported by their Southern branches, have in some degree come out against the segregation system.

4. In the current discouragement over the stalemate in public school desegregation, there is a tendency to overlook the notable permanent achievements which may in the end outlast anything accomplished by the highly perishable works of the Old Reconstruction. As of last March, for example, 104 of the 208 formerly all-white, publicly supported colleges and universities in the South had opened their doors at some level to Negroes. At present only four states are holding out against admission. The excitement over the flare-up of violence at the University of Alabama has obscured the fact that this was the only instance of such violence that has occurred on a Southern campus over the admission of a Negro student.

5. Negroes played important roles in both Reconstruction periods, but in the current movement they are vastly better equipped

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to defend themselves and advance their cause than were their newly emancipated grandfathers and great-grandfathers. They have already shown new capacities for leadership that have surprised their friends as well as their opponents. In the long run, it may be that their own resources will prove decisive in the contest.

All these tendencies point to the eventual doom of segregation in American life and the triumph of the New Reconstruction—*in the long run*. But the "long run" implies "gradualism," and "gradualism" is a word that has acquired almost as many evil associations as "appeasement." Impatience with that word among people who have waited nearly a hundred years for promised rights is understandable. I use the word here not to propose or define policy, but to characterize a historic phenomenon. *Undesirable or not, gradualism is an inescapable fact and a basic characteristic of the New Reconstruction.*

Professor Paul A. Freund of the Harvard Law School has pointed out that the Supreme Court's phrase, "deliberate speed," is derived from 18th-century chancery practice. It was not inspired, as some would seem to think, by the haunting line from Francis Thompson's poem, *The Hound of Heaven:* "Deliberate speed, majestic instancy." Those who prefer the more heroic and poetic construction of the court's ruling would do well to ponder the unhappy history of "majestic instancy" in the First Reconstruction. However deliberate and halting its speed, the New Reconstruction would seem to promise more enduring results.

CANDLES OF THE HEART

ROBERT PACK

HERE comes, with those occurrences of mind,
Perhaps some rain, some snow; perhaps some sun,
Some sky, clouds shaped by thoughts once left behind,
Come you, come I, now see, comes everyone.
And these arrivals are not ever done;
Events dance purely for that secret sight
When all the candles of the heart are gone,
And gone, in time, the candles of delight.

But if I still delay, now I've begun
To love you with old moodiness of rain,
Shyness of snow, possessiveness of sun—
Remember—candles to the touch are pain,
What mind conceives is never purely done;
Though here come you, come I, comes everyone.

ROBERT PACK'S *Irony of Joy* is one of the three volumes included in Scribner's *Poets of Today II*. Born in New York City in 1929, and educated at Dartmouth and Columbia, he was poetry editor of *Discovery*, and is now completing a book on Wallace Stevens.

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1656: ENGLISH JEWRY'S ANNUS MIRABILIS

Was There a Formal Readmission?

CECIL ROTH

TERCENTENARIES are in fashion. Hardly had the excitement of the American Jewish Tercentennial celebration died away, when Anglo-Jewry began its own more modest program, which is now reaching its climax. There is of course no question of imitation. We over here had begun to think of ours perhaps as soon as you decided to embark on yours: and the older among us recall how fifty years ago, too, our respective Two Hundred and Fiftieth commemorations ran neck and neck. At that time, we in England knew precisely where we stood, historically speaking, just as you in America did. The first group of Jews arrived in what is now the United States in September 1654, establishing what is now the world's greatest Jewish community. In England we were equally sure of ourselves.

The Jews had been expelled from England by Edward I in 1290. For upwards of three and a half centuries, the country had been, with certain reservations, *Judenrein*. Then, when the Puritan Revolution had engendered a new spirit here, a self-sacrificing Dutch rabbi named Menasseh ben Israel had come to England on a mission to Oliver Cromwell and secured his sympathy for his dramatic plan for the apocalyptic Readmission of the Jews. Although the Whitehall Conference which met to consider the question in December 1655 was divided in its views, Cromwell himself decided to grant Menasseh's petition on his own authority, giving him a favorable reply by word of mouth some time between the 14th and 28th of January 1656 (1655 in the "Old Style" calendar). In the early years of this century, certain enthusiastic antiquaries in Anglo-Jewry went so far as to institute a minor annual *Yom Tov* about this time of year, calling it "Resettlement Day."

This is still more or less the story which is generally believed and repeated, notwithstanding the work done during the last half-century by various historians and the fundamental corrections which they have made to the accepted story. Generally speaking, such corrections are of merely academic importance. In this case, on the other hand, they are absolutely fundamental to the position of Anglo-Jewry, and indeed of the Jews in the English-speaking world as a whole. For it is near enough to the truth to say that the Jews were never "re-admitted" to England: and the fact that they were not re-admitted, but gradually resettled, had a profound influence on the subsequent course of Anglo- and American Jewish history.

ONE may say indeed, veering to the other extreme, that the Jews (or at least Jews) were never absent from England, and that, notwithstanding Edward I's edict of expulsion, the country was never *Judenrein:* so that the traditional picture has to be drastically revised in this respect as well. Jewry, like nature, abhors a vacuum, and during the entire period between 1290 and 1656 there was almost perpetually some Jewish element which maintained its association with England. Even before the Expulsion, a Home for Converted Jews *(Domus Conversorum)*

THE actual facts of the return of the Jews to England in 1656 after long absence, like most dramatic events in history, have become enveloped in legend and misinformation, from which CECIL ROTH here tries to rescue them. Well known to our readers for his investigations into some of the more curious corners of Jewish history, Dr. Roth teaches at Oxford and is the author of many historical works, both Jewish and general. "Were the Sephardim Hidalgos?" (August 1955) was his last previous contribution to our pages.

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had been established in London, and when the Jews were ejected from the country in 1290 they left behind them in it a goodly number of erstwhile co-religionists.

The remarkable thing was, that although the Home continued into existence until the 17th century, it was never empty. Always, there were at the worst a handful (and sometimes more than a handful) of inmates. Sometimes, they were foreign converts who somehow or other turned up in England; sometimes, down to a full half-century after the Expulsion, they were English Jews who somehow or other had managed to evade the Edict of Expulsion, or perhaps had filtered back afterwards, and now yielded to force of circumstances; sometimes, Jews from abroad heard of this beneficent institution and the pension of three halfpence daily which it conferred on all its inmates, and came over expressly to become converted and enjoy its benefits. Among the latter, there was one picturesque adventurer who cut something of a figure in English history in the troubled period of the Wars of the Roses —a Portuguese Jew of dubious birth who after knifing a man in a quarrel came to England, was converted and took the name of Edward Brampton in honor of his godfather, the King of England, used the opportunity to obtain court patronage, became a soldier of fortune, married two wealthy heiresses in succession, was knighted and became governor of the Island of Guernsey, was the *eminence grise* who incited Perkin Warbeck to make his bid for the throne, and spent his last years back in his native Portugal as an honored English exile.

But besides these apostates there were numerous professing Jews who arrived from time to time: men like Master Elias the physician, who came from Flanders in 1309, apparently in the hopes of getting his co-religionists readmitted; Rabbi Saul Levi (later, as Paul de Santa Maria, to be bishop of his native Burgos and one of the most influential ecclesiastics in Spain), who spent a lonely Purim in London in 1389, when he was sent there by the King of Castile as a hostage; or Elias Sabot, the eminent and ubiquitous Italian physician, who arrived with a retinue of ten persons (obviously, he wanted to have a formal quorum or *minyan* for religious services) in order to attend on the ailing Henry IV in 1410. And every now and again the records reveal the presence of similar adventurers, scoundrels, or scholars.

These are of course mere collector's pieces with little serious application. On the other hand, in the 16th century a new atmosphere prevailed. The fresh facet of Anglo-Jewish history associated with this period is of really great historical significance, by no means restricted to Anglo-Jewish antiquarians. And indeed the story of the discovery of this new page is itself of considerable interest. Seventy years ago, Sir Sidney Lee (himself of Jewish birth, and later editor of the Dictionary of National Biography) was beginning his Shakespearean researches, and was very greatly intrigued by one problem: could Shakespeare ever have seen a Jew, and could the delineation of Shylock in the *Merchant of Venice* bear the slightest relation to actuality? Making a detailed study of the contemporary English literary and historical sources, Lee was able to find quite a remarkable number of references to the Jews, and he published a couple of articles on Jews in Shakespeare's England. At almost the same time, Lucien Wolf, perhaps the most gifted amateur ever to dabble in Jewish history, supplemented and absorbed these data in his own monograph on what he termed the "Middle Period" of Anglo-Jewish history, between the Expulsion and the Readmission. As a result of these two studies, it became plain that in Tudor England, and especially under Elizabeth, a number of Jews and Marranos made an appearance of longer or shorter duration in England, the most important being Dr. Roderigo Lopes, Elizabeth's physician, who was executed for treason against her in 1594.

This remained the state of our knowledge for something like fifty years. In the period following World War I, a couple of younger historians (I myself being one) came to the fore in England and began to

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make mild secondary contributions to the period which Wolf had hitherto regarded as his own preserve. He did not resent this, but goaded by it he resolved to put us in our place, which he did very effectively. He now produced in rapid succession two monumental papers on the Jews in Tudor and Elizabethan England, mainly based on manuscript materials from the Inquisitional Archives which he had long been assembling. These entirely revolutionized the accepted picture of Anglo-Jewish history at this period. And their significance was not by any means confined to this insular sphere. I hardly know any other articles or publications of recent years which have made quite so great a difference to our general picture of modern Jewish history. I may mention, as one of the mere by-products of Wolf's work, the hitherto unknown personality of Don Solomon Abenaes (formerly Alvaro Mendes) Duke of Mytilene—the romantic heir to the position of the Duke of Naxos and to his colonizing interest in Palestine, who has now been accepted by Israeli historians as one of the pioneers of Zionism.

Briefly, Wolf's great contribution to history was this. Formerly, the impression had been that the Marranos of Spain and Portugal had infiltrated in the generation or so after the Expulsion from those countries only into the various Mediterranean lands. Then, at the end of the 16th century, there began the massive Marrano emigration which was responsible for the establishment of the great Sephardi community of Amsterdam, which opened an entirely new chapter in European Jewish history; this being followed within the next half-century or so by the sister communities of Hamburg, London, the West Indies, and indeed New York.

The alternative picture presented by Wolf, which has now entered into Jewish historiography, was utterly different from this. Within a generation of the Forced Conversion in Portugal in 1497 (for that, rather than the Expulsion, was what ended the history of the declared Jewish communities in that country), New Christian (i.e. Marrano) immigrants began to infiltrate into all the seaports and commercial centers of Northern Europe, attracted not only, or not so much, by the opportunities to practice their religion there with a somewhat greater degree of safety, but also by the economic opportunities that these places offered in a period of rapidly expanding international commerce. They now began to observe Jewish practices, if they felt like it, with fewer qualms. But what first attracted most of them was the prospect of profitable livelihoods.

Of course, there were some whose main motivation was religious. There were others who emigrated from religious and economic motives combined. Very many removed themselves in due course to the Mediterranean lands and declared their Judaism openly. But the Jewish colonies in the Atlantic seaports were not composed entirely of the stuff of which martyrs were made. In due course, some of these colonies (such as that of Rouen) were uprooted; others (like Bordeau and Bayonne in France) continued for generations living a life of subterfuge; others (like Amsterdam) ultimately threw off their disguise and established open Jewish communities. But this was no sudden, dramatic episode as represented by older chroniclers, but the culmination of a process extending over the best part of a century, and linked with developments on a wider stage.

One of the most important Atlantic seaports and commercial centers was, of course, London, and here too the same process occurred as in the other places to which reference has been made. As the result of Wolf's researches, now supplemented in a minor degree by those of one or two scholars both Jewish and Gentile (the latter still attracted by the hypothetical Shakespearean associations of the subject), we now know that almost from the beginning of the 16th century, and almost continuously for a period of one hundred and fifty years, there was a Marrano colony in London with a subsidiary one for a time in Bristol. It varied from generation to generation in size, in importance, and in Jewish enthusiasms. But at one time or another it seems to have com-

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prised a number of figures who were to play a part of great importance in subsequent Jewish history, including Joseph Nasi and several of the famous Marrano physicians who shed luster on the 16th century.

There was a time at the close of the reign of Henry VIII when the London colony was of great significance in the mechanism of the Marrano Diaspora. We know that normally religious ceremonies were observed at home; sometimes, as it seems, there was a fully constituted secret synagogue. A large number of members of the group subsequently turn up on the Continent or in the Levant as fervent professing Jews. Lucien Wolf imagined that at the close of the reign of Henry VIII the colony was broken up, but the present writer found that this was based on a misinterpretation or rather double reading of the documents. On the other hand, he himself asserted on the basis of records in the Italian archives that there was a formal expulsion of the Marrano groups in 1609, but he in turn has been proved incorrect, as many of their members stayed on, and were indeed reinforced from abroad. In fact, what deterred the Marranos at certain periods from settling in England and induced the emigration of those already there was commercial stagnation more than anything else. The group was therefore sometimes larger and sometimes smaller, sometimes more fervent and sometimes less. But from the reign of Henry VIII onwards, such a colony was a perpetual part of the London scene. And it was part of the London scene when in 1655 Menasseh ben Israel arrived from Holland with his grandiloquent, pretentious scheme for securing the formal "Recall" of the Jews to England and the setting up under official auspices of a new, officially recognized community—with himself as presiding genius and rabbi.*

There is no need to give any details here of Menasseh's mission and his vicissitudes. Briefly: he waited on Oliver Cromwell, and secured his sympathy. But the all-powerful Lord Protector was unwilling to risk unpopularity by acceding to the petition on his own authority, and tried unsuccessfully time after time to get some other body to pronounce in favor of the proposals. All that happened was that, at the Whitehall Conference which he summoned to meet in December 1655 to consider the question, the judges present pronounced that there was no law which excluded the Jews from England. This itself was, from one point of view, a disappointment to Menasseh, who had hoped for the dramatic repeal of what turned out to be a non-existent Act of Parliament! A great deal of interest was aroused. There was a flurry of publications, *pro* and *contra*. There were some notable expressions of sympathy. But nothing tangible resulted.

As may well be imagined, Menasseh's self-imposed mission was regarded with anything but sympathy by the group of Marranos already living in London. They were happy enough as they were—living undisturbed, carrying on their trade with Amsterdam and Lisbon, observing Jewish rites in their homes or coming together for service much as they pleased without fear of disturbance. They required nothing more. They were uninterested in Menasseh's quasi-Messianic schemes, bound up with the problem of the Lost Ten Tribes and the hope of national regeneration. Indeed, they were unwilling to have attention called to their existence, which (so far as they were concerned) could not do much good, and might do a great deal of harm. For the most part, they would very much have preferred it if Menasseh had stayed at home. And indeed they had the experience of history on their side. None of the great Sephardi groups of Western Europe which were now beginning to play so important a role had come into existence as the result of a melodramatic gesture such as Menasseh was now proposing: all had been the result of a gradual evolution. It was a dispute not unlike that two and a half centuries later, between those

*The only detailed work which takes all this into account is my *History of the Jews in England* (Oxford University Press, second edition, 1949) to which the reader is referred for further details to supplement the present wide generalizations.

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Zionist leaders who favored political, and those who favored practical, work for asserting the Jewish claims in Palestine.

In the spring of 1656, circumstances forced the two sides temporarily together. The outbreak of war with Spain endangered the position of the members of the Marrano colony, most of them of Spanish birth; and alarmed by the opening of proceedings against one of the group, Antonio Rodrigues Robles, they decided to declare themselves openly as Jews. They now therefore joined Menasseh in presenting a new and far more modest petition to Oliver Cromwell, this time simply asking for permission to perform divine service in their private houses without molestation and to acquire a burial ground for the interment of their dead. Once again, Cromwell tried to devolve the responsibility on the members of his Council and, failing in this, did nothing at all except (as it seems) to inform the petitioners in private that, while he would not formally grant their petition, he had no objection to their acting as though he had done so. This must have been in the early summer of 1656, and from this episode the Tercentenary of British Jewry has been reckoned. Within a few months of this, as a matter of fact, the first London synagogue was consecrated.*

All this was a bitter disappointment for Menasseh, who had been hoping, petitioning, and working for something very different and far more ambitious—a formal action readmitting the Jews or, at the very least, even at the last desperate stage, authorizing the practice of Judaism. He was so disillusioned that, as a recently discovered document shows, he even went so far as to return to the community of Amsterdam the scroll of the Torah which had been given him as a symbolic gift to the new community; in his opinion no new community (at least in the sense in which he conceived it) had been founded. He retired to Holland, abandoned by his fellow Jews but fortified by a gift from the Lord Protector, to die a broken man, his dearest wish unfulfilled. There can be no doubt that his efforts had been responsible for the creation of a new and more favorable atmosphere in England, and also for the declaration that there was no law excluding the Jews from the country; but that was all. Otherwise, he left the Marrano community much as he had found it, only more assured of its position and venturing a little more courageously out into the open.

But in the long run it turned out that what had happened was providential. Within a couple of years, Charles II had been triumphantly restored to his throne, and the legislation of the Commonwealth was automatically reversed. There cannot be the slightest doubt that, had Menasseh been what he would have considered successful in 1655/6, and had Cromwell or his Council admitted the Jews formally to the country, this would now have been canceled, and Jews who had come to settle in England would have been chased out—together with the Marranos already established in England. Obviously, the latter's fears had not been exaggerated. Now, since nothing had been done, there was nothing to undo. Under Charles II, after a little initial nervousness, the incipient community reverted to the process of slow, unostentatious consolidation, being able to insure themselves before long of the "Merry Monarch's" good-natured sympathy. There were one or two attempts made to disturb them, but by the end of his reign their position was solidly established and could be considered reasonably safe. The ultimate factor was not propa-

*Since this article was written, Dr. Roth has made what he considers the most important historical discovery of his career, which fundamentally affects what historians (including himself) have formerly believed about the circumstances of the Resettlement of the Jews in England. Briefly, he has found evidence which shows conclusively that in spite of what was formerly stated, the petition of Menasseh ben Israel and his associates asking for permission to practice Judaism in England (and by inference in the American colonies as well!) was considered and actually granted by the Council of State on June 25, 1656. Subsequently the minute recording this decision was for some mysterious reason removed from the Order Book and destroyed. This startling discovery does not, however, invalidate the substance and conclusions of the present article.—Ed.

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ganda, not Messianism, not legislation, but something entirely different.

It may be said that with the Restoration the British people resolved to reconcile itself after certain hesitations and disruptions to a state of religious pluralism, subject to the recognition of the overriding rights of the national church. A country that desired to assert its dominant position in international trade could hardly decide otherwise. In such circumstances, there was room for all forms of religious divergence, and even for Judaism. Indeed, though Judaism might be more alien than other forms, it was not more obnoxious, for it is notorious that intimate divergences always engender the greatest bitterness. What people dreaded was the possibility of Catholic dominance, with its political implications, or of a recurrence of Puritan dominance, with its restrictions on individual liberty. Whether or not there was a synagogue in London hardly mattered when such threats had to be faced.

One thing that is very significant is the part played in all this by the Judiciary. It was the two judges present at the Whitehall Conference, Glynne and Steele, who were responsible for the all-important declaration that there was no law which forbade the residence of Jews in England. Later on, during the disturbed period which followed Cromwell's death, rabble-raisers applied more than once in the courts for action to be taken against the Jews: the applications were in both cases dismissed, almost contemptuously. If there was nothing illegal in the residence of the Jews in England, then facilities must be given to them to carry on normal activities: and the courts recognized that they should be allowed to take an oath in a form conformable with their consciences (not the degrading Continental Jewish oath) and should not be compelled to appear on the Sabbath. Marriages contracted according to Jewish religious forms were recognized as legal and binding by the English courts. The process of the Resettlement, then, though not recognized by statute, grew up under the protection of the Judiciary and the Common Law.

HENCE, from 1660 onwards, there developed in London not a Jewish community based on Menasseh ben Israel's theories, but one based on Marrano realities. This was the all-important factor which henceforth shaped Anglo-Jewish history and profoundly influenced the development of Jewish life in all the English-speaking lands. Menasseh had wanted an authorized community, admitted under conditions, and therefore subject to certain regulations such as existed at this time in many places on the Continent. He envisaged the appointment of an officer to control the immigration and supervise the conduct of Jews, the payment of a special tribute, limitations of number, and settlement only in certain specified places. He would certainly have been prepared to acquiesce in restriction of occupation and of area of residence, probably a ghetto, perhaps even the Badge of Shame. But he failed, and the informal community which developed out of the Marrano colony in consequence of his failure knew nothing of all this. Not being authorized, the colony could not be regulated, and not being regulated, it knew hardly any restrictions other than those shared with other members of dissenting faiths. From the moment of the Resettlement the Jews thus enjoyed a degree of freedom in England paralleled in no other country of the Western world—not even Holland.

They could live wherever they pleased—in any city of the realm, and in any street or area of the place of their choice—nothing being imposed in the nature of a ghetto. They could dress as they pleased, in the height of fashion or in complete disregard of it, nothing in the nature of the Jewish Badge being required. They could engage in any industry or occupation they pleased, and in very nearly every profession. They could have Christian servants in their houses. They could set up factories and employ as many hands as they wished for the manufacture of whatever commodities they desired. They could appear in courts of law and carry on litigation without the necessity of submitting to a degrading form of oath. Though there was some idea that Jews could

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not own freeholds, owing to a recently unearthed medieval "statute," they could nevertheless acquire property on 999-year leases at nominal rent, and within a generation of the Return we find them setting up as country gentlemen—and being accepted as such by their neighbors. They mixed with Gentile society—landed, scientific, literary—on their own merits. They became from an early date members of the august Royal Society, and Jewish physicians attended on the highest in the land. They accumulated fortunes, and did not have to fear that they would not be able to enjoy them, for they were subject to no special taxation or tribute. It was precisely on the basis of the negative outcome of the negotiations of 1655/6, the Tercentenary of which is now being celebrated, that Anglo-Jewry was able to plant such sure foundations.

I HAVE retold the traditional story here in exaggeratedly simple terms, even at the risk of creating a false impression. *Of course,* Menasseh ben Israel's mission was not useless. *Of course,* his petitions and his propaganda and his personal advocacy and the Whitehall Conference played a great part in smoothing the way for the Resettlement. But, in effect, all this did no more than accelerate the process, or if you please lubricate the engine. The Marrano community would in any case have come out into the open within a few years in much the same way as it did, even if Menasseh had never come to England and Cromwell never read the Bible. Unless the English religious scene or economic outlook had radically changed, the Resettlement would have taken place in much the same way quite apart from these dramatic accidents. It was the fruit of circumstances, not of propaganda.

We must always remember this in considering the history of the English-speaking peoples, and the same is true, I think, of the Jewish communities of the English-speaking world, perhaps particularly so of the mother country. We hate declarations of principle. We always prefer to face problems as they arise, and deal with them practically and pragmatically, rather than consider hypothetical circumstances. If thereafter our political or legal theorists manage to discern a philosophical coherence in our expedients and subterfuges, they are welcome, but this will not affect the way in which we face our next problem and difficulty. In 1648, an attempt was made to extend religious toleration in England to all persons of whatever religious belief, and in terms which would have included the Jews (echoing the principles which Roger Williams had envisaged for the colony of Rhode Island). But it failed, to some persons' intense disappointment. Similarly, when in 1655 Menasseh ben Israel petitioned for the "Recall" of the Jews to England, he was heart-broken at the negative result. The English genius preferred to wait until it was faced with the fact of the presence of Jews in England, and then determine how they should be enabled to adjust themselves in English society. It was distressingly un-Messianic. It was hopelessly illogical. But it worked.

In brief: not despite, but because of, Menasseh ben Israel's failure to secure the formal Recall of the Jews to England in 1655/6, the Jewish colony, which even before this had already begun to establish itself informally in the country, were able to live, within certain limitations, normal English lives—and these limitations, it is important to note, were for the most part shared by Christian non-conformists of various denominations. Inevitably, the same applied (as I tried to show in an article in the February 1954 number of COMMENTARY, at the time of the American Tercentennial celebrations) in the English colonies beyond the Atlantic—to a somewhat greater degree, indeed, in view of the greater ease and informality of life in these. Thus, what happened in England during the discussions of 1655/6 inevitably affected, for the good, American Jewish history as well. It is as certain, I think, as any historical hypothesis can be that, had Menasseh ben Israel succeeded in his mission, the development of American Jewish life would have been less genial and easy than was in fact the case.

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AMERICA, BRITAIN, AND THE MIDDLE EAST

For a Policy of Strength

G. F. HUDSON

WHEN the news broke last year that Egypt was to receive arms from the Soviet bloc the comment of one British observer with long experience of the Middle East was simply "At last!" What he found surprising was not that the rulers of the Soviet Union had in 1955 moved to upset the precarious balance of forces in the Middle East, but that they had not done so before. The explanation of their delay in exploiting such obvious opportunities for mischief is probably to be found partly in preoccupations elsewhere, and partly in developments within the Middle East which have created a new situation there during the last twelve months.

There was, of course, an initial Soviet attempt to break through into the Middle East just after the end of the Second World War, when Russia failed to withdraw her occupation troops from Persia by the date agreed on with America and Britain, and protected a separatist revolt in Persian Azerbaijan. This first move was a fiasco, for Persia appealed to the United Nations; America and Britain made a firm stand on the agreement; Russia climbed down, and the revolt collapsed as soon as the Russian troops were taken out of the country. Russia's unwillingness on this occasion to go through with the original policy after it had run into strong opposition may be attributed primarily to the priority accorded to European commitments; Russian control in Eastern Europe was still at that time far from being consolidated, and it would have been imprudent to force a showdown with the Western powers over Persia in clear breach of treaty obligations when these powers appeared so acquiescent in the westward extension of the Soviet empire.

When tensions later developed in Europe over the Berlin blockade and the secession of Yugoslavia, Russia had her hands full in that quarter. Then in 1950 the storm center shifted to the Far East and Russian policy had to take account of a possible spread of the Korean War. Only after positions had been more or less stabilized both in Europe and in the Far East could Moscow concentrate its attention on the affairs of the Middle East. And by that time the possibilities for effective action without the direct use of force had become greater than they had ever been before. With the emergence of Colonel Nasser as dictator of Egypt, an opportunity was presented such as had not existed in the days of King Farouk, or even as long as the national revolution was under the leadership of General Naguib.

CONTINUING the discussion in these pages of the present Middle Eastern crisis, G. F. HUDSON here sets forth a policy by which the United States and Britain, he feels, can best advance the interests of the free world—and of peace. One of COMMENTARY's regular contributors, Mr. Hudson is a widely recognized authority on Asian affairs and now serves as director of the Center for Far Eastern Studies of St. Antony's College in Oxford, England. His last previous appearance in this magazine was with "What Is the Iron Curtain For?" in the December 1955 number.

AT NO period since the original Bolshevik revolution has Communist subversive activity been successful in either Turkey or Persia. The Turkey of Kemal Ataturk was for years in relations of quasi-alliance with Russia—for it was the Western victors of the First World War, and not Bolshevik Russia, which tried to impose on Turkey the Treaty of Sèvres. And there was a disposition in Turkey to draw parallels between the Soviet and Kemalist regimes as

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modernizing and anti-imperialist movements. But the strong and intensely nationalist government of Kemal would not tolerate any Communist activity inside Turkey, and memories of two centuries of conflicts and wars with Russia made the Turks vigilant for any signs of a revival of Czarist imperialism. The Soviet attempt to intimidate Turkey in 1940 only aroused Turkish antagonism, which was intensified when Moscow demanded joint control of the Straits in 1946. American support under the Truman Doctrine enabled Turkey to resist a pressure that might otherwise have been overwhelming, and later on Turkey together with Greece joined NATO, thus extending the defensive organization of the "Atlantic" countries to the Eastern Mediterranean and the highlands of Ararat.

Even with these alliances, however, and the military aid forthcoming from the United States to strengthen her national defenses, Turkey remained in a highly exposed and vulnerable strategic position. For in addition to a frontier with the Soviet Union to the northeast, another with Bulgaria to the northwest, and a dangerous proximity to Russian bases in the Crimea across the Black Sea, she had long boundaries to the east and southeast with Persia, Iraq, and Syria—weak neutral countries which might in the event of war be coerced into joining Russia or giving free passage to Russian armies. Hence the Turkish anxiety for a pact which would prolong the NATO defense system eastward and make allies of at least Persia and Iraq. It was Turkish diplomacy that took the initiative in the negotiations that led to the Baghdad Pact.

Persia has long been, and still is, superficially much more vulnerable to Communist penetration than Turkey. Persia has not undergone any such thoroughgoing modernist transformation as the Kemalist revolution in Turkey, and its social structure has remained relatively "feudal," with extremes of wealth and poverty admirably suited to the needs of revolutionary propaganda. But the Persians, like the Turks, had long memories of past Russian pressures and conquests, and their nationalism was at least as much anti-Russian as anti-Western.

The Persian move to expropriate the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was preceded by a refusal to grant Russia an oil concession in northern Persia, and even during the height of the conflict with Britain the Persians were careful to avoid bidding for Russian support. The British on their side refrained from using force at Abadan, and when the dispute was finally settled by negotiation, the Persians became convinced that there was no longer any threat from Britain to their political or economic independence. On the other hand, the alarming activities of the Persian Communists (the Tudeh party), together with the presence of Russian military power on two land frontiers, disposed the Persian government to seek reinforcement of its security, and the way was open for a pact uniting Turkey, Iraq, Persia, Pakistan, and Britain in a defensive alliance.

THE line of containment of the Soviet empire established by NATO in Europe was thus extended eastward into the middle of Asia, and the new security system appeared at the outset to have provided a substantial addition to the defensive strength of the free world. There was, however, a vital difference between the Baghdad Pact and the older organization of NATO. Unlike NATO, the new league was not buttressed by the power and moral support of the United States.

Logically, the policy which led the United States first to protect Greece and Turkey under the Truman Doctrine and then to participate in the collective defense of Western Europe, and also in a series of similar defensive pacts in Southeast Asia and the Far East, should have implied completion of the line by endorsement of a pact to cover the Middle East as well. But American policy in the Middle East was something apart, unrelated to American policy in the rest of the world.

Traditionally, the Middle East had been outside the range of American foreign pol-

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icy; there had not been any important American interest in the area. But by 1955 the United States had acquired a stake in the Middle East which, instead of strengthening her over-all position in world politics, rendered her subject to an unlimited blackmail by the most backward and benighted state in Asia. An American-owned oil industry sprang up in the deserts of Saudi Arabia, and in connection with it there was the leased air base at Dhahran. These concessions held by favor of the Saudi king made it the cardinal principle of American Middle Eastern policy to avoid giving offense in any way to that august ruler.

This meant in practice that America must not get on the wrong side of any one of his three ruling hatreds—hatred of the rival dynasty reigning in Iraq, hatred of Britain as a protector of minor principalities of Arabia whose territories he coveted, and hatred of Israel in the common cause of the Arab world. The United States must not, therefore, join the Baghdad Pact of which both Iraq and Britain were members, and must not guarantee Israel against a war of *revanche* by the Arab League.

In the summer of last year, however, this paralysis of American policy in the Middle East did not seem likely to have tragic consequences because neither the Baghdad Pact countries nor Israel appeared to be in any immediate danger. The threat of a major war was considered to have receded, and though it was extremely risky for Britain to undertake commitments of alliance with so exposed and vulnerable a country as Persia except in partnership with the United States, it might be hoped that Russia would be deterred from any move against Persia by the possibility that America would in the end be involved if Britain were at war, even without a specific underwriting of the Baghdad Pact. Israel likewise seemed reasonably secure against serious attack—as distinct from the guerrilla raids of the *fedayeen*—because the limitation of arms supplies to the Middle East under the Tripartite Pact on Palestine prevented the Arab states from acquiring an equipment of modern weapons sufficient for the launching of an aggressive war with any prospect of success.

But this situation afforded Moscow an opportunity which it boldly grasped. Without making war or even fomenting a Communist insurrection, Russia was able to transform the political situation in the Middle East and win for herself a predominant influence in the rear of the Baghdad Pact defensive line merely by offering arms to the uncommitted Arab states, and in the first place to Egypt. Both America and Britain seem to have been taken entirely by surprise by this move, yet it was always an obvious possibility, given a Russian desire to create disturbance in the area. An embargo can only be fully effective if the power or powers applying it have a monopoly, and the West had no monopoly of surplus armaments.

The consequence of a supplementary supply of arms to Egypt, and even of the mere prospect of such a supply, could only be to give Colonel Nasser a new freedom of action to pursue his aims. These ran parallel to the policies of Saudi Arabia, but the overriding purpose was different. For Egypt, as for Saudia, the enemies were Britain, Iraq, and Israel (with the addition of France), but all local issues were subordinated to the supreme aim of Egyptian leadership in the Arab world. Nasser's personal power in Egypt was to be the basis of a policy of arousing and exploiting the forces of pan-Arab nationalism in order to create a federation under Egyptian supremacy, with elimination of all residues of Western colonialism, from Morocco to the Persian Gulf. And success in this policy was to confirm Nasser's dictatorship in his own country.

This grand design determined the lines of the Egyptian political offensive. Iraq was attacked, not because of the dynastic alignment which made her hateful to the Saudis, but as being the only other Arab state which could dispute with Egypt the leadership of the Arab world, and because she had defied Egyptian authority by entering into a pact with non-Arab nations without Cairo's consent. Britain was attacked,

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not so much because of her remaining imperial possessions and protectorates in Arabia (though the termination of these was part of the pan-Arab program), as because of the challenge to Egyptian ascendancy involved in the special British relations with Iraq and Jordan.

Finally, Israel was the target of the new Egyptian revisionism, not merely because of Egypt's own anti-Israeli emotions or in the hope of wiping out the disgrace of defeat in the previous Palestine war, but above all, because to stand forth as champion of the anti-Israeli cause seemed the best way to command the allegiance of the whole Arab world and (with the assistance of intensive radio propaganda) to draw the masses of the Arab countries into Cairo's orbit even against the wishes of their respective governments. Even Iraq, for all her resentment of Egyptian tutelage, was susceptible to the pull from Cairo when the question of Palestine was involved, so that aggravation of the tension with Israel was also a means of breaking Iraq away from the solidarity of the Baghdad Pact.

The United States was not directly a target for Nasserite animosity, for unlike Britain, she had neither territorial holdings in Arab countries nor membership in the Baghdad Pact. But indirectly, the United States was also an enemy because under the Tripartite Pact on Palestine she was committed to preventing Egypt from becoming strong enough to attack Israel. For the attainment of the desired superiority over Israel, Nasser could only look to a power which had no interest in maintaining peace in the Middle East, but on the contrary aimed at producing tension and crisis. Such a power was at hand, ready to provide arms of the most modern type and technicians to give training in their use, hostile to just those states with which Egypt was at enmity, and not a party to the Tripartite Pact. Thus the Moscow-Cairo axis came into being.

There was only one adequate countermove for the Tripartite Pact powers in response to the Russian arming of Egypt. This was for them to make explicit and definite the responsibility which they had already undertaken to preserve the armistice in Palestine, and to warn Egypt without ambiguity that any serious armed attack on Israel would automatically mean for Egypt war with America, Britain, and France. In addition to such a commitment for keeping the peace by their own power, or even without it, it was the plain duty of the Tripartite Pact powers, in accordance with the principles on which they had agreed to act, to provide Israel with enough arms to balance those which the Arabs were obtaining from Russia and thus enable Israel on her own to deter the Arab states from aggression or defend herself effectively if attacked.

But instead of tackling the situation with resolution and in concert with one another, the Western powers began to run away from the crisis as soon as it arose. The American government found it could not reinforce the Tripartite Pact or supply arms to Israel because this would be displeasing to the Saudi king and might endanger Aramco oil and the Dhahran air base. The British government was no less alarmed at the prospect that Egyptian displeasure would upset the recently concluded agreement on the Suez Canal and increase the Egyptian opposition to the Baghdad Pact.

It was in an ill-considered attempt to resolve the Arab-Israeli crisis and at the same time to placate Egypt that Sir Anthony Eden made his disastrous Mansion House speech on November 9th of last year, when he advocated a territorial settlement based on a "compromise" between the armistice line and the superseded United Nations partition line of 1947—in return for which he apparently hoped that the Arab states would be graciously pleased to terminate their "state of war" against Israel. As Israel naturally refused to enter into any negotiation on the basis of large-scale territorial cessions, the only effect of this move was to make matters worse, for the Egyptians were now convinced that they could go ahead without risk of British or American intervention, and that the paying course of action would be to

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step up political pressure and prepare for war.

As the situation deteriorated, both American and British official publicity began to dwell on the dangers of an "arms race" as a reason for not supplying arms to Israel. The arguments put forward were curiously reminiscent of those used by appeasers in the days of the Spanish civil war, when it was held that in order to avoid a conflict among the great powers, Britain and France should respond to the Italo-German arming of Franco by withholding arms from the Spanish Republic. There was the difference, however, that the Axis powers in 1936 at least pretended to adhere to the Non-Intervention Agreement, whereas Russia has openly rejected all appeals for halting the flow of arms to Nasserite Egypt.

The attempts to win the heart of Nasser with gifts and promises have continued. The anti-British *coup d'état* in Jordan, brought about by Egyptian intrigue and propaganda, only strengthened the British determination to be reconciled with Egypt at all costs; while Mr. Dulles was busy explaining to Senators—not indeed very convincingly—why the policy principle of strengthening nations threatened with attack by, or with the help of, Communist states did not apply to Israel.

The situation would nevertheless have become distinctly embarrassing for British and American statesmen had it not been that there was always a way out, a perfectly respectable exit from national responsibilities. There was the United Nations. Let the Security Council, with its built-in veto, take charge of the matter: then there would be no need for the United States or Britain to do anything. Neither Egypt nor Saudi Arabia would be able to object to the jurisdiction of the world organization in their dispute with Israel, and Israel would be safeguarded against attack—provided, of course, that Russia did not use the veto to block any action by the Security Council in the event of war. Russia has now delighted all her admirers and won golden opinions everywhere by supporting the reference of the Palestine problem to the Security Council, which is exactly what it was the aim of her policy to bring about, since it means that nothing can be done without Russia's consent and cooperation. Russia strives to become the arbiter of Middle Eastern affairs by first arming aggressive forces and then offering her services as peacemaker and mediator.

Afraid to take the only steps which can decisively stop the drift towards war in the Middle East, and yet unwilling simply to connive at an Arab attack on Israel, the American and British governments have been plunging ever deeper into an incoherent muddle of contradictory actions which bring them no nearer to a solution of their troubles. It was reported that at the recent NATO conference the Greek Foreign Minister twice asked for guidance on a Czech request for permission to fly Czech-built aircraft across Greece to Egypt, and, receiving no answer from the American or British representatives, indicated that he took their silence as consent. Thus NATO, which exists to contain Soviet expansion, is prepared to facilitate Soviet aggression by proxy in the Middle East.

On the other hand, the American government has explained to its allies that, while itself unwilling to send arms to Israel, it will not object if limited supplies (which might come from America in the first place) were to reach Israel from Canada or France. Thus Mr. Dulles will be able to tell the Saudi Ambassador that America is not arming Israel and that there can be no reason for reprisals against Aramco, but he will have the satisfaction of knowing that Israel is getting some arms and his conscience will be clear if he is accused of promoting a Soviet-Arab aggression.

In one way and another, indeed by great efforts and at great expense, Israel will probably succeed in obtaining enough weapons of an up-to-date type to put up a not hopeless fight if attacked by a Soviet-equipped Arab League. But such reinforcement of Israel will almost certainly not be sufficient to deter the Arabs from ultimately resorting to the arbitrament of war. The

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Arab nationalists, as their spokesmen have repeatedly made clear, are not interested in local adjustments of the frontier or in any relief for the refugees which would leave them outside Israel territory. Their objection is to the existence of Israel as an independent state and their purpose is its complete extinction. If they were to accept a settlement which left Israel still in existence, it could only be one which by territorial cessions destroyed the economic and strategic viability of the Israeli state and made the final liquidation only a matter of time.

It follows that Arab tactics must be to wait for the maturing of their new Soviet-created military power, and then to work up a crisis with threats of war in order to extort from Israel, with the endorsement of the great powers, concessions fatal to her national existence. If Israel refused to yield, war would be bound to follow, even if some Arab leaders should think that they could gain their ends without it; for the prestige of the Arab governments, and particularly of Colonel Nasser, would be too deeply committed to make withdrawal possible.

Once war had begun, it would almost certainly prove impossible to localize it. The Security Council, at the mercy of the Russian veto, would be incapable of intervention on Israel's behalf, but the Western powers, confronted with the harsh reality of Soviet-sponsored aggression in the Middle East, would be driven, if only by the revolt of public opinion in their own countries against policies which had led to such an outcome, to take some kind of action to assist Israel. The story of Korea would be enacted all over again. Early in 1950, official statements in Washington indicated that America would do nothing to protect South Korea if the latter were attacked. But when the North Koreans, encouraged to expect that there would be no foreign intervention, launched their invasion across the frontier, America did intervene, and the sequel was three years of war which threatened at one time to develop into a full-scale struggle of the great power blocs.

The only way to avoid a repetition of what happened in Korea is for the Western powers to reanimate the Tripartite Pact and declare without equivocation that they will automatically be at war with any state launching an offensive in force across the Palestine armistice line. In other words, the only way in which war in the Middle East can definitely be averted is for the Western powers to guarantee the existing frontiers of Israel, and not "agreed frontiers"—the fatal formula which can have no other effect than to encourage the Arabs to a policy of blackmail ending in armed hostilities.

A Nasser is not to be turned aside by moral suasion, but only by the clear realization that the course on which he has embarked—but on which he has not yet gone too far to be able to draw back—will lead him into war not merely with Israel, but with three great powers.

If this certainty were once grasped by Nasser and his allies, they would adapt themselves to it and eventually negotiate with Israel on the basis of the existing frontiers. Russia is not going to fight the Western powers simply in order to enable Egypt to destroy Israel, and the Arab states will not be strong enough by themselves to fight the Western powers plus Israel.

IF, THEREFORE, the Western governments can muster enough courage to tell Nasser that his blackmail has got to stop, and if they can face the temporary increase of unpleasantness in Western-Arab relations that this must involve, war can be ruled out. It cannot be ruled out otherwise. As long as the Arabs think they can wage it against Israel alone without any Western intervention, they will follow the course which must lead to it, and no tours by the Secretary General of the United Nations or talks in the veto-bound Security Council will avail in the long run to avert it. The responsibility lies with the statesmen in Washington, London, and Paris, who have to choose between keeping the peace by a difficult, but necessary, decision and continuing to drift through ambiguity, evasion, and wishful make-believe towards a bloody catastrophe.

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STALINISM VERSUS STALIN

Exorcising a Stubborn Ghost

BERTRAM D. WOLFE

MUCH analysis of the Soviet Union applies, unconsciously, a variant of the myth of "inevitable progress." Since everything changes, runs the argument, the totalist state, too, must change. And since it is hard to imagine anything worse, the change must be for the better.

Every "right feint" in the perpetual reversals of field that accompany the attempt to break through to one and the same goal, has in its day been hailed as the long awaited "inevitable change," the "sobering that comes from the responsibilities of power," the "response to the pressure of reality," the "mellowing process that sooner or later overtakes all militant movements," the "preordained downward curve in the parabola of revolution," the "diffusion of authority which could lead to a constitutional order," the rise of a "rationalist technocracy," or of a "limited and traditionalist despotism," the "inevitable work of erosion upon the totalitarian edifice." (Each of these formulae is quoted from some highly respected authority on Russian affairs.)

As early as 1921, when Lenin introduced the Nep, it was pronounced a yielding to economic reality and a making of peace with the Russian people. "Socialism in one country" was hailed as a break with the Lenin-Trotsky aim of world revolution. The Constitution of 1936 was the beginning of democracy and a reign of law, and of peace with the Soviet people. "Popular Front" and the Litvinov line were an abandonment of class war, an alliance with progressive countries and parties, a renunciation of the dogma of the inevitability of imperialist war. The Grand Alliance evoked illusions inside as well as outside Russia. The "Geneva Spirit" had scarcely been dispelled when fresh illusions sprang from the 20th Congress and the desanctification of Stalin.

All these expectations of change involve the same two fundamentals: peace with the Soviet people and peace with the world. Which brings us to the essence of totalitarianism—twofold war: an unending one on its own people to re-make them in the image of its blueprint for man; and on the rest of the world to conquer it for Communism.

If it is regarded as but "the latest variant of age-old tyranny and absolutism," totalitarianism cannot be understood at all. Traditional absolutism had as its fundamental aim the maintaining of the status quo: a freezing of the present or a return to the past. But totalitarianism is dedicated to "the future." It has a vested interest in keeping things in flux, in permanent revolution from above: to create as rapidly as the recalcitrant human material will permit, a new man, a new society, and a new world.

Moreover, even the ancient absolutisms had staying powers that the fashionable dogmas of "dynamic sociology" cannot account for. Monarchical absolutism grew and expanded for several centuries. Czarist autocracy lasted for more than three. Oriental

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THE significance of the recent 20th Party Congress of the Russian Communist party is here explored by a noted expert in the history of Bolshevism. BERTRAM D. WOLFE was born in 1896 in Brooklyn—where he still lives—and was educated at City College, Columbia, and the University of Mexico. Formerly Chief of the Ideological Advisory Staff of the Voice of America, he has now returned to independent writing. He is the author of a life of Diego Rivera, of the authoritative *Three Who Made a Revolution* (1948), and of the recently published *Six Keys to the Soviet System* (Beacon). His last previous article in these pages was "Professor Carr's 'Wave of the Future'" in March 1955.

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despotism survived ebb and flow, invasion and upheaval, for millennia. The key question is whether totalitarianism, too, may not manifest built-in staying powers which, through all the changes so far, have tended to enlarge its fundamental characteristics rather than to "erode" them.

WHEN Joseph Stalin died, Bolshevism was fifty years old. Founded by Lenin in 1903, it had had only two authoritative leaders; they had set upon it, successively, the stamp of their personalities, methods, conceptions. Lenin ruled twenty years, from 1903 to 1923, during the last six of which he also ruled over Russia. Stalin ruled both party and government for thirty years, from 1923 to 1953.

Quite properly, attempts to write a history of the Russian Revolution have had the character of biographical histories. In the more stable context of the 19th century, it was possible for historians to believe that they could write largely in terms of institutions and impersonal forces. But in an age when "movements" assault the citadels of power, subvert the established order, and remake society according to their blueprints, the character, the passions, the ideas, the practices of the founder and shaper of the movement become of prime importance. How can one write of Nazism without Hitler, or of Bolshevism without Lenin and Stalin?

Lenin's Marxism was so different from Marx's, so formed by his personality and the Russian heritage, that the friendly Charles Rappaport dubbed it *marxisme à la tartare*. When Stalin took over Lenin's party machine, government, and doctrine, he set upon them a "Caucasian Mountain" stamp. Yet the changes he introduced involved the enlarging of basic elements in Lenin's doctrine and method, and were made within the framework of Lenin's machine, his monopoly of power, and his determination to transform the world.

Stalin's heirs have inherited a totally atomized society; a completely centralized and "monolithic" party; a single-party state; a doctrine of infallibility of "the summit"; a completely collectivized and statized agriculture; a powerful, if one-sided, forced-tempo industrialization; the techniques and momentum of a succession of "Five Year Plans," of which the current one is the Sixth; a completely controlled culture; a regime of absolute force and continuous psychological warfare on their own people; a system of promotion, demotion, correction of error, and elimination of difference through permanent purge; a method of advance through zigzags toward unchanging goals; a commitment to permanent revolution from above until the Soviet subject has been re-made and Communism has won the world. It is within this framework that Stalin's heirs have taken over the land where "Socialism has already been achieved and Communism is being built."

THERE is a fundamental difficulty in the leader principle which, as Karl Popper has written,

> makes the very idea of selecting future leaders self-contradictory. . . . The authoritarian will select those who obey, who believe, who respond to his influence. But in doing so, he is bound to select mediocrities. . . . Never can an authoritarian admit that the intellectually courageous, i.e., those who defy authority, may be the most valuable. . . .

Even Lenin wondered after one of his purges whether "If you expel all the insufficiently obedient but intelligent people and are left with none but the obedient fools, will you not surely destroy the party?"

Joseph Stalin, less sure of his merits, more reckless with the lives of all who doubted, or who earned his distrust, surrounded himself with more mediocre men. Why, one asks as one studies them, are these men at the head of a great people? What made Molotov and Voroshilov into representatives of "Old Bolshevism" if not that Stalin had killed off their betters? The "new" men at the top in the USSR today are Stalin's men. He owes his place and cult to them, and in a deeper sense they owe their place to him. They made the purges, and were made by

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by them. In a time when it took service to the cult, bloody activity, special luck, and an unusual talent for survival, these are the ones that survived.

Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Bulganin, Khrushchev, and Malenkov, who fill seven of the eleven places in the "new" party Presidium, are Stalin's old nine-man Politburo, minus Beria and Stalin. Though they "represent" generations that no longer exist, they have an absolute majority in the Presidium. Pervukhin and Saburov are engineers wholly trained under the new regime, and then turned overseer-politicians. Stalin added them to the Presidium at the 19th Congress.

Since Stalin's death, two more members have been acquired, Kirichenko and Suslov. Both were admitted to the Presidium, not at the "sovereign" 20th Congress, but seven months earlier, at the same time that they, along with three others, were added to Khrushchev's party Secretariat. Thus the Presidium now consists of Stalin's men plus two of Khrushchev's.*

Given a great country with 200,000,000 inhabitants and the world's largest empire to experiment with, the members of the Presidium have learned other trades besides those of faction lieutenant and courtier—just as the subalterns of the beheaded Red Army who took command after its five thousand top officers were purged in 1937-38 finally learned the trade of general after losing to Hitler an empire eighteen times the size of France and an army of over five million men.

But the cult in whose service they rose to positions of power systematically dwarfed them at the same time. The Stalin cult, in its swollen, sky-filling form, could not survive Stalin's death. For what right did such dwarfed men have to be individual or even "collective" dictators? Moreover, in the end they had been irked by Stalin's arrogation of the credit for all they did, thought up, and even ghost-wrote for him. (The real leadership of the USSR was always more "collective" than the cult had admitted while Stalin was alive, or than his surviving collaborators will acknowledge now that they are trying to acquire credit by denouncing it.) And they had been moved to fear and secret hatred by the precariousness of their positions. Their cold funeral addresses testified that Stalin had exacted such exaggerated "posthumous" tribute in life that there was no reserve left to call on after his death.

For six hours and ten minutes they concealed the fact of death while around the corpse they made their calculations, deals, and plans. Then there came from them, not a cry of grief, but of alarm: a call to maintain "steel, monolithic unity . . . political vigilance . . . intolerance against inner and outer foe. . . insure uninterrupted leadership . . . avoid disorder and panic." The first post-Stalin number of *Kommunist* (March 9, 1953) called for "collective work, collective leadership, and monolithic unity." Eighteen days after the greatest genius of all lands and times had breathed his last, an issue of *Pravda* appeared without a single mention of his name. Thus the struggle with Stalin's ghost, discovered by our press at the 20th Congress, began before the corpse was cold.

In a land where absolute power is supposed to permit the control of all things spiritual and material, "Operation Cutdown" was intended to be carefully timed, spaced out, controlled, and planned. They tried out the ghost for size, experimented with different formulae, skipped the commemoration of one of his birthdays altogether, then gave him considerable praise on the next.

In the fashion he himself had taught them, they unloaded on him responsibility for those parts of the Stalinist program or tactics which had become outmoded. Thus Stalin had borrowed American technique in the thirties and used American military help in the forties, but when the Soviet armies came back from the West stirred by what they had seen, Stalin and his band had to start a great drive against "kow-towing to

*For an analysis of the Candidate (Alternate) members of the Presidium, and particularly Zhukov, see the writer's article in the forthcoming July 1956 *Foreign Affairs*.

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the West" and "cosmopolitanism," at the risk of having their absurd claims that Russians had invented everything prevent for a while their learning further from Western technique. Now the present Soviet leaders blamed the whole obsolete anti-cosmopolitanism drive on Stalin's ghost.

They have loaded on to him responsibility for the Tito impasse—though they themselves had all had a hand in it—and for other things symptomatic of the increasing rigidity and paranoia of Stalin's declining years, or so entangled with his prestige that they could not be repudiated while he was still alive. Having learned from the great "Operation Re-write" which began in the late twenties that by writing history with the pistol instead of the pen one could make Stalin's figure as big as he himself desired, they thought they could now use the same methods to reduce him to whatever size they should plan.

But to what size? Their own, lest they themselves be not big enough to rule? Cut him out altogether? Then by virtue of what authority could they still claim to be the rulers of a great nation? Who were they if not Stalin's men?

For three years they have been wrestling thus with his ghost, and still they have not prevailed. As when Jacob wrestled with an angel until his thigh was out of joint and the sinew shrank, so these men are forever lame—because they are Stalin's men. Laying a ghost is not so simple when the exorcists have been the ghost's own accomplices (some even say his murderers) and are now his heirs. They have held the heritage three years now, yet at the 20th Congress the one delegate overshadowing them all was the specter of Stalin.

From Stalin's deathbed council, a triumvirate emerged: Malenkov, Beria, Molotov. No novelty here, for during fourteen of his twenty years of personal party dominion Lenin himself had covered his one-man rule with a succession of *troikas*: Lenin-Krassin-Bogdanov, Lenin-Bogdanov-Dubrovinsky, Lenin-Zinoviev-Kamenev, from 1914 to 1917 Lenin and Zinoviev alone. Wherever two or three were gathered together with Lenin there was Bolshevism. When Bogdanov disagreed with Lenin on electoral tactics, and Krassin disagreed with him on the inner party regime, they were simply excommunicated and a new, more complaisant *troika* formed, to edit the paper, run the groups abroad, instruct the underground in Russia. Stalin, too, had covered his rise to personal power under the appearance of a "collective leadership" of which he was but the "party wheelhorse." He, too, had had *troikas*: Zinoviev-Kamenev-Stalin, Bukharin-Rykov-Stalin. Only after 1929 was it the cult of Stalin alone, with its priests and adepts.

For nine days Malenkov was heir apparent: Premier and General Secretary, "Head of the Party and the Government." On the ninth day, "at his own request," he was "relieved" of the post of General Secretary. After two years, again "at his own request," he was "relieved" of the Premiership. Having confessed to "my guilt and responsibility for the unsatisfactory state of affairs in agriculture" (in other words, for Khrushchev's errors), and to his incompetence in local work and "inexperience in directing individual branches of the economy," he was made Minister of Power Stations.

Three months after Stalin's death the arrest of Beria took place. He was tried by "socialist legality"—no definite charges: four versions have been published; no representation by counsel; the Supreme Court, illegally, had only one Supreme Court Justice, the other "justices" being two generals, two trade union overseers, a party official, a Deputy Minister of the Interior, and the president of the Moscow City Court. Beria himself was not allowed to be present at his "trial," yet he "confessed" to having been an imperialist agent all his life, and was shot within twenty-four hours. No novelty here, either, except that it had taken Stalin thirteen years of experiment with the trials and confessions of non-Communists before he killed his first party comrade.

Two years and seven months after Stalin's

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death, and five months before the 20th Congress, Molotov confessed that he had misled the party by failing to recognize socialism when he saw it! Exit the third triumvir. At the Congress, First Secretary Khrushchev felt it necessary to attack all three ex-triumvirs again—Beria by name, the other two by echoing their formulae of "confession."

Beginning in Lenin's day with the 10th Congress in 1921, all Party Congresses have been preceded by a purge of dissidents (not necessarily bloody) which assured a majority to the line and leadership of the center. The 20th Congress was no exception. First came the fall of the *troika*, and the death of Beria and twenty-five others. Next, Khrushchev added two of his own men to the Presidium and three to the party Secretariat. Shatalin, a Stalin-Malenkov appointee, disappeared from the latter body. Then Khrushchev personally, or his Chief of Cadres, Aristov, went from republic to republic, region to region, city to city, changing First Party Secretaries and other high officials. The new Khrushchev appointees in turn changed their own subordinates. The changes, transfers, demotions, "criticism and self-criticism," and disappearances in the six months preceding the Congress mounted into the thousands, but only in Georgia, so far as I know, and among Security officials, was the purge bloody.

The new top appointees come almost entirely from the old Moscow apparatus previously headed by Khrushchev and before him by Kaganovich, the old Ukrainian apparatus likewise headed first by Kaganovich and then Khrushchev, and from the Central Committee's administrative apparatus headed by Khrushchev. This purge culminated at the Congress, where 44 per cent of the members of the Central Committee elected at the 19th Congress were replaced. "Is it necessary to prove that the unity of the Party did not lose by that but only gained?" Khrushchev asked the delegates.

Khrushchev made the opening speech at the 20th Congress, delivered the over-all report (on all matters), was chairman of the Resolutions Committee, was elected chairman of the new RFSFR Bureau, delivered the secret report on Stalin's ghost, made the closing speech. It took Stalin three or four Party Congresses before he got to a point of comparable domination. Yet commentators dutifully reported that the Congress was held under the aegis of "collective leadership"!

Of course, there may be reasons for Khrushchev's haste in monopolizing the stage. He is sixty-two, whereas Stalin took over the party machine when he was forty-three or forty-four. Khrushchev has no galaxy of stars, no outstanding Old Bolsheviks, to get rid of. He has taken over a party that, in his words, is now "more monolithic than ever." And, unlike Stalin, he had no prior "theoretical" works to his credit. His 50,000-word address constitutes his first claim to the stature of interpreter and infallible exponent of sacred doctrine. The aging Stalin published his 50,000 words on the eve of the 19th Congress, on which occasion he distributed the role of reporter to the Congress among all the "sons," speaking himself for only ten minutes. Secure in his patriarchal rule, he could allow a wide semblance of "collective leadership," whereas the anxious parvenu leader on his way up simply had to lay down the line on everything.

In official theory, the Congress is the "supreme body" that rules the party, lays down its line, decides all matters of principle, selects an Executive to carry out its will between sessions, and holds its "servants" to account for their stewardship. In practice, it is a sounding board for the party's real individual leaders and policy-makers.

Lenin saw to that from the beginning. Motivated by his belief in centralism, in an elite party, and above all his belief in himself, he set up a guardianship from the outset. Acting as a rule through his *troikas*, he appointed the organizers who were to set up the party's local bodies. These were returned to each congress as delegates, confirming the center that had appointed them. The congresses or committees that he could not

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control, he split. That, in fact, was how Bolshevism was born and became a separate party.

Since whatever Lenin did was done in the name of and "by the working class," it became essential that he prove that all other working-class parties were "bourgeois."

At the 10th Congress in 1921 Lenin dealt the final blow to the authority of Party Congresses in general. Up to that time each Congress, since it was supposed to decide the party line, had been preceded by a free discussion period, after which delegates were supposed to be elected on the basis of their respective platforms. Having outlawed all other parties, Lenin was infuriated to find that working-class resentment of his dictatorial methods was taking the form of a "Workers Opposition" inside his own. He thereupon pushed through a measure outlawing the "Workers Opposition," the "Democratic Centralists," and the "Trade Union Opposition" as "bourgeois" and "petty bourgeois" factions, or as "representatives of alien class moods inside the Party." And at a secret closing session he had another measure pushed through permitting the Central Committee to expel any official elected by a Party Congress without waiting for sanction by a subsequent Congress. It was from this time on that Party Congresses became no more than sounding boards.

As a sounding board the 20th Congress was an unqualified success. Its fifteen hundred-odd hand-picked participants could not have entered—nor would they have dared enter—into a serious discussion of anything. But their presence and role as a Party Congress could give resonance to whatever the new boss and his associates wanted to amplify; and even withhold resonance from whatever it was desired to play down—with one exception: the struggle with Stalin's ghost.

Khrushchev reported on everything, did everything, was everything, but the sounding board continued to echo: "collective leadership."

Nine tenths of the "debates" were on how to maintain the Stalinist line of "priority for heavy industry," and continue thereby to deprive the Russian people of even a modest reward for their unremitting toil; nay, it was a question of how to get a further speed-up. But correspondents must look for something new to report, so nine tenths of all the flood of talk went unreported except for the "novelty" of the seven-hour day or 40-hour week (to be introduced in the course of the next five years) and some contradictory talk about "greater equalization of pay" with greater "incentive pay for unequal production" and greater equalization of pensions. The seven-hour day had first been promised in 1927, to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution. It was even written by Stalin into his Constitution of 1936, and proclaimed afresh to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of October. In 1957 it will be proclaimed once more, to celebrate the fortieth! As Boris Souvarine has remarked, "Bolshevism has always been very expert in conjugating the future tense." What was really meant, however, has been summed up in a lapidary formula of Pervukhin's glossing Khrushchev's report:

> Our Party has fought decisively, and is fighting against the anti-Leninist view . . . that heavy industry may ever cease to be our main task at any of the stages of Socialist construction.

Translated into plain speech, this means that *never* will butter take precedence over bombs, *never* will production for use ("socialism") take precedence over production for accumulation—that is, production for the power and wealth of the state, which means totalitarianism. Even Stalin himself never ventured to discount the future that heavily. Now the very existence of the future tense is being called into question. What is left then of Utopia?

In agriculture, too, the Stalinist line was not only continued at the 20th Congress, but sharpened and extended. Khrushchev had been Stalin's own "planner" (if that's the word for it) and taskmaster in agriculture, and it was his words that in 1948 had actually opened the attack on "the little worm of individual property that still sits in

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the mind of the *kolkhoznik*." At that time Khrushchev set out to transform the kolkhozes by combining them into ever larger units, units so large that it would be possible to have every one of them directly "chaired" by a Communist chairman, immediately supervised by a Machine-Tractor unit, and intimately penetrated by a Communist cell. Before this drive began, the overwhelming majority of the kolkhozes, far from having party cells, had not even had a single party member. By January 1, 1950, the number of kolkhozes had been reduced to 254,000. By the 19th Congress in October 1952, this number had been cut to 97,000, of which 79 per cent had Communist party units. By the 20th Congress, the number was down to 87,371 kolkhozes, of which thirty thousand were newly captained by city Communists sent to them to be "elected" chairman. All but 8.4 per cent of the kolkhozes now had party units—and the drive is still continuing.

At the same time, Khrushchev has started a new agrarian revolution from above by his campaign to send out young people from the cities to put immense tracts of range and semi-arid land into cultivation and raise corn north, south, east and west, regardless of climate and other natural conditions.

However, the real body blow to the peasants of the Soviet Union was delivered more quietly, with the Congress sounding board muted. Not Khrushchev, but a delegate from Cherkassy Province, F. I. Dubkovetsky, got up to urge that

> . . . it is necessary to reconsider the question of the participation of the collective farmers in the communal economy so that the collective farmer will work not a mere minimum of work days but throughout the entire year. . . . And life itself shows that the small parcels must be reduced to a common denominator, with one tenth of a hectare allotted per able-bodied person. . . .

Here was the voice of the "rank-and-file" peasant crying to be further driven and further expropriated! As soon as the Congress was adjourned and the sounding board dismantled, the *kolkhozniks* learned that their "plea" had been heard. The Central Committee and the Council of Ministers published a decree in *Pravda* on March 10 declaring:

> It is essential that the collective farmers' personal garden plots should be of subsidiary importance until the communal sector has been sufficiently developed to satisfy fully both . . . public needs and the *kolkhoznik's* personal needs, and the principal part of his income must stem from his participation in kolkhoz production, while his garden plot . . . should be of truly subsidiary importance . . . an embellishment of his way of life.

It was in the field of foreign policy that the sounding board provided by the 20th Congress was most effective. A commonplace of the Litvinov "general disarmament" and "collective security" line, namely, that the "camp of peace" was strong enough to curb aggressors and therefore "war is not inevitable," was repeated word for word as "something new." Once upon a time Moscow's English-language *New Times* reported:

> The speaker denied that war is inevitable, or the maintenance of peace impossible! . . . Those who say: "As long as capitalism exists, it is impossible to avoid war and hopeless and useless to fight to maintain peace," are either out and out doctrinaires or ordinary imposters!

The speaker was Georgi Dmitrov, "Helmsman of the Comintern." The place was Moscow. The date, May 1, 1936. The speech was delivered from Lenin's tomb. Standing behind the speaker and leading the applause ostentatiously was—Joseph Stalin!

What is really new in all this is the readiness of the refurbishers of this item to travel in order to sell it—which neither Lenin nor Stalin would do, nor needed to do. The present Moscow line on Tito is likewise a new gamble whose consequences are still unforeseeable, though, as Tito must know, the basic question is still the one that Lenin always asked: "*Kto kovo*—who uses whom?"

Closely related to the spirit of "Geneva," the drive to win favor in the neutralist countries, and the wooing of Tito, are the 20th Congress' pronouncements on an "alterna-

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tive peaceful or parliamentary road to socialism." The enthusiasm which greeted these pronouncements when the first cable summaries arrived was chilled when people took the trouble to read in full Khrushchev's bowdlerized quotation from Lenin as well as the terrifying list he gave of "examples" of peaceful transition to socialism. The quotation turned out to be from a passage in which Lenin declared that "when socialism had conquered in a large country" its frightened small neighbors might be induced to yield without a struggle in order "to save their physical heads." The examples of "peaceful transition" turned out to be: Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Rumania, Albania, Yugoslavia, and —China! Khrushchev explained—as if we didn't know it!—that Communists might be willing to take power by non-violent infiltration of "bourgeois" institutions, but he also made it clear they could not maintain and exercise that power without violence. They would have to "transform parliament from an organ of bourgeois democracy into an organ of the people's will" led by a "vanguard party, the Communist Party," and to establish a one-party dictatorship in the name of the proletariat. The "new line," as it was so well summarized by the late Peter Meyer, said in effect: "If you yield without resistance, we will not use force. If you resist, we will use force. So it is up to you to decide whether there is to be a rape, or a peaceful, voluntary yielding."

Not only did the resonance of the sounding board make things introduced by Stalin's *epigoni* over the past three years appear to be fresh novelties; it lingered on to give added effect to pronouncements made after the Congress had adjourned. A most striking example is the projected cut in manpower of the armed forces of the USSR, which, in this writer's judgment, will be carried out seriously and in full. But this step could have been foreseen by any careful student of Soviet population statistics and labor plans. Last year, when I predicted a cut in the forced-labor camp population as well as in the armed forces of the USSR, it was on the basis of those statistics and plans.*

So far, the labor deficit for an expanding industry, and for an agriculture that has been steadily depleted of its labor force, has been made good by the sizable "crop" of human beings that each year reached the working age of sixteen. But Dr. Naum Jasny, even before the announced reduction of Soviet military manpower, compiled a population table for the USSR after consultation with two other expert demographers, Eugene Kulischer and Warren Eason, which indicates that this source of new labor has been drying up. This table shows that the Soviet government *must* not only make a drastic cut in its armed forces right now, or else abandon its Sixth Five-Year Plan, but will have to make such a cut at least three times more, and much more drastically, in 1958, 1959, and 1960. Dr. Jasny's table is based on nothing made known at the 20th Congress, to which the first announcement of the cut in military manpower has been tied; nor can it be corrected, as Stalin corrected earlier census deficits, by having the census-takers shot as "wreckers." Here is part of the table as published in *Sotsialistichesky Vestnik* (April 1956, New York and Paris):

Annual Working Force Increment
(Youths Reaching 16)

1950	1,300,000
1951	1,300,000
1952	1,600,000
1953	2,600,000
1954	2,500,000
1955	2,400,000
1956	2,100,000

Nineteen-fifty to 1956 were the seven fat years, the last four being very fat indeed, for those who reached sixteen then had been born in the comparatively good years of 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, when the lower ranks of the population, relatively unmolested by Stalin's great purges, found life a little better, married, and managed to bring up more children. The average for the four

*See this same writer's recently published *Six Keys to the Soviet System* (Beacon, pp. 146-7).

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fattest years, 1953 to 1956, was roughly two and a half million new workers a year.

But then came the lean years, the years of the locust, the terrible years of the war. Men and women starved and died, fewer babies were born, and fewer survived.

Children Born in	*Reach 16 in*	*Number Added to Labor Force*
1941	1957	1,800,000
1942	1958	800,000
1943	1959	300,000
1944	1960	300,000

An annual increment of only 300,000 in a country with a population on the order of two hundred millions obviously cannot even make good the labor force's loss from invalidism, death, and superannuation, much less continue to swell it—and still less contribute the same quota of eighteen-year-olds to the army as before. So how can we make the decisions of a Party Congress responsible for a reduction in military force rendered obligatory by a population deficit? Is it not clear from Dr. Jasny's table that, regardless of what the free world does, the Kremlin will have to continue such reductions over the next three years? Either that, or give up—and, in any case, probably not fulfill—the Sixth Five-Year Plan?

IN SHORT: the "new men" in the Kremlin, on closer scrutiny, turn out to be not so new: they are still Stalin's men. The "collective leadership" turns out to have spawned a new *khozyain* (boss), if not yet *Vozhd,* who is manifestly "more equal than the others." They tried Beria and made him confess in true Stalinist fashion, and, as Stalin taught them, they have used Beria's corpse, and are now trying—oh irony!—to use Stalin's own as a scapegoat. The 20th Congress was prepared for, as were earlier Congresses, by a purge. Far from being a return to the frequently unruly discussions of Lenin's first years in power, or even of Stalin's first years, it proved to be "more monolithic than ever before." It neither chose new men nor adopted new measures. But, as sounding board, it was the most successful of all Party Congresses—except for its failure to keep under control the unresolved struggle with Stalin's ghost.

Stalin's heirs are striving to get out of the shadow, to cast off the rigidities and mounting paranoia of his last years. They want to put the blame on the corpse for the last zigzag but one, but meanwhile they intend to continue Stalinism in industry and agriculture, and to push forward as before in the Stalinist war to re-make a people and win the world. While they exploit for propagandist ends the universal expectation of change on the death of a tyrant, and invoke a direct discipleship to Lenin such as they never possessed, they continue Stalinism without its obsolete features and paranoiac excesses.

Whether Stalin had lived or not, the time for a new zigzag or turn had come. It was initiated, even before his death, at the 19th Congress, and his *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR* pointed the way. That is not to say that each reversal of field in the pursuit of the same unchanging goal produces no novelties. But the *epigoni,* being smaller men who lack Stalin's terrible patience and demonic force, exhibit strikingly little originality in this latest turn of theirs. It has nothing comparable to the breadth and sweep of Lenin's turn from "War Communism" to the Nep; from immediate world revolution to peace pacts and "concessions to capitalist investors." Nor does it have the sweep of Stalin's swing from "no bloodletting" to the great blood purge; from "defense of the peasant" to forced collectivization; from "social fascism" to the "People's Front." Nor anything of the magnitude and lightning surprises of the triple zigzag from "collective security" to a pact with Hitler, then to Grand Alliance, then to Cold War. The *epigoni* demonstrate that they are *epigoni* by the smallness, the imitativeness of what they do, by their borrowing of trivial and fragmentary features from previous maneuvers, and utilization of mutilated passages from the very same texts and formulations which accompanied these maneuvers. It is the

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world's unthinking expectation of change and its weariness of a tension which will have to be maintained as long as the causes of it have not disappeared—it is the pathetic eagerness of the outside world to be deceived that magnifies these tired and trivial maneuvers into something big and portending change.

Where genuine novelty does lie, however, is in an operation the new leaders of the USSR planned but seem to have been unable to control: the effort to assure their succession by a gradual deflation of Stalin's ghost. Because they cannot draw a line between his "crimes" and his "great conquests"; because they cannot apologize to some of his—and their own—corpses without having a whole army of skeletons force their way into the strange dance of death; because their regime of absolute force, having downgraded the police, finds that it has upgraded the army; because an aging party headed by an even older leadership is holding down a country where new class formations and new generations demand a place; because these exorcists are the disciples, the heirs, and the accomplices of the ghost they are attempting to exorcise; and because their hinted plea that they were but the intimidated minions of a madman, so reminiscent of the alibis of Hitler's fallen entourage, raises the question whether any system which puts absolute power in the hands of a madman may not itself have something paranoid about it that corrupts the spirit and unhinges the mind—for all these reasons the future appears pregnant with surprises, and the position of Khrushchev and his associates insecure.

In any case, it is no service to the hapless people over whom they rule, or to the freedom and peace of the world which they perpetually threaten, to write these men larger than they are, or to fall for the din of the not too clever propaganda that emerged from their 20th Party Congress.

PETER MEYER

May 23, 1902 — May 9, 1956

Good Friend and Valued Contributor

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HOW EDUCATE THE GIFTED CHILD?

The Problem of Precocity

SPENCER BROWN

ONE of the biggest headaches in American education is the child who learns too well too quickly. He presents problems to society, to the schools, and to his parents.

Society's eager misunderstanding of the question was illustrated for me not long ago at a lecture by a prominent educator who was lamenting the waste to our nation and the world caused by our failure to use fully the powers of our gifted children. In a rhetorical flight, he invoked Mozart: if only our schools could do their job, they would turn out Mozarts every year. Everybody nodded approval. But this was nonsense. We may lose a Mozart once a century, but not more; that's all there are.

Much of what follows is summarized from two excellent works, a monograph by Havighurst, Stivers, and DeHaan, *A Survey of the Education of Gifted Children,* and a compilation edited by Paul Witty, *The Gifted Child.* The first is directed to the general reader, and the second, though written for teachers and administrators, is largely in non-technical language. More popular books, such as Theodore Hall's, or Cutts' and Moseley's, are likely to give an incomplete and not altogether accurate picture. The reader interested in college acceleration for gifted children should also consult the so-called Andover Report*.

How shall we define a gifted child? The term is inconveniently comprehensive; it may cover anything from Einstein down to your children and mine, who, let us admit, are closer to average.

There are all kinds of gifts. There is extraordinary athletic ability, about which we need not worry, since it is sought out and rewarded extravagantly by school and college and society. There is unusual skill with tools and machines, which our educational system, following our social pattern, foolishly relegates to a position clearly inferior in general esteem. There is unusual ability in the arts, which is hard to assess accurately, since clever aping of adult mannerisms can so often simulate precocity. There are unusual powers of social leadership, of managing practical affairs and other people: when a child possesses these little understood talents, he may not be trained or rewarded by his school (except that some colleges try to select a freshman class composed entirely of "leaders"), but he has every incentive to develop them, since they bring him approbation from his fellows in school and money or power in later life. And there is general

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WRITING as a teacher (at the Fieldston School in Riverdale, New York City) and a parent, SPENCER BROWN, in this survey of current technique for spotting and then educating exceptionally gifted children, tries to suggest a sensible approach to the problem of precocity and early promise. Our readers will recall several other discussions of educational theory and practice by Mr. Brown, the most recent of which was "Dr. Flesch's Cure for Reading Troubles" (August 1955). A book of poems by him, *My Father's Business and Other Poems,* will be published by Scribner's in the fall as part of their Poets of Today Series.

*Robert J. Havighurst, Eugene Stivers and Robert DeHaan, *A Survey of the Education of Gifted Children* (University of Chicago, Supplementary Educational Monographs No. 183, Nov. 1955); Paul Witty (ed.), *The Gifted Child* (Heath, 1951); Theodore Hall, *Gifted Children: The Cleveland Story* (World, 1956); Norma E. Cutts and Nicholas Moseley, *Bright Children: A Guide for Parents* (Putnam, 1953); *General Education in School and College.* A Committee Report by Members of the Faculties of Andover, Exeter, Lawrenceville, Harvard, Princeton, and Yale (Harvard, 1952).

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high academic ability that manifests itself in either general or specific academic accomplishment. This last is what everyone is talking about, and it is measured or estimated with the concept known as the "IQ."

The IQ ("intelligence quotient," a ratio between "mental age" and chronological age) is arrived at by one of the many standardized tests for mental age, the best known of which is the Stanford-Binet. According to the Stanford-Binet scale, 95-105 is "normal." An IQ of 125 or 130 is considered "gifted," and 155 or so is generally considered the dividing line between "gifted" and "highly gifted" or "genius."* It is estimated, or guessed, that something like 7 per cent of Americans have IQ's above 125 on the Binet scale; 3 per cent are above 135; 1 per cent are above 140; about one-quarter of 1 per cent are above 160; and only one or two in a million reach 180.

With this information, one might think he could judge his child's rank and capacity by finding out his IQ. But this would be only a rough guess at best. In the first place, if a test other than the Stanford-Binet is used, the figures will be different. The Wechsler-Bellevue Test, for example, will give the same child a considerably lower IQ than the Stanford-Binet. There is no mass test strictly comparable to the individual Stanford-Binet; and not many schools are equipped for individual testing. And, alas, there are a few self-styled psychologists who will give a gently elastic judgment to please an ambitious parent.

In the second place, for a variety of reasons, almost all schools and most reputable testing organizations refuse to tell parents their child's IQ. Parents are notoriously competitive about their offspring; they are also likely to use the IQ, whatever it is, as a club to extort either hard work or high marks; and since intelligence is mostly hereditary, they take their child's IQ as a personal endorsement or affront. Parents do not usually understand the differences between a Stanford-Binet and a Wechsler-Bellevue IQ, for example, nor will they know the median IQ of their child's classmates. Furthermore, an IQ, though ordinarily stable, can fall if the child's emotional balance is upset. And if a very bright child is not tested young enough, his IQ on the Binet scale will give an inadequate impression of his powers.

Most teachers have learned to take the IQ with a grain of salt, recognizing it as only one of many instruments to judge a child's potential ability. They can often gain as good an indication from standardized tests of scholastic aptitude like the Psychological Test of the American Council on Education, or the Scholastic Aptitude Test of the College Board. Though a few teachers pay no attention to IQ's, and a few regard them as the sole criterion for separating sheep from goats, most teachers use IQ's responsibly—realizing that all standardized tests have the dubious quality of predicting a runner's success in the marathon from his time in the hundred-yard dash.

A HIGH IQ, then, is a moderately good indicator of unusual intellectual ability. At least as useful to teachers (and parents) is a knowledge of general traits of gifted children, the conclusions from a vast amount of study in the past thirty or forty years, done notably by Professor Lewis M. Terman and his associates at Stanford University and Leta S. Hollingworth in New York. By now much of this information has filtered into the public consciousness and has dispelled older and erroneous notions about intellectual power and genius.

From case studies of hundreds, even thousands, of gifted children through their schooling and well into adult life, it has been possible to paint an accurate composite portrait of the gifted child. In what follows, the reader must be asked to discard his private picture of the spindly, knock-kneed, myopic, clumsy, pathologically shy near-genius, the twelve-year-old high school senior

*Leta S. Hollingworth, one of the pioneer investigators into gifted children, thought that the word *genius* was a misnomer for a child or youth and should be reserved for an adult who had already made significant contributions in his field. Very few parents or children share her caution.

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down the block. The reader without a wide, statistically significant acquaintance with gifted children must accept the composite portrait on faith; a teacher or school administrator will recognize its accuracy at once.

The gifted child may be described as just like other children, but much more so. He is a better physical specimen than the average child. As a baby he walks and talks sooner than the others. He asks more and better questions; he cultivates his hobbies more intensely and profoundly; he reads sooner and more widely. Besides his high IQ, he has speed, a broader attention span, and more ability to generalize on his information. In school his greatest superiorities are in reading, the use of language, arithmetical reasoning, science, literature, and the arts. In arithmetical computation, spelling, and factual information his superiority is less marked. He is no more uneven in his accomplishments than the ordinary child. He is less inclined to boast, less likely to be tempted to cheat. He is more altruistic in his social attitudes. As Professor Terman observes, "There is no law of compensation whereby the intellectual superiority of the gifted tends to be offset by inferiorities along non-intellectual lines." The gods are distinctly unfair. The gifted child is more likely than the average to be successful in adult life; he earns more; and as a final inequity he lives longer.

Thus far the unanimous judgment of the experts. There is a crumb of consolation for the average person, however, in that the highly gifted child (very roughly, one with an IQ over 155) generally fails to fulfill his extraordinary promise. That is, he is successful, but not *more* successful enough to set him apart from other able children. This comparative failure, tragic to society and perhaps to the individual, is thought to be due not to inherent instability (the popular notion of the madness of genius) but to the emotional costs of making peace with and a place in a slow-witted world. Here, however, the experts disagree: Professor Terman thinks that the highly gifted person is no more maladjusted than the merely gifted; Hollingworth feels that he faces "unusual hazards in personality development."* They agree that the optimum IQ seems to be between 125 and 155. But there is no doubt that the ordinary man's picture of unstable, unhealthy, anti-social genius, though perhaps accurate for a few spectacular cases, is the reverse of truth for most gifted children.

With so much information available, it should be easy to identify the gifted child—even when he is very young, since intelligence tests are as reliable at six as at sixteen, or more so. There are nevertheless three social impediments to the ready discovery of such talents.

First, we must want to discover gifted children badly enough to set a whole school or a whole school system to the task. Fortunately, this is something that some school administrations are willing to do, and do efficiently. Besides school- and city-wide intelligence testing through which exceptional ability has a good chance of being detected, many schools and communities systematically survey children's marks in their studies and their marks in achievement tests (standardized tests of subject matter, which are better indicators of aptitude than are school

*Dr. Bruno Bettelheim (summarized in Witty, p. 148) gives an acute analysis of the difficulties of adjustment of highly gifted children and their comparative failure to use their full intellectual powers. A boy who is physically strong cannot use his strength at all times against his contemporaries because of social disapproval of bullying. But a very bright boy can continue to gain adult approval by intellectually terrorizing his age-mates; they are no match for him and cannot retaliate in kind. He thus, we may presume, increases his own isolation. Furthermore, if he should have a personality disturbance arising, for example, from ignorance of emotional relations within his family, he may come to distrust his intelligence if it is inadequate to solve his vital problem. This leads to a relatively permanent blocking of his intellectual activity. If, on the contrary, his intelligence can perceive the causes of his difficulties, he may be overcome with anxiety. He may then decide to use his intelligence for *secondary* matters alone; though he will thereby gain the adult approval he craves, he is nevertheless divorcing his intellectual investigations from anything in which he is genuinely interested.

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marks). Many schools also ask teachers to recommend unusual students for further testing. None of these devices is fool-proof, but taken together they will catch most of the gifted children and screen out most of the average. Obviously, school systems offering elaborate special treatment of gifted children must use these processes as a matter of routine. Most of the cities queried by Dr. Havighurst and his associates have such programs, and the more provision that is made for education of gifted children, in, for example, such school systems as those of Cleveland, New York, and University City, Missouri, the more careful the selection.

Yet no matter how thorough the process, it has the limitation of selecting academic ability and overlooking special gifts unless (as happens often but not always) they are accompanied by academic ability. And testing for special gifts is difficult and time-consuming. A few communities, notably Portland, Oregon, and Quincy, Illinois, have made serious and thorough attempts to test aptitudes in social leadership, the plastic arts, music, writing, and a foggy concept labeled "creativity." These tests, however, are still experimental, elaborate, and expensive; they have to be judged by persons expert in the field being tested. But they are better than the nothing that is done almost everywhere else. Clearly, if the schools are to pay attention to the arts, they must find some way of detecting exceptional promise in order to develop it. But among all questions having to do with gifted children, this one is farthest from solution today.

The third and perhaps greatest impediment to the selection of ability is that it implies a lively desire to do something once the selection is made. And this desire does not always exist. From teachers and administrators it demands extra work and flexibility and willingness to change. From school boards and taxpayers it demands large sums of money, for, as we shall see, the education of the gifted is expensive. And from everybody it demands willingness to accept what appears to be undemocratic.

But the theory of unequal treatment for unequal talents dates back in American education at least to Thomas Jefferson, who advocated a ruthless weeding out of the unfit. Jefferson would have sent on to high school only "the best subjects," and only "the most promising subjects" of those already winnowed would he send on to the university. A strictly equalitarian treatment for all children would require trigonometry for both morons and engineers, violin lessons for both the tone-deaf and the Menuhins, and abolition of the farm system of the Brooklyn Dodgers. Granted that special training for the unusually able should be contingent upon demonstration of that ability without reference to financial ability, and granted that such training is not without its psychological and social hazards, it should be acceptable as being efficient without being undemocratic. The question remains: what kind of training?

THERE are three chief answers: "enrichment," special grouping, and acceleration. They are not mutually exclusive—in fact, we seldom find one without another—but they represent not only different teaching but different thinking.

Enrichment means adding to the curriculum other material or experiences not offered the average child—material and experiences desirable in themselves but denied the average child by his slower pace in meeting normal requirements. Enrichment, alongside the regular curriculum, is like a dog going for a walk in the country with his master. The master goes straight along the road and covers five miles; the dog covers the same road; they come home together. But in an hour and a half the dog has run, not walked, about fifteen miles, has chased two real and eleven imaginary rabbits through the brush, has investigated tantalizing openings of drains, has bristled in fear or barked in bravado at other dogs, and has scored his daily near-miss of a squirrel. He has lived a full, rich life while the master has merely walked five miles.

If educational enrichment were as easy as this, it would be universal for all who could

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stand the pace. It would be cheap, would not create problems of school administration, and would not gratify the gifted child's parents and irritate his friends by ostentatiously singling him out, saving him time, or giving him extra credit. But enrichment for the child invariably involves additional work for the teacher, who, though willing, is already fully occupied. And enrichment involves teaching a class on two or more levels simultaneously, which is one of the most difficult aspects of the art.

Among various devices for enriching the regular curriculum we may mention special projects or reports on special interests, emphasis on creative or investigative work at the expense of drill (since gifted children need much less drill than their classmates to master the same material), experience in class leadership, and extensively collateral reading. A different kind of enrichment, usually requiring special or additional classes, occurs when a child is encouraged to widen his understanding of a study by experience in the fine arts, handicrafts, or industrial arts. This "lateral enrichment," as it is called, has the great advantage of counteracting a tendency of gifted children to become too verbal or bookish. But it is often unsatisfactory for that reason: if a child is fascinated by a study, he wants more of it, not something else; and you may kill his interest by forcing on him a substitute that he ought to want but doesn't. A third kind of enrichment is actually impoverishment: to give a gifted child extra busy-work or unnecessary drill designed to keep him out of mischief, or to use him for running errands and delivering messages, is the mark of a desperate teacher or an inferior school.

Enrichment does not imply a saving of time: the dog is no further at the end of the walk than if he had been on a leash, though he has enjoyed himself more and is a more experienced dog. But the reader will have noted a problem created, or aggravated, by the success of enrichment: at the end of the walk, by extended practice in running, the dog's margin of superiority in speed over the man has been increased. This problem we must return to after considering one of the alternatives to enrichment.

THE device of special grouping is self-explanatory. It may mean a special class once a week; or voluntary classes quite outside the school, as at the Worcester Art Museum or the Museum of Modern Art in New York; or community music projects, as in Dayton and Worcester; or separate groupings for all academic work, as in the Cleveland "Major Work Groups" described in Mr. Hall's book; or separate schools, like Hunter College Elementary School and Bronx Science and Stuyvesant High Schools in New York.

Special grouping vastly facilitates enrichment, which is indeed its chief purpose. Though posing considerable administrative problems of selection and scheduling, it is favored by many schools that cannot otherwise help the gifted child because of crowded classes. Hence it is a device widely used in school systems of large cities. Small schools, schools in wealthy suburban communities, and private schools are less likely to use special grouping, and more likely to try to enrich their instruction of the gifted within the framework of regular classes. Of course, many private schools and suburban schools are in some measure special groupings in themselves: a majority, or all, of the children are presumed to be headed for college; they are strongly self-motivated, or at least driven by the ambitions of their parents; and a truly gifted child stands out less in this setting than he would in a more heterogeneous classroom.

Though a few special groups have as their avowed purpose the saving of children's time (e.g., the study of three years of mathematics in two), most of them are intended only to broaden and deepen the children's information and interests. And yet, whatever the intention, the results will eventually be the same in one significant respect; and so will the results of enrichment without special grouping. To return to the canine metaphor for a moment: the dog that always walks on a leash can run twice as fast and as

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far as a man; but the dog that has run unleashed at his proper pace will soon be able to run three times as fast. Whenever the dog returns to the road and runs along it, he outdistances the man in a few seconds. Whenever a gifted child from a special group returns to the standard course—at the end of elementary school, at the end of junior high school, or at the beginning of college—he is more superior to the average than when he was first singled out.

Paradoxically, the readiest way to judge the success of educational enrichment is to note whether and how much it has *widened* the gap between the gifted child and the average. And to attempt, at any given time, artificially to close the gap thus widened may be disastrous to the gifted child's morale and performance. In short, since almost by definition he has a "mental age" in advance of his years and can work as if he were older than he is, it is almost impossible to teach him properly, either by enrichment within his class or by special grouping, without his being accelerated beyond his contemporaries.

THE term *acceleration* seems to be undergoing, in educational circles, the pejorative fate common to all unpleasant words. It is not yet a dirty word like its predecessor, *skipping*, but educators utter it with evident distaste while admitting privately that they cannot do without it. Sensible parents have reluctantly come to believe that acceleration is a Bad Thing. Yet even those psychologists and teachers most adamant against acceleration will, in their calmer moments, confess that the question cannot be *whether* to accelerate but must be *when* and *how much*.

For those who think that new "acceleration" is but old "skipping" writ large, we may make a tenuous but valid distinction. Skipping is simply kicking the gifted child upstairs—with all that the phrase implies. He is a nuisance where he is: promote him. This practice has an advantage—it puts him nearer where he belongs intellectually—but many dangers. Though skipping a child through an inferior school brings the day nearer when he has a chance of more stimulating teaching in a higher school, it is a confession of an impoverished curriculum.* And the work of the higher grade may be no more interesting to him, and hence will fail to elicit any real effort on his part. But the chief difficulty is that it is nearly impossible to advance a truly gifted child through a routine curriculum enough to meet his mental powers and academic skill without putting him completely outside his class physically, socially, and emotionally. A nine-year-old with an IQ of 135 belongs with twelve-year-olds; a twelve-year-old with the same IQ belongs with sixteen-year-olds in the sophomore or junior year of high school. The devastating effects of adequate skipping can be seen at once.

Acceleration, on the other hand, if it is not merely skipping, always implies either enrichment or special grouping, or both. It does not attempt to make the bright child "hurry up and wait," to whisk him over a year or two of work at a pace that extends even his powers, and then set him on a higher level to revert to crawling. Skipping is like passing the car in front of you at sixty and then slowing down to twenty behind a line of trucks. Acceleration should be like driving at a steady forty-five. The accelerated child should be kept in a group maintaining a high speed, or else should be given a great deal of extra mileage to cover, through more varied scenery.

Such is the purpose of many accelerated programs, good and bad, in many schools and systems in all parts of the country. Pittsburgh permits early entry into elementary school for the gifted child; the University of Chicago Laboratory School (whose children have a median IQ of 125 to 130)

*It is also a confession, fortunately less frequent now than it once was, of a desire to save money by hurting children. In a crowded school system, if you can get 10 per cent of your children through in six years instead of eight, you can postpone the long overdue school building and avoid having to float another bond issue. The attractions of this policy, to a certain type of mind, are obvious.

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does eight years of elementary schooling in seven; New York City has special schools that compress three years of junior high school into two; high school students of sufficient maturity and ability have been accepted into college at the end of their junior or even sophomore years (a process much favored by the Fund for the Advancement of Education, which has abetted it with massive scholarships); advanced standing in college courses, enriching but usually not shortening the four years, is now granted to some entering freshmen on the basis of nation-wide tests; and a program of both these last types of acceleration is being encouraged by the recommendations of the Andover Report.

If I were writing this twenty years ago, I should feel it my duty as a teacher to emphasize the dangers of acceleration. Though the gifted child is usually more robust and more mature than his average contemporary, he is not much more so. To send him through school and college a year ahead has never seemed excessive to responsible observers. But to accelerate him two, three, or four years—he can and should do the work—may harm him more than help him. Like everyone else, he longs to make the baseball team, to persuade a pretty girl to pretend to worship him, to hack around with a cheerful crowd, to achieve status not dependent on his brain (which he may even come to despise because it has deprived him of status). The gifted child suffers from all normal problems of growing up. He, especially, suffers from the "social inutility" of children. Childhood and adolescence bring him troubles enough without the added hardship of being exceptionally small and young.

All this is still true. But the case against acceleration may have been oversold to teachers and to sophisticated parents. The evidence is conflicting. There are studies* purporting to show that boys who accelerated into and through college during the war did not suffer academically or socially. And there are studies* vindicating the experimental early admission to college of the "Ford Babies"—winners of scholarships from the Fund for the Advancement of Education. My own observation of and conversation with such boys indicate the contrary. They say they have missed something in not being with their class, and having status in their class, through school. Though the Ford Baby girls are glad to be younger than their dates, the Ford Baby boys find it hard to get dates at all. The colleges think the experiment has been successful; but colleges, we should remember, are less sensitive than elementary and high schools to the student's problems of adjustment. If he gets good marks, joins an extra-curricular activity or two, and does not achieve a "nervous breakdown," the college is prone to assume he is well off.

The psychologist is happier about acceleration than is its beneficiary. Terman and Oden conclude that children of 135 IQ or higher should enter college at seventeen at the latest, and would be better off to enter at sixteen. "The influence of school acceleration in causing social maladjustment has been greatly exaggerated. . . . The data on physical and mental health, both in childhood and the adult years, favor the accelerates."† On the other hand, a poll‡ of gifted children who had been sent to high school at eleven showed that they later thought the right age for entering high school was thirteen. It should be added that school administrators nowadays tend to agree with the children rather than with Terman.

While we debate, there is a relentless, largely justified, and steadily increasing

*Sidney L. Pressey, *Educational Acceleration: Appraisal and Basic Problems*, p. 153. Bureau of Educational Research Monographs, No. 31. Ohio State University, 1949.

*Richard Pearson, "The Students' View of Early Admission." *The College Board Review*, No. 28, pp. 10-13. Winter, 1956.

† Lewis M. Terman and Melita Oden, in Witty, *op. cit.*, p. 43. See also Terman and Oden, *The Gifted Child Grows Up*, Stanford University Press, 1947.

‡ Ruth Strang, "Mental Health of Gifted Children," in Witty, p. 137.

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pressure of society on the schools to hurry the ablest young people through school and college, into advanced training, and out into production, reproduction, and gainful activity—which is exactly what the young people want.

All this is most unsatisfactory and may simply tempt us to give up, to say with a small measure of truth that we can neither help nor harm our gifted children. (One great teacher modestly says about his most famous student, "He was so brilliant that no teacher could possibly have prevented him from learning.") We comfort ourselves by saying, "Talent will out," for there is no way of disproving the statement even if it is false: if it didn't out, how can we know it was genuine talent? But there is no reason to commend our education if we can teach all but the best.

A few general conclusions we may tentatively accept. A one-year acceleration of a gifted child is almost always desirable. If more is unavoidable, it should be done as reluctantly and as late as possible, for disparity in age becomes less and less troublesome as children grow older. Though gifted children waste proportionately more of their time in elementary school than in high school, and more in high school than in college, acceleration is easier for them emotionally in college.* Acceleration in groups, for obvious reasons, is much better than individual acceleration, though in a small school it is often difficult to make up a group. Selection of students for acceleration should be done carefully and responsibly, not rigidly on the basis of a certain score or IQ; indeed, the best schools and teachers almost play it by ear. And finally, a program of enrichment continued all through school, on into the essentially similar program of advanced standing in college, is better than acceleration.

THIS last policy unfortunately costs the most money. But if we really want a solution, this is the nearest thing to it.

As evidence, we find that in the best suburban public schools and the best private schools, where the student body is already partly selected through the social and cultural level of the parents, where classes are small, where teachers are generally skilled and well informed, where administrators and guidance people are sensitive to individual needs and differences—under these favorable and costly circumstances enrichment is the usual method, and acceleration infrequently resorted to.

This should not be taken as a blanket endorsement of private schools. Many private schools are much worse for everybody, and especially for the gifted, than many public schools. There is no virtue in small classes poorly taught. The private school that makes of its teachers jacks-of-all-trades (basketball coach *cum* French teacher *cum* admissions director), that takes its teachers raw from college and lets them sink or swim without training before or on the job, that pays its teachers half the public school scale and thus has a high turnover of its faculty—such a school will be worse, not better, than its public school competitor.

In short, among the various devices we have discussed for aiding gifted children, there is no cheap substitute for skilled teaching by highly educated and resourceful and devoted teachers. Such teachers enrich every class, and they view gifted children as an additional opportunity to exercise their skill. With such teachers, almost any program or device of enrichment, with or without acceleration, is likely to succeed. Without them, it will be an empty ritual.

SO FAR we have tried to survey a problem without offering a panacea. We have left untouched the often vexing question of

*My testimony on this point is suspect, since I am a high school teacher. When the question is raised of compressing the eight years of high school and college into seven, college teachers unanimously prefer the year to be taken from high school, high school teachers from college. This follows from the well-known principle that to every teacher his own class is the most important experience in education. But the teaching in the last year of a *good* high school is generally superior to the teaching in freshman courses of the best colleges.

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the maladjusted gifted child who even under favorable circumstances does mediocre work or none. We have not asked whether American communities are willing to accept financial and intellectual responsibility for educating the gifted, as they accept at least the nominal responsibility for educating everybody else. We have left untouched—as have the schools generally—the question of selecting and training special talents in the arts and crafts. But we should not leave untouched the attitude of parents toward their gifted children.

Most such parents are pleased and grateful to whatever gods they believe in. They are often humble, sometimes so humble that the child rides roughshod over them; they sometimes make the mistake of prizing the child's gifts over the child himself; and they occasionally heap such praise on the child as to make him think the world owes him a living. But such mistakes (and it is nearly impossible not to make some mistakes) are the result of emotions natural in the situation and not always harmful in the long run.

In decided contrast is the ferocity of some parents toward their offspring, the schools, or both. The father who was made miserable by graduating from high school at fifteen will find a dozen good reasons for subjecting his brilliant son to the same misery. The mother who has read up on psychological tests and knows her Gesell will try to outwit the tests by luring her child into activities and feats beyond the norm for its age. (It can't be done: there is no known way to add a cubit to the stature of an IQ. All that education can do is to bring out what's there.) Though all writers agree that the worst mistake is to force a gifted child too soon into adult patterns, this is the one mistake all such parents make as soon as they recognize their child's abilities.

Studies of highly gifted children* show that their fathers, generally of the upper middle class, exhibit all the competitive drives characteristic of that class, but with more frustration in themselves and more apprehension for their children. The mothers often show a rejection of their feminine role and of the child, with consequent guilt and anxiety and compulsive over-protection. Lacking as much success as they crave from their own lives, they will so identify themselves with a gifted child as to overpower him.

Yet sadder and commoner than the plight of the gifted child of driving parents is that of the average child whose parents think he is gifted. A child usually appraises his ability more realistically than his parents can, for he sees and measures himself in daily competition with his classmates. His teachers, not being emotionally involved in the judgment, are likely to be even more accurate. But sufficiently ambitious parents whose wish is father to the "genius" will follow their own estimate sooner than the child's or the teachers'. Since if he is talented he ought to do spectacular work, and since his work is merely capable, they drive him to work harder. When the time comes for him to gain admission to college, dormant family ambitions can produce volcanic eruptions. The child's and his teachers' protests are overridden; his life is miserable, and his name is Legion.

IN WRITING this piece I have tried not to think of myself and my children, or of you and your children. Yet I have caught myself writing, and you have been reading, with just these persons in mind—matching traits here and experiences there, hoping rather than thinking. Let us therefore drop the pretence of impersonality; I shall speak, to parents, as a teacher who has taught more than his share of gifted children.

If your child is not gifted, it will be easy for him to find company. In the most selective schools in the country he will be among the majority. And if you cannot face the fact that he is in the "lowest" 94 per cent of humanity, you are more interested in your own vicarious success than in him as a person.

If your child is gifted, and if you are a properly relaxed parent, you may not suspect

*See Zorbaugh, Boardman, and Sheldon, in Witty, pp. 86 ff.

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it for a long time. When you do, make it your business to give him as average a childhood as you can. He will grow up sooner than the rest anyway. It is instructive to recall John Stuart Mill (IQ 190 ± 4), the genius who never had a childhood and who suffered for it all his life. Your child is not a John Stuart Mill, and to sacrifice his childhood for nothing—or even for the fame of Mill—is a crime.

If your child is gifted, a good school, public or private, will give you better advice than you can give yourself. A good school will have seen others like him. You haven't. And don't think that the good school nowadays will neglect its best students merely because they don't get into trouble. The school is interested in its own reputation, which it gets largely from its best students.

If your child is *highly* gifted and can win top college honors and national scholarships ("merit badges," as Sloan Wilson scornfully calls them), well and good. But to emphasize these, to drive him for marks and awards, will cost him the healthy recreation and hobbies and collection of useless information that mark the well-rounded and happy person. You need not worry: he is as ambitious as all young people, but he has the good taste not to parade his ambition.

If your child is extremely gifted, a genius—but stop right there. We have come full circle in our concept of genius, from Samuel Johnson's definition of "a man endowed with superior faculties," through the romantic notion of the mad, dark, Byronic freak of nature, back to something close to Johnson. In the modern view, genius is extraordinary youthful promise somehow luckily fulfilled in adult life. The tremendous odds against the occurrence of such promise are magnified because it is rarely fulfilled. The English musician William Crotch was as much a prodigy as Mozart. But though we celebrate Mozart's bicentennial this year, there will be no great hubbub in 1975 for the bicentennial of Crotch.

We spoke earlier of the severe problems of adjustment of the extremely gifted child. Mozart had such problems. But your child and mine, and you and I, do not. In the million-to-one chance that the problem might confront someone of our acquaintance, we should not know enough to do anything sensible about it. Genius, statistically, is like being hit by lightning. Genius such as Mozart's is like being hit by lightning inside a well-rodded building on a clear day in January. And the survivors of this experience, who alone could give us advice, are too much interested in other things to tell us how it feels.

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SECULAR HEBREW AND ESOTERIC YIDDISH

The Fate of Their Modern Literatures

JUDD L. TELLER

ALTHOUGH occasional skirmishes still punctuate the armistice, it has been a long while since any large-scale action has taken place in the Yiddish-Hebrew war. Trading across the lines, not wholly interrupted even at the height of hostilities, is openly carried on now. Nor is it unusual to see soldiers from the opposing armies fraternizing in the trenches. Hardly a week passes without some learned, reverent mention of Yiddish in the literary supplements of the Israeli press, hardly a season without the appearance of Yiddish novels in Hebrew translation.

Histadrut, Israel's federation of labor, has been especially eager to reconcile the two language camps, perhaps because its supporters include American trade union leaders who are still committed in principle to upholding the Yiddishism of their old (and by now virtually outworn) Bundist creed. Whenever a Yiddish dignitary visits Israel, he is certain to be honored with a reception by Histadrut, which takes pains to insure a large turnout of the older Hebrew writers.

But the passions that once flared so intensely are not quite dead. A few of these bilingual receptions, both here and in Israel, have adjourned on verbal near-brawls because of some tactless remark casually dropped by hosts or visitors.

THOSE unfamiliar with the events leading up to the Hebrew-Yiddish war are often under the impression that the two literatures have been at one another's throats from the first, mainly for ideological reasons—modern Hebrew being a champion of Zionism, and Yiddish a defender of Dispersion (*Galut*) nationalism. The facts are rather more complicated. Modern Hebrew literature was a Johnny-come-lately to Zionism—indeed, some of its first practitioners not only believed in *Galut*, they believed in the Czar's *Galut*. And conversely, the early advocates of Yiddishism included a great many Zionists, a few of whom pioneered alongside David Ben Gurion in pre-1914 Palestine, and even then joined issue with him on the language question. Indeed, there was a time when the two literatures, springing from a common East European origin, were conducted as a single enterprise.

Mendele Mocher Seforim, the "grandfather" of Yiddish literature, was also a godfather of Hebrew; he helped shape the prose styles of both by casting his works first in one language and then translating them into the other. Sholom Aleichem and I. L. Peretz each wrote some Hebrew, and Chayim Nachman Bialik, who launched the modern Hebrew poetic renascence, also tried his hand at Yiddish verse.

This complementary relation was made possible by the fact that the two languages were obverse sides of the same coin; one was the daily, the other the sacred, "Sabbath" tongue of East European Jewry. A writer with yeshiva background (that is, with an

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WHAT accounted for the passion and bitterness that made the contention between Hebrew and Yiddish assume the proportions of a cultural civil war? In tracing the sources of the struggle, JUDD L. TELLER attempts to show how, by a curious trick of history, the two languages have reversed roles, with each now playing the part the other used to play. Whether Israeli literature falls victim to the curse of parochialism and insularity may depend in large measure on the willingness of the new Hebrew writers to draw from the experience of Yiddish. Mr. Teller, a veteran contributor to these pages, has written widely on various aspects of Jewish culture, and is also active as a lecturer. He is the author of *Scapegoat of Revolution* (1954).

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extensive Hebrew education) could easily work in both. However, shortly after the two languages became media of secular literatures, the Yiddish and Hebrew partnership began to break up. Yiddish writing emerged as the popular ("vulgar") literature of the masses, while Hebrew served for the literature of an intellectual elite, and each began to acquire its own peculiarities.

Because of the diversity and size of its audience, Yiddish ranged over a wider terrain. Hebrew, as the *lingua franca* of those members of the Jewish intelligentsia who had already savored Emancipation without quite severing their umbilical connection with the mass of the people, worked a smaller thematic area more intensively. History has, ironically, reversed the status of the two languages in our own day: literary Yiddish is on the way to becoming an esoteric or pseudo-sacred tongue used only by a narrow circle of so-called *weltliche* (secular) intelligentsia, while Hebrew is embracing an ever wider, more worldly range of interests.

Everywhere we look we find evidence of the dramatic change in status of the two languages, especially since the establishment of the State of Israel. Much Hebrew literature from the time of Haskalah until about thirty years ago was filled with bitter lamentation for the plight of the Hebrew writer as a prophet without audience. By contrast, the Yiddish writer enjoyed a responsive public and had no reason to feel neglected or ignored. Today, Yiddish theoretically still has an audience of many millions, while the assured readership of Hebrew literature is only a fraction of the million Jews now constituting the Israeli nation; but these figures, however accurate, are deceptive and the truth is very much the other way around. Each literature now stands where the other once was. How did this reversal come about?

The precursors of modern Hebrew literature, the early *maskilim*, Moses Mendelsohn and his disciples, were in a direct line of succession to the traditional rabbinical elite against whom first the Hasidim and then the Jewish socialists took up arms. The rabbinic anti-Hasid and the enlightened *maskil* had in common a reverence for rational faith, Jewish learning, and the civilized amenities. They also shared a belief in their own superiority to the untutored multitude. The *maskilim*, never questioning the fundamental principles of religion, remained devout in the modern Orthodox sense. Only environmental differences account for the tragic schism between East European Orthodoxy and the German Haskalah.

Yiddish, on the other hand, was from the first assigned a low status. The Hebraists branded it a *shifchah*, a concubine like Hagar whom Abraham turned out into the desert at Sarah's command. Yiddish might serve and entertain, but it could never rule the household. It was a proper language for *techinot* (the prayers written for women) and suchlike sentimental supplications, but could not be expected to convey the loftinesses of Torah, or true knowledge.

The precursors of Yiddish literature were the later *magidim*, or itinerant preachers, the bearers of East European Jewry's social gospel, and the early Hasidic leaders, who were regarded by the rabbinate as instigators of an anti-intellectual revolt.

The allegories of the *magidim* and the Hasidic wonder-tale were addressed to the relatively uneducated lower classes—the innkeepers, artisans, and small shopkeepers; the learned *misnaged* dismissed them with contempt. In its secular forms, Yiddish literature spoke (sometimes with the voice of socialism) to still lower reaches of the population —the apprentices and domestics, the so-called proletariat of the Pale. Its focus, consequently, was on the concrete conditions of the people; its concern was not with the abstract status of the Jewish nation among all other nations—*Yisrael Ba-amim*—but with Jewry's intramural relations (and more often than not, its *class* relations). It did not judge Jewry as a whole and find it wanting, but accepted it as a world, indeed almost *the* world. It tendered its compassion to the humble even outside the Jewish community. And where Hebrew literature blamed the Jew of the Pale himself for his abject condi-

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tion, drawing invidious comparisons between what he had been in ancient times and what he had now become, Yiddish literature, from the Hasidic tale through the *shund-roman* (the popular novels about mistreated domestics) to its fully mature works, celebrated the glory of the common man.

TRUE to its rabbinic heritage, Hebrew literature was strong not on tales and stories but on essays. The polemics of the early *maskilim* gradually developed into a literature of national thought dealing with the problems first raised by the Emancipation, which haunt the Jewish intellectual to this day: the *raison d'être* of Jewish survival, rationalism versus faith, religious allegiance versus secular nationalism. With the possible exception of Ber Borochov's monumental socio-political writings in Yiddish, almost all the significant literature of Jewish nationalism and its important Zionist-socialist sub-section—the work of Peretz Smolenskin, Ahad Ha-am, Micah Yosef Berditchevsky, A. D. Gordon, Hugo Bergman, and Yehudah Kaufman—was produced in Hebrew. Most of these works can be loosely classified as religious thought, in direct succession to the major Hebrew literary tradition. Yiddish nationalist writing, on the other hand, largely took the form of polemical tracts addressed to a mass audience, and with few exceptions concerned itself with prosaic material conditions, not high destiny. The movements it produced—Bundism, Folkism, and Territorialism—have all proved ephemeral, though they were espoused by distinguished minds. Moreover, unlike its Hebrew counterpart, Yiddish nationalist literature was almost wholly secular, thus diverging from the major tradition of Jewish literature.

The spirit of the essay also dominated modern Hebrew poetry in its earliest stages, which coincided with the first phase of the Russian Haskalah (beginning of the 19th century). Couched in a hyperbolic rhetoric adapted from the prophets and the medieval *piyutim* (devotional hymns), this versifying, like the essays of the movement, aroused the wrath but never the contempt of Haskalah's rabbinic antagonists. Yet it was abstruse and recondite, holding itself aloof from the day-to-day concerns (not to mention the comprehension) of the ordinary Jew. Curiously enough, it took a pogrom to make Hebrew poetry turn its eyes with sympathy to the mass of Jews; in Bialik's famous Zionist poem on the Kishinev pogrom, *Ir Ha-Haregah* ("The City of Slaughter"), modern Hebrew verse blossoms into full maturity. This was a time when Jewish socialism could offer only a secular messianism, a future working class solidarity.

Bialik saw Kishinev as marking a solemn fusion of material condition and national destiny, with the historic Jew as a nimbus around the bleeding head of the living Jew. His call to Jewish pride to rise up in the face of Gentile savagery marked the end of Haskalah's habit of treating the Jews like *muzhiks* resisting the Light. The *goy* was made a horrible partner in the Jew's condition and the dialogue between conservative and enlightener raised to a higher level, being placed in the context of the ever recurring debate between those who saw the Jew as the object, and those who regarded him as the subject, of history. The poets who followed Bialik—as, for example, Saul Chernichovsky, whose emphasis on form earned him a reputation as a Hellenist, and Zalman Schneur, whose propensity for the sensuous got him the nickname "Pagan"—did not go back to treating the "unemancipated" Jew superciliously. They did, however, take up the Hellenist side in the ancient controversy.

This concentration on the single general theme of Jewish dignity-emancipation-sovereignty made Hebrew poetry appear parochial alongside its Yiddish counterpart, whose catholicism can be ascribed to its very preoccupation with the material and social situation of the Jew. And as Yiddish poets moved westward with the tide of Jewish emigration, they extended their horizons to include life on several continents.

But the diverse literary origins of Yiddish verse account even more significantly for its broader scope. Until the First World War,

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Hebrew drew its poets, with few exceptions, from the narrow world of the yeshiva. The precursors of Yiddish poetry were an infinitely more colorful crew—the *badchan* (a kind of wedding entertainer) and the *Purim shpieler* (actor in the Purim pageant), the courtyard singer, and the wine-cellar balladeer, the author of *techinot,* and also a goodly sprinkling of yeshiva *bachurim*. This broad cross-section was reflected in a variegated body of poetry such as Hebrew has only recently begun to match. Thus Yiddish verse had such exponents as Morris Rosenfeld, poet of social protest; Moshe Leib Halpern, social satirist; Yehoash, classicist and Yiddish translator of the Bible; the metaphysical Melech Ravich, whose long ballad on the Jew's ambivalence toward his own Jewishness has gone unnoticed even in Yiddish literary circles; the vanished Soviet Yiddish poet Izi Charik, laureate of the revolt of the Pale's lower depths; Itzik Manger, lyricist and parodist; and H. Leivick, a poet of Kafkaesque self-flagellation.

A SIMILAR disparity between Yiddish and Hebrew was even more evident in fiction. Yiddish fiction served a long apprenticeship before it acquired the status of a full-fledged literature. Its "folk" origins insured from the start that it would be rooted in the life of the ordinary Jew and that it would try to be entertaining as well as instructive. Yiddish being the daily tongue of East European Jewry, literary ability, and not formidable scholarly attainments, was alone required of one who aspired to write in it, and it could enlist the primitive and untutored talent as Hebrew could not. The result was a body of Yiddish fiction even more diversified than the poetry. Nor was this richness diminished when Yiddish fiction began to achieve intellectual respectability.

Mendele Mocher Seforim, Sholom Aleichem, and Peretz broadened the appeal of the Yiddish story without narrowing its base. Mendele, writing in both languages, gave Yiddish fiction standing among the educated Hebrew-reading elite. Sholom Aleichem's humor captivated all classes in the Pale. Peretz attracted the secularized, the later proponents of *weltliche yiddishkeit.*

In style and mode Yiddish fiction ranged from the playfully amusing to the savagely realistic. I. M. Weisenberg's work spawned a whole school of naturalists and masters of the argot like Oizer Warshavsky, Chayim Leib Fuks, and Fishl Bimko. And the effects of the political and social upheavals in Eastern Europe and of the migration to America were commemorated on an epic scale by Sholem Asch, David Bergelson, I. J. Singer, Isaac Bashevis Singer, and, within a smaller framework, by Leon Kobrin and A. Raboi.

But for all its variety, there is little concern with character in Yiddish fiction. Norman Podhoretz was not wholly wrong when he observed (in "Jewish Culture and the Intellectuals," COMMENTARY, May 1955) that Yiddish writers, by and large, have dealt only peripherally with the individual. Yet this is not quite the shortcoming he seems to think it. In the congested Pale, the individual had, literally, not enough room in which to become a complete and sovereign human being, and the world outside the Pale refused to grant him any autonomy and status apart from the group to which he belonged. Thus it was only natural that in the fiction produced by the writers of such a community the individual should possess importance only insofar as he exemplified, or departed from, the "folk" condition. This type of literature falls within the ancient and well-established tradition of *Don Quixote.*

COMPARED to Yiddish, early Hebrew fiction labored under great disadvantages. Unspoken for centuries and enshrined in the archaic *piyutim* and formalized exegetical writings, the Hebrew language was at first grotesque in its fumbling attempts to portray life in the concrete. Furthermore, fiction itself was regarded as an unmanly indulgence by a generation so steeped in Talmud that it could look upon even some of the sacred books that were short on *Halachah* (legal analysis and debate) and long on *Aggada* (legend and story) as inferior fare. Early Haskalah fiction was melodramatic in con-

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ception and primitive in execution, with rabbinism and Hasidism standing for everything that was evil in Jewish life, and the Enlightenment and its followers representing absolute good. Even after it had left behind the parochialism of Haskalah, Hebrew fiction continued for a long time to deal with the central Haskalic theme of ignorance and obscurantism versus reason and enlightenment. But the struggle between the demands of tradition and those of secularism was now translated (as in Mordecai Z'ev Feierberg's *Whither*) from a social-intellectual contest in the public world, into a private psychological war within the hero himself. Enlightenment was no longer seen as release, but as agony. This theme of the Jew in limbo, at home neither in the *goy*-dominated world of Europe nor in the *shtetl* from which he fled, was most powerfully developed by Micah Joseph Berdichevsky (1865-1920), a brooding Nietzchean who, in his attempt to project the alienated Jew into a symbol of modern man, is a forerunner of Franz Kafka and Arthur Koestler.

The vitality of the Yiddish-speaking multitudes emerging into new freedom during the last two decades of the 19th and first decade of the 20th century was infectious, and Yiddish literature, like Hasidism, was essentially optimistic. Oversimplifying the causes of the depressed condition of the Jews of the Pale, Yiddish writing was hopeful about its amelioration. The isolated Hebrew writer, on the other hand, working in the austere tradition of Haskalah, brooded apprehensively over the fate of the Jew. Yiddish optimism generated *Galut* nationalism; Hebrew apprehensiveness led to a determinist Zionism.

But in retrospect it is clear that this picture had already undergone a change by the end of World War I, when the reversal of roles referred to above began to take place. The Soviet Yiddish writer, in best Haskalah form, castigated what he called "the residues of reaction and superstition," although for a quite different purpose. And the American Yiddish writer, shivering in the early evening chill of his alienation from the larger Jewish community, like the Haskalah writer of an earlier day, began to sulk and complain about the contemporary Jew, and to lament the absence of *nachwuks* (successors). Polish Yiddish literature, however, centered in a community still largely autonomous, continued as realistic interpreter of Jewish life.

MEANWHILE, Hebrew fiction, now being produced by writers who had emigrated to Palestine after the Russian Revolution, transformed itself from a censorious into an elegiac literature, nostalgically conjuring up that very life of East Europe which it had treated so harshly before. Thus until very recently, Hebrew fiction very much resembled the American Yiddish fiction of our own time in its idealization of the *shtetl*, and knew a similar estrangement from its potential audience. Though the men and women of the second and third *aliyot* (waves of immigration to Palestine) had renounced the *Galut* and all its works, the new Hebrew fiction set a halo of reverence around the *shtetl*. While the new pioneers were still disciples of Haskalah in a very basic sense, the new Hebrew writers were renouncing it altogether. The cry went up for a literature that would deal with the condition of Palestine's pioneering Zionist society.

Only one major Hebrew novelist of that day could satisfy the demand—the other Hebrew writers had too little previous experience in dealing with life around them. The Socialist-Zionist utopianism and the Dostoevskian despair of Yosef Chayim Brenner, who was killed by Mufti pogromists in Jaffa in 1920, suited the mood of the second *aliyah* (the third, post-World War I *aliyah* found it somewhat too heavy). Several other novelists, notably Ever Ha-dani and Yehuda Ya-ari, also wrote about the pioneering society, but the two major Israeli novelists, Shmuel Ya-akov Agnon and Chayim Hazaz—although the latter was never a nostalgist and sensed the moral disintegration of East European Jewish life—have only recently turned to writing about Israel's restoration. (As for Hebrew poetry, it followed a somewhat different course. Bialik

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had set its pattern by joining high destiny and material condition. His successors advanced rather jauntily from the challenge of *Ir Ha-Haregah* to a celebration of Halutzic pioneering. Also, perhaps because of the very nature of poetry, Hebrew verse could reflect the new environment sooner than fiction.)

The reversal of the positions of Yiddish and Hebrew was completed by World War II, the destruction of East European Jewry being the final term in the process. Yiddish had always been the first language of the slaughtered communities, notwithstanding the encroachments of Polish and Russian. Except perhaps in a few Latin American countries and in some parts of Israel, nothing like the Yiddish-speaking *shtetl* exists any longer—a whole society living out its life in Yiddish. The sad, inevitable result is that Yiddish literature today is out of touch with large areas of Jewish experience, as was modern Hebrew in its early period.

IT TOOK Hebrew fiction a long time to come to terms with the needs of its audience. By the 1940's, Hebrew had been a modern language for half a century, the speech of farm, factory, market place, and street, but its novelists and storytellers were still lost in reveries about the East European past. It was left to the sabras or native Israelis, to resolve this anomaly. The mid-1940's (and particularly the years after the War of Liberation) saw an avalanche of literary works by young natives, whose introduction of slang shocked the older writers as stylistic vandalism. Their subject matter was highly personal; they wrote what were virtually diaries of their days in the anti-British underground and in the Arab war. Plays by sabra writers were performed before packed houses, crowds flocked to hear them read from their writings, and their books went through many editions.

They were influenced largely by Hemingway, but their sensitivity to the moral dilemmas posed by war indicated a kinship (unconscious perhaps) with Brenner. Their elders, who had raised them to be free of the vacillations and misgivings of the *Galut*, were pleasantly surprised. For these young men and women were different from their forebears in a very essential way, and yet at bottom they were traditionally Jewish. In contrast to the stereotyped picture of the Jew of the *Galut*, they did not postpone and evade decisions, defer action, or talk endlessly instead of acting. Yet they were not immune to, and bore courageously, the agony of making necessarily imperfect moral decisions in the heat of very practical action.

Perhaps never before in all history has there been such a literature—written by men still in the front lines and passionately convinced of the rightness of their cause, yet self-searching, full of guilt, and crying out for penance. The most forceful exponent of this vein in sabra literature—its major vein—is S. Yizhar, a writer of slender output and impeccable style, a Rehovot school teacher and a former Mapai member of Knesset.

In a few years' time there came a noticeable slackening of sabra literary output and of the enthusiasm for it. Today, the young writers are engaged in a realistic, hard-headed search for causes. They reproach themselves for having been too self-centered in the past and for having written too privately; they ascribe the success with the public of their previous work to topicality, and now say that relatively little of it can survive on its intrinsic merits. This self-criticism is perhaps too harsh, yet there is great truth in it. From early adolescence these writers were involved in youth movements, moving like wolf-packs through school, play, and underground units, which were then incorporated intact into the Israeli army. Even their most shattering experience, the War of Liberation, which brought them face to face with radically new situations, hardly confronted them with new kinds of people. They realize now that they must go beyond the limited range of their past experience and seek sustenance from different sections of the population. The new slogan is: study the new immigrants!

But good literature is not called forth by slogans, whether of the Russian kind demanding "socialist realism" or of the *Life* magazine kind recommending "optimistic" fiction. What these young writers are really

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searching for is some indigenous literary tradition on which they can draw. The disrepute into which Haskalah and militant Zionism had cast the *Galut* and the *shtetl* make it all the more difficult for the sabra writer to establish a rapport with the main streams of Jewish literature. A recent Israeli newspaper article, reiterating charges against Haskalah that are frequently heard in Israel today, called for the removal of its literature from school curricula. According to this article, the work of Haskalah's leading poet, Yehudah Leib Gordon, "although of questionable literary merit, [has had] a destructive influence on the attitude of our youth towards the religious and spiritual values of our people," and "all our well-intentioned efforts to perpetuate the values of the *Golah* can hardly persevere against [Mendele's] descriptions of . . . the multitudes of *kabtzanim* [paupers] and centers of *kabtzanut*."

THE desperation of the younger sabra writers is demonstrated by the fact that one of them has recently gone so far as to suggest that Yiddish might offer instructive examples! The most daring and successful effort by a sabra writer to establish communication with Jewish literary tradition was made by Moshe Shamir, in his three most recent works: *Yad Chazakah,* a play named after Maimonides' major work and concerned, as Maimonides had been on occasion, with the problem of the "alien in our midst"; *Melech Basar Va-Dam,* a novel, and *Milchemet B'nei Or,* another play, both of which latter deal with the civil war in Hasmonean Judea under Alexander Jannai.

All three works have obvious relevance to contemporary Israel. All three deal with periods, subjects, and personalities out of the Halachic-Midrashic, not Biblical past. Several years ago Ben Gurion advised Israeli writers to rely on the Bible for inspiration and to eschew the Midrashic literature of the Exilic era. Shamir is one sabra writer who has patently repudiated this counsel. Raised in Labor Zionist youth movements, caught up all his life in political activity of one kind or another, Shamir received little, if any, formal schooling in the Talmudic and rabbinic literature on which his recent books draw. His earlier work was perhaps even slangier than most sabra writing, but his style in the latest novel and the two plays has an almost archaic quality (resembling Agnon's) appropriate to the literary idiom of the periods he is treating. Although traces of Marxist influence are visible here and there, his primary involvement is with theological and ethical problems—an incredible preoccupation for a member of Mapam.

Though Shamir's talents raise him above most of his contemporaries, the path he has followed is nevertheless typical of his generation's movement from "Palmach jive" to Midrashic stateliness, and from war stories to historical parables. But most significant is his simultaneous concern with the metaphysical and materialist motifs of history—a concern also shared by many others of his generation. This seems to indicate that the dichotomy between the Yiddish involvement with the material conditions of the masses and the Hebrew interest in Jewish destiny is being resolved. And, indeed, to unite the Yiddish and the Hebrew spirit by giving a new normalcy to Jewish life was the grand purpose of Zionism. Israeli literature is bound increasingly to reflect this union—as it must if it is to achieve lasting vitality.

Yet one final question remains. Might not Israeli literature become just another parochial, inconsequential, small people's literature? One can safely predict that it will defy this classification if it does nothing else. The very fact that Israeli writers are attempting to establish their succession to one of the most universal of all literary traditions insures against parochialism. One cannot imagine a literature based on the ancient Hebrew sources, and yet grappling with contemporary reality, as anything other than universal in interest, whether or not it succeeds in placing itself among the major literatures of the world.

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ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND COMMUNIST TEACHERS

Critique of a Report

PAUL R. HAYS

THE American Association of University Professors, an organization with about 37,000 members, recently adopted a report on "Academic Freedom and Tenure in the Quest for National Security" in the course of which it was said: "We cannot accept an educational system that is subject to the irresponsible push and pull of contemporary controversies."

The priggishness of this academic aloofness from "contemporary controversies" recalls Pliny the Younger's irritation at being interrupted in his reading of Livy's histories by the eruption of Mount Vesuvius. But subjection to "irresponsible" push and pull is quite another matter. The professors are clearly justified in demanding an attitude of responsibility from the university administrations, just as those administrations, and the community as a whole, are justified in expecting that university professors and their Association will take responsible positions on matters of controversy, contemporary and otherwise.

One of the essentials of the attitude of responsibility which we have a right to demand of university professors is that they will examine issues seriously and soberly, and that they will stand fast against those barrages of slogans and catchwords which sometimes sweep others off non-professorial feet. In the course of the contemporary controversy over freedom and security, professors, like the rest of us, have been bombarded from both sides. That the professors have stood up very well against the pressure from what may be roughly described as the McCarthy-Jenner-Eastland line of attack is admirably demonstrated by their "Report." As Sidney Hook has pointed out, it is almost impossible to find a professor who has expressed agreement with this line or approval of its tactics. Indeed, it would be a very bold professor who would dare to risk the scorn and contempt which his colleagues would heap upon him if he expressed such views.

But, although professors ought to be peculiarly fitted for the duty of keeping more than one idea in mind at a time, there seems to some of us to be a serious doubt as to whether the profession has been able with equal firmness to withstand the pressure from the other side, the side which may roughly be designated (at the risk of incurring the wrath of General Telford Taylor, who has strictly prohibited the use of the phrase) the anti-anti-Communist side. The screams of "McCarthyism" from that side have surely been at least as raucous and as frequently absurd and misdirected as have been the screams of "Communism" from the other. How well have the professors demonstrated their responsibility in face of *this* "irresponsible push and pull"?

THE "Report" of the Association avoids those excesses which have resulted from the panic so assiduously whipped up in an attempt to frighten professors and other intellectuals into believing that their freedom has been destroyed. There is in it very little echo of the exaggerations of Robert May-

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LAST YEAR the American Association of University Professors appointed a special committee to review the question of "Academic Freedom and Tenure in the Quest for National Security." PAUL R. HAYS, whose essay addresses itself to the report recently rendered by the AAUP's special committee, is vice-chairman of New York's Liberal party and professor of law at Columbia University. A previous article by him, "Congress's Right to Investigate," appeared in November 1955.

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nard Hutchins, whose efforts to picture the present situation as a reign of terror where no professor dares to speak out have done so much to discredit the causes for which he claims to stand. These professors have not been stampeded by the cries of "McCarthyism" into such grotesque misrepresentations of the contemporary status of academic freedom as has even such an eminent and respected scholar as Robert M. MacIver. The sound of thirty-seven thousand professorial voices screaming at the top of their lungs that they were afraid to say a word would, perhaps, have suggested paradox even more than do Professor MacIver's own vehement protests.

So the Association's professors "do not say the battle is lost." In fact, they find that "there is . . . cause for gratification that even during the recent past a large measure of freedom has been both developed and preserved."

But with all this there is still to be found in the "Report" such reflections of the synthetic panic as the statement, "It would require great fortitude, for example, for any teacher or student to espouse a position the Russians have adopted, rather than some official stand taken by the United States, on any significant contemporary issue." Unless the professors are thinking of such elemental issues as murder and slave labor, it is hard to think of any significant contemporary issue on which thousands of professors do not regularly, and as an everyday matter of course, express agreement with the Russian position rather than the American. While I *do* know professors who defend the Russians in their murder of those who have the great fortitude to speak out against their oppressors, I suppose they are rather few in number, and though, so far as I can see, they are in no danger whatsoever, perhaps there is some element of courage involved in publicly espousing murder. But nothing could be more astonishing than the proposition that it requires any courage whatsoever to take a position, for example, against German rearmament, or for recognition of Red China. In fact, though, quite properly, no risk whatever of jobs is incurred in taking either side on any such contemporary issues, I would judge on the basis of my own experience that a professor who took the "American" side would be in greater danger of derision from his "liberal" colleagues than a professor who took the "Russian" side would be from the "reactionaries."

In spite of the generally not too unfavorable atmosphere of academic freedom which the Association finds, it is concerned with individual examples of breaches of this freedom and much of its "Report" is taken up with discussion of these examples. Many of these present interesting and perhaps arguable points. (Apparently, however, there was some limitation on argument, since at least one of the professors who attended the meeting which adopted the "Report" is quoted by newspapers as having characterized the proceedings as "tyrannical.") But it is not the individual reports which raise the more puzzling questions as to the degree of responsibility demonstrated by these professors, but rather the general principles which guided them in their determinations in individual instances.

One of the "Relevant General Principles" of the "Report" refers to the claims of military security. The professors "unhestitatingly accept the application to colleges and universities of needed safeguards against the misuse of specially classified information important for military security." But they believe that "in no degree do they [the safeguards] justify the proscription of individuals because of their beliefs or associations, unless these persons were knowingly participants in criminal acts or conspiracies, either in the past or at present."

In other words, an applicant for a position in a university department dealing in secret material for the Department of Defense could not be "proscribed" merely because he announced that he believed that the welfare of mankind would be furthered by his stealing documents for transmission to the Soviet Union, unless it could be

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proved that he had already knowingly stolen documents somewhere else. The fact that he was known to meet every evening after dinner with a group of Soviet spies under surveillance by the F.B.I. would be no ground for denying him access to secret information. The university administration would have to prove that the meetings were not held merely for the purpose of drinking beer or discussing Chekhov.

The language which the professors use betrays them on this "relevant principle." The irresponsibility of their formulation is the direct result of their failure to examine the slogans and the catchwords of the anti-anti-Communists as carefully as they have examined those of the other side. The professors have been panicked by such empty phrases as "proscription of individuals" and "beliefs or associations" (*cf.* "guilt by association"). A moment's reflection would have demonstrated that *some* beliefs and *some* associations are clearly and vitally relevant to the right of access to classified information. By falling for the catchwords, they were prevented from taking that moment for reflection.

THE same kind of muddled, slogan-ridden thinking is found in the discussion of disclaimer oaths and general investigations. Here the professors say:

> We deplore the entire recent tendency to look upon persons or groups suspiciously and to subject their characters and attitudes to special tests as a condition of employing them in responsible positions. This country's greatness is founded upon a belief in the individual's importance and upon a trust in his ability and worthiness to serve his fellow-men in accordance with his capacity. Only by gross misconduct, proved by means of due process, should the right to this trust be lost, and then only to the extent necessary to defend the common interest. The confidence reposed in the individual and in his integrity, and the independence of decision and action granted him, have been vindicated throughout our history by the loyalty of our citizens, and by their willingness to make sacrifices in times of crisis. With infrequent exceptions, even those who have pursued false causes and have seemed at times to threaten the nation's fundamental principles have done so, as history generally recognizes, out of concern for the general welfare as they saw it.

Special tests of "characters and attitudes" are as common in our system and as typical of it as is reference in Fourth of July orations to "sacrifices in times of crisis." For example, an attitude of carelessness toward other peoples' property may be all very well for a professor, but it clearly should be the subject of a special test for the responsible position of a bank clerk. Professors may appropriately have characters which are free of guile and trusting of all fellow-men on the ground that most individuals are worthy of trust, but a special test of character may be required in this respect for detectives and policemen. And a bank clerk's telling his girl friend of his plans to rob the bank is probably not "gross misconduct." Perhaps "due process" would reveal that he was only trying to impress her with his nonchalance. But it might be a sufficient reason for loss of trust, just as a professor's announcement that he planned to recruit his students for the Mafia might be innocent merriment, but would bear looking into. And, finally, the fact that Alger Hiss believed that his treachery would serve the general welfare "as he saw it" hardly qualified him for a professorship. Or perhaps these professors think it does, and that with the loss of John Wilkes Booth, who also acted for the general welfare as he saw it, the universities were deprived of a valuable possibility for the chair of dramatic literature.

Consider the emotive words in this pastiche of irresponsible thinking. "The country's greatness," "belief in the individual's importance," "trust," "worthiness," "serve his fellow men," "defend the common interest," "confidence," "integrity," "independence," "throughout our history," "the loyalty of our citizens," "sacrifices," "the nation's fundamental principles," "concern for the general welfare." Surely, we can expect better from our professors than the thoughtless piling up of catchwords to beguile us into believing that we need not consider individual characters and attitudes in

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choosing people for responsible positions.

The professors begin their discussion of what a professor *can* be fired for with another high-sounding statement which is equally incapable of surviving the slightest test for content. "Action against a faculty member," they say, "cannot rightly be taken on grounds that limit his freedom as an individual, as a member of the academic community, or as a teacher and scholar." Since, of course, any grounds whatever for such action would limit all three "freedoms," the statement means precisely nothing—though it certainly has a resounding ring.

THE fact of the matter is, of course, that, thank Heaven, university professors are better than this collection of false platitudes would indicate. They can reason; they can examine arguments dispassionately; they can weigh evidence. What has carried them away, and trapped them in this bog of nonsense, is their desire to defend the right of Communists to be university professors. All of their illogical statements, specious reasoning, and resort to catchwords and slogans is really directed, not to proving that Al Capone would make a good university professor—although they succeed in proving that too—but to justifying the right of Communists to teach. The issue is not whether "beliefs and associations" are important in determining whether we want John Doe as a colleague. Of course they are. The real issue which has got the professors so steamed up that they have forsaken logic and common sense is whether Comrade Doe should be fired. In order to be sure to include Comrade Doe under the protective cloak of academic freedom, the professors have made the cloak so broad as to include almost anybody who hasn't actually been hanged for murder.

If the professors had been more willing to meet head-on the issue of the desirability of having Communist professors, they could have spared themselves all the parade of principles so general that they are false or meaningless or both. Whether Communists should teach or not is an arguable issue in itself. But there are arguments against it which the professors seem curiously unwilling to examine. There may be some merit, for example, in their argument that the determination of who *are* Communists is not likely to be made with fine discrimination by some university administrations. This argument, however, is logically unavailable to the professors because they have already taken the position that those who *undoubtedly* are Communists should not be fired for that reason. A somewhat similar dodge is used in recommending that professors oppose the move to make Communist party membership illegal. Don't do that, they say, because it would only drive them underground, and we all want them "kept in view." Of course, if the Communists are such pleasant, harmless, agreeable ideologues that we want them to teach in our universities, driving them underground would be an injustice—but it would have nothing to do with the desirability of keeping them in view.

The arguments against having university professors who are Communists is, briefly, that Communism is not an ideology but a conspiracy, and that membership in the Communist party today is for all practical purposes proof of complicity in that conspiracy. A part of that conspiracy which is particularly relevant to teachers is the requirement of the party that members use their role as teachers to further the ends of the conspiracy, regardless of the means used to do so. A teacher's membership in the Communist party therefore means that he is devoting every possible effort to bringing about the destruction of the United States and the success of the Soviet Union.

AT NO point in their "Report" do the professors attempt to deal with these arguments directly. But it seems fairly certain that they must reject them. The identification of Communism as just another competing ideology becomes explicit when the professors say:

To maintain a healthy state of thought and opinion in this country, it is desirable for ad-

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herents of Communism, like those of other forms of revolutionary thought, to present their views, especially in colleges and universities, so that they may be checked by open discussion. How else are Americans to know the nature of the ideological currents in their world? If representatives of Communism from abroad were to be employed under an exchange program in American institutions of higher learning, as has been proposed, the unwisdom of the present academic policy would quickly become evident. We urge that American colleges and universities return to a full-scale acceptance of intellectual controversy based on a catholicity of viewpoint, for the sake of national strength as well as for academic reasons.

It seems scarcely necessary to point out the absurdity of the notion that you have to have Communists to teach the nature of Communism, since this "Relevant General Principle" is unlikely to fool many of the professors or to lead to widespread demand for Egyptians to teach Egyptology or homosexuals to teach homosexuality.

The assumptions which underlie the quoted paragraph are much more serious in their implications. If it were not for the fact that indications of the same attitude are common in intellectual circles generally, there would be occasion for astonishment in the professors' blandly unquestioning acceptance of Communism as merely one of the entirely respectable ideologies presently competing along with others for public acceptance in the market place of ideas. The professors' canon of "catholicity" never led them to demand that Nazis and Fascists be imported to teach those ideologies. It is a major mystery of our day why, among all the temporarily successful gangsters of modern times, the Communists alone have been able to acquire in the eyes of the intellectuals a special aura of respectability.

Professors are particularly concerned with problems of learning, and some of them might well devote their attention to what appears to be a phenomenal failure of the learning process. Even those of us who were pointing out in the thirties the lessons to be learned about Communism can understand if not excuse the failure of the intellectuals of that time to grasp those lessons. While it may seem gratuitous for the American Association of University Professors to praise Johns Hopkins University, as they do in their "Report," for keeping as a professor an expert on the Soviet Union to whom in the thirties the obscene Moscow purges "sounded like democracy," we could, again, understand that praise if the professor had since learned the true character of those purges. A tolerant view of our intellectuals would even allow them the right to have been taken in by the wartime propaganda about our gallant allies, in spite of the Hitler-Stalin pact. But how they could have withstood the postwar revelations of murder and espionage, of trickery and deceit, of enslavement and oppression, defies analysis in terms of the logic of intelligent learning. And today, when so much of the history of the Communist movement over the past thirty years stands exposed, not only by the investigation of scholars but by the admission of its principal leaders, as the insane violence of a homicidal maniac, one might reasonably demand of the professors that they exhibit some evidence that, however late, at last they have learned the most elementary lesson of their times.

But no. What others have learned to look upon as a war to the death waged by forces of darkness and evil against all decency, is to the professors an "intellectual controversy" which would be furthered by a "catholicity of viewpoint" in our universities: Communism is not a conspiracy to destroy the freedom of mankind, but a form of revolutionary thought like other "forms of revolutionary thought." Inviting Soviet professors to teach in our universities would not present an opportunity for espionage and sabotage (unless it presented a chance to seek asylum), but would show "the unwisdom of our present academic policy."

THE professors who subscribed to this "Report" would have commanded confidence and respect, if they had sought to deal with the arguments of such colleagues of theirs as Professors Sidney Hook, George S.

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Counts, and John L. Childs, instead of having resort to general principles which merely repeat the empty stereotypes of the anti-anti-Communists. In addition to the vigorous dissents reported by the press, one item of information contained in the "Report" suggests that, whatever the position of the leaders of the American Association of University Professors, the average American professor has not been stampeded into taking irresponsible and indefensible positions. The faculty of the University of California, "after a full year's discussion, voted by secret ballot in a majority of 79 per cent to sustain the policy of the University excluding Communists from employment." And this majority voted not only to exclude "Communists from teaching positions simply upon evidence of membership in the Communist Party," but also to exclude teachers whose "commitments or obligations to any organization, Communist or other, prejudice impartial scholarship and the free pursuit of truth. . . ."

APOLOGIA PRO VITA NOSTRA

JACOB SLOAN

How cool within the fiery
furnace of His creatures
the young men daily raise
wide sleeves in happy praise
to His more-than-natural ways:
  See how they rise at Lauds
    each from his place,
  banked line to line against
    each other's grace.

Then see us, sweating, sad,
like animals from nature,
that cannot hold to hear
His open voice for fear
what once was, will be, clear:
  See how we, beating, breast
    each other's sins,
  that all our rage may be
    forgiven Him.

When we were young, we stared
hour-long at mirror eyes,
suddenly to surprise
our true identity:
Who now that we have grown
through the simple glass
know, We are not our past,
but what we think

or seem. Birds we followed once
in longing and in flight
across His empty sky
defy their own

formations: "Veer away, away,
stragglers turn, leaders,
Jesus ends as Caesar,
all can be

what none was really born to."
When young we denied
ourselves in every guise:
We were His.

But now we must hail
the living evidence—
our foxhead against
His lion tail.

Jacob Sloan is associate editor of the *American Jewish Yearbook*, and a frequent contributor of verse and criticism to Commentary.

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THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN JEWRY

Part II

HERBERT J. GANS

THE main trends in the development of the American Jewish community can be traced most clearly in the changes that take place between generations. These, in turn, are reflected, at least to some extent, in the kind of upbringing that parents give their children from one generation to the next. Part I of this essay, in the May number, began with the way East European Jewish immigrants raised their children, and then went on to describe what happened to Jewish life in America when these children—the second generation—matured and became the majority in the American Jewish community.* In this concluding part, I want to show, first, how the second generation has been raising its own children, the third generation, and then go on to examine some major tendencies in Jewish life today that may shed light on the type of community that will emerge when the third generation grows into adulthood. Finally, I shall project these trends into the distant future in an effort to weigh the possibilities of Jewish survival in America, and to guess at the forms that the Jewish community of the future might take.

As I pointed out in Part I of this essay, the Jews of the second generation strove, with considerable success, to attain the level of income and the way of life of the American middle class. This mobility drive, plus the fact that they grew up suspended between two cultures—the American and the Jewish—had the effect of weaning them away from what I called "traditional Judaism." Yet they remained members of the Jewish community; they continued to consider themselves Jews, never even showing an awareness of any alternative to being Jewish.

Many of them did, however, believe that they could choose not to raise their children as Jews, but most of them soon found that they had no wish to do so; or if they had, they discovered that the world around them —by labeling the children Jewish—prevented realization of the wish. In the course of rearing the children, then, they became conscious of how Jewish they themselves felt and of how real, although sporadic, was their need to express their feelings of Jewishness.** The evolution of suitable forms of expression which could also be transmitted to the children led to what has commonly been considered a revival of "traditional Judaism."

But as I suggested, even before the postwar period traditional Judaism was being transformed into what I called "symbolic

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LAST MONTH we published the first of this two-part article by HERBERT J. GANS on the present and future of the American Jewish community. From a somewhat different viewpoint, Mr. Gans treats many of the same issues as the pair of articles by Will Herberg on the general religious revival in America (August and September 1955), and another pair by Nathan Glazer (December 1955 and January 1956) on the specifically Jewish side of the revival. Born in Germany in 1927, Mr. Gans has lived in this country since 1940. He is research associate on the staff of the Institute for Urban Studies at the University of Pennsylvania, where he is completing his doctoral dissertation.

*I defined generation in "cultural" rather than "chronological" terms. Thus, the second generation includes all those who were raised in a family of East European Jewish background, regardless of date.

** *Jewishness* is one's sense of identity as a Jew, while *Judaism* I defined as the religious and secular culture of the Jewish people, and "traditional Judaism" as the Orthodox East European culture, together with its Conservative and Reform redefinitions.

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Judaism," a conglomeration of ceremonies and customs whose main purpose was to manifest these newly experienced feelings of Jewishness in those areas of life allotted to religion and related activities by American middle-class culture. I described three of the major elements composing the new Judaism: an "objects culture" in which physical objects used in traditional practices are taken out of their original context to serve as independent symbols of Jewish religious feelings; a Jewish popular culture in which a Jewish flavor is given to themes from American leisure culture; and a Jewish "problems culture" within which Jews moralize about such questions as assimilation, intermarriage, and anti-Semitism in a manner calculated less to find solutions than to affirm their identification with Jewry.

The picture I have sketched of the second generation contrasts sharply wtih the situation of the youthful third generation. While the Jew of the second generation spent his childhood in a distinctly Jewish home, first absorbing Jewishness unconsciously and effortlessly from his parents, and then rejecting the Judaism that accompanied it, the third-generation Jewish child is brought up in an American middle-class home relatively devoid of Judaic traditions. Until he reaches school age he may not even be aware that he is Jewish, but once he discovers this fact, either from his elders or his peers, his parents will take great care to see to it that he learns to *feel* Jewish.

In the first-generation family, the father was the overseer of the child's Jewish training; in the middle-class family of today, the mother usually takes charge. But mothers tend to be less concerned with tradition, religious observances, and scholarship—the elements of Judaism—than with the child's social and emotional adjustment—his feelings of Jewishness. However, neither the mother nor the father possesses any great confidence about *how* to make their children feel Jewish. Consequently, when the child is old enough he is sent to Sunday school, an indigenous American institution which offers training in Judaism, but is utilized by the parents mainly as a means of strengthening the child's sense of Jewish identity.

Meanwhile the parents hover over the child to make sure of his progress in this regard. They try to help the Sunday school out by creating a "Jewish atmosphere" at home—that is, by using the material and non-material appurtenances of the symbolic Judaism mentioned above. However, the parents see to it, consciously or not, that this kind of Jewish atmosphere does not conflict seriously with the general middle-class American tone of the home.

As for the children, they have been infused with the culture and symbols of the child's America before ever setting foot in the Jewish school. They are not strongly motivated to learn the themes and symbols of yet another culture, especially one that is strange, and endorsed only qualifiedly by parents and peers. Most of them come away from Sunday school understanding that they are Jews, but with only a smattering of information about the implications of being Jewish and a scant interest in Judaism.

Jewish educators, whose concern is to insure the survival of a Jewish culture and of Jewish religious institutions that perpetuate traditional Judaism, appear to be committed to an endeavor that is of little importance to parents and of even less concern to the children. The constant discussion of pedagogic techniques and the re-definitions of Jewish education at conferences, in speeches, and in magazines are all symptoms of the dissatisfaction Jewish leaders feel at the thinness of the Jewish knowledge spread by the schools.

THE teachers see the problem largely as an educational one and, disputing over methods, fail to realize that they are actually trying to reverse a powerful trend toward cultural assimilation. In other words, their difficulties stem from the fact that they are attempting to persuade the third generation to accept, and to internalize, the patterns of a traditional Judaism which the parents, who are the major influence on the child's cultural attachments, gave up when they were children.

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Most parents are neither willing nor able to reassume an attachment to traditional Judaism that would provide the impetus to direct the child toward the goals of the Jewish school. Often, parents leave the job to the rabbi—or teacher—almost entirely (thus endowing him with greater authority than he has had before), although he alone is unable to motivate the children. Other parents make it plain from the outset that they do not want their children taught traditional Judaism, and ask no more of boards of Jewish education than that their children be told "about Judaism, but not how to practice it." "Don't make him too religious," they ask. "After all, I don't want my child to become a rabbi."

There is not enough information as yet to assess the attachment of the confirmed or Bar Mitzvah third generation to Judaism, traditional or symbolic. However, the regularity with which summer camps and teen-age youth groups go on repeating elementary material over and over again, suggests that only a handful of third-generation youngsters seem to absorb anything they learn in school. Most of them forget all but a few large facts and symbolic impressions soon after they graduate. On the other hand —as attitude studies conducted among Jewish youths show—the parents' concern with the children's feelings of Jewishness does seem to bear fruit. The home, and the Jewish schools, not to mention non-Jewish society, combine to make the children think of themselves as Jews, and to feel Jewish. Among teen-agers, for example, after-school sociability is still largely restricted to other Jews, and the synagogues reinforce this tendency by offering themselves as centers of Jewish adolescent activity.

ADULT American Jewry today is primarily of the second generation. Third-generation adults are still few in number, and besides, almost nothing is known about them. Therefore, in trying to visualize the kind of Jewish community that will emerge when the third-generation youngsters come of age, the best we can do is to make some guesses based on their upbringing and on more general trends in American life. The speculations that follow largely depend on three assumptions about the future that should be made explicit at the outset.

The first assumption is that the Jews—despite certain differences setting them apart—will follow in the main the evolutionary pattern of other American ethnic groups, many of which have already gone through something analogous to the present experience of the Jewish community and are now approaching a more advanced stage of cultural, if not social, assimilation. I am referring here to the Scandinavians, Germans, Irish, and others, who have been in America for four or more generations,* as well as to the Italians, Poles, Czechs, Greeks, etc., etc., many of whom came about the same time as the East European Jews.

My second assumption is that discrimination against Jews is decreasing, and that eventually, the economic, legal, and political disabilities once attached to Jewish identity will virtually disappear from the American scene. Public education, the Americanization of other ethnic groups, and the urban middle-class spirit of tolerance are all working to this end. Organized anti-Semitism is already confined mostly to the lunatic fringe, although the anti-Semitism latent in American society may prove more persistent. Also the physical attributes by which Jews were once characterized or stereotyped have become less conspicuous. Jewish children grow up taller and less "Mediterranean" in appearance than their parents. And as Jewish names grow much more Americanized, it becomes harder and harder to tell Jew from non-Jew—a difficulty that can only increase with the years.

Finally, my speculations are grounded in a set of admittedly hopeful assumptions con-

*The German Jews, who have also been here for four generations, are a special case because their assimilation was slowed down by the later arrival of the East European Jews. Nevertheless, someone should study the descendants of these families, to see what has happened to them and their relation to the Jewish community, generation by generation.

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cerning the evolution of American society itself. I assume here that the long-term trends of high productivity and employment and the steady increase in the standard of living can be maintained, and that tendencies toward a greater democratization of consumption, and of the social, economic, and political structure generally, will win out over other, more centralist and authoritarian tendencies. Regional, rural-urban, and ethnic diversities in American culture should continue to diminish. Conversely, the increase in leisure time, educational level, and exposure to new experiences (through the mass media and travel) should lead to a diversification of consumption styles, while encouraging experimentation with new ways of using leisure. And of course, everything I say is predicated on the hope that international relations will be more stable than today, and that no major war will occur.

Thus, the picture I am about to sketch of the future of American Jewry does not claim to be prophecy, but is rather a projection of trends and assumptions. My forecast will be accurate only to the extent that my assumptions are valid, and only if the few trends I have selected out of the large number observable turn out to be the significant ones. I might add that while the perspectives and techniques of sociology have guided me in my notion of which trends are significant, the projecting done here should not be mistaken for sociology.

PERHAPS the major distinction between the second and third generations of American Jewry lies in the differing degree to which being Jewish affects their lives. Because the former grew up in an all-embracing Orthodoxy that they could reject only with a struggle, they have continued to react to it ever since, sometimes positively, and sometimes negatively, but usually with some intensity. The third generation, on the other hand, comes to maturity in middle-class homes in which Jewish culture and religion play only a small, and circumscribed, role. Since the only traditional Judaism the third-generation child meets is in the Sunday school, Judaism, far from being a symbol of parental authority and hence a source of future emotional importance, becomes merely one of the many things he learns about.

Furthermore, the permissive rearing of the third generation breeds a mild and thoroughly middle-class Jewishness; any contradictions in values between secularized home and Sunday school Judaism are minor and superficial, giving rise to few cultural conflicts. This is so not only because the second generation has erased many of the cultural differences that used to separate Jew from non-Jew, but also because of changes in American middle-class society that have brought greater tolerance.

Consequently, the upbringing of the third-generation Jew bears little resemblance to what I characterized as the "marginal" upbringing of his parents. Rather than growing up as they did, straddling two cultures, the third-generation Jew has a childhood much the same as that of other members of the American middle class, with only the slight difference arising from his ethnic background. Thus, although socially the third-generation Jew remains a member of an ethnic group, he tends to wear his ethnicity rather lightly, as one of several roles and allegiances he possesses in American society: it may trouble him a bit if he should encounter incidents of anti-Semitism, and it may edify and please him when he participates in the Judaism which accompanies his feeling of Jewishness.

This decrease of marginality is accompanied by a weakening of the drives that have sent so many second-generation Jews into the upper reaches of the middle class. As a rule, the third-generation Jew is born into an economically comfortable family. Almost from the cradle he is assured of a college education, while his choice of career no longer need be dictated by purely economic necessities. Jewish students are getting more and more to resemble non-Jewish ones, and it seems that the scholarly, intellectual Jewish youngster is becoming a rarer type.

There are also indications that the grades,

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along with the academic aspirations, of Jewish students are less likely to be above average than they used to be. Third-generation Jewish college graduates now seek careers in many of the same fields that attract non-Jews, and they seem to be impelled by a desire for similar kinds of job security and status. Many youngsters, of course, end up in their father's businesses, especially if these are respectable and endowed with prestige, rather than "fringe" ventures. They will operate appliance businesses, but will not go into delicatessen stores or the junk business—unless they can make over the latter into a "waste removal" firm. The driving young promotor who quits school because of need or an impatient urge for the business world is less frequently seen nowadays.

Again, many of the changes described here are responses to what is happening in American society at large. There seems to be fairly widespread agreement, for example, that the role of the lone innovator or promoter—be it in business or the sciences—has shrunk (though this is less true of the consumption goods area, where Jewish businessmen are numerous). Moreover, many of the occupations and industries closed to the second-generation Jew, plus the new service industries that have sprung up in his own lifetime, are today being opened to his children.

IT WOULD appear from all this that the adult third-generation Jew will be very much like any other American in the higher middle-class brackets in the way he both earns and spends his money. If the Jews were more comparable with other ethnic groups, we could predict with some confidence that the third-generation Jew would loosen his ties to the Jewish community and soon cut them altogether. Since his Jewishness is mild, and his attachment to Judaism slight, he would drift steadily in the direction of social assimilation, seceding bit by bit from Jewish institutions, friends, and even family.

However, the indications are that such will not be the case. For one thing, the decline of discrimination, along with the development of what Kennedy and Herberg have called the "Triple Melting Pot," has weakened the incentive for moving away from Jewish institutions. Furthermore, the likelihood that third-generation Jewry will largely live in the suburbs means that religious and social affiliation—at least of a nominal kind—is bound to be encouraged by the community, though to a lesser extent than before. An additional deterrent to full-scale assimilation is the fact that, in seeking friends, the third-generation Jew will want to associate primarily with people equal to or above him in income, education, and standard of living. This would limit his associations to the professional, proprietary, and managerial upper middle classes among Jews and non-Jews alike. But it is unlikely that the non-Jews of these groups, which are still conservative with respect to social differentiation, would accept the Jew as a social intimate—as the still nearly complete separation in dating, fraternity organization, and many other areas of social life in the "better" American colleges indicates. Nor is there any irresistible incentive that might persuade Jews to try to "pass" (as there is in the case of Negroes). Finally, because the third-generation Jew will feel some obligation to his parents, he cannot be expected to deviate too sharply from their preferences, especially in the absence of powerful temptations. The strong taboos on intermarriage characteristic of the second generation, for example, cannot disappear overnight when there are few incentives to challenge or defy them.

Lacking both sufficient invitation from the non-Jewish world or any strong need to escape from his own, the third-generation Jew seems destined, then, to remain within the group in which he was raised. Unless major changes overtake American society, the third-generation Jewish community may be expected to differ little from the current one—at least on the surface. Underneath, however, new forces will begin to take shape, and these should make themselves felt as the third passes over into the fourth generation.

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For one thing, while Jews may not seek wholesale acceptance from the non-Jewish world, they will probably begin to penetrate the social barriers that still exist today. Relations that in our time are limited largely to business hours, neighborly acquaintance, or distant friendship, may become more personal, and third-generation Jews may increasingly number non-Jews among their *close* friends. Intermarriage rates may be expected to rise slowly, for the number of Jews whose cultural and emotional affinities with non-Jews are strong enough to overcome remaining social barriers will multiply. Jewish organizations may find that while Jews on the whole will be more socially active than ever, a larger proportion of them will gravitate toward non-sectarian groups. Among the Jewish ones, a growing "community apathy" will probably manifest itself in reduced membership lists, shrunken budgets, and the sapping of organizational strength in general. Small or specialized organizations, including those that base their existence on differences between East European and German Jews, or between particular East European localities, may merge or disband altogether. The Yiddish-language groups, who are going through this process at the moment, will all but disappear in the third generation.

As the third generation begins to feel less strongly about its Jewishness, the need to express it may be expected to decrease. A proportionate drop in religious attendance seems likely, although absolute numbers may be swelled by the population increase due to the post-World War II upsurge of births. As attendance declines, an increasing proportion of the remaining worshippers will be made up of those who go to synagogue or temple for religious reasons—that is, for the Judaism of the services, rather than the familiar Jewishness of the surroundings.

A process of simplification may develop in Jewish services and synagogue practices adjusted to the level of interest obtaining in the third generation. An eventual union between Reform and Conservative groups is already being forecast today, and the tendency towards non-denominationalism observed in Protestantism but restrained among contemporary Jewry by East European prejudices against Reform (which once was dominated by Germans) may appear in the Jewish community too.

Outside the synagogue, traditional religious practices will probably yield more and more before the spread of the "objects culture." At the same time, however, the "objects culture" itself may undergo simplification. Some of the less frequently used objects will be discarded, while the more significant symbols associated with the major holidays and ceremonies will gain in significance. As the level of popular knowledge about Jewish traditions continues to decline, eventually only the most impressive and most easily comprehensible among the major objects and symbols may survive. The function and meaning of these will gradually be exaggerated as they become, in later generations, practices that represent the entire range of traditional Jewish religious life.

It is difficult to make predictions about the fate of Jewish popular culture. The nostalgia and guilt which the second generation expressed in "Judaizing" themes from American culture are not likely to affect the third. This would seem to portend the disappearance of Jewish popular culture. Yet given continued prosperity, no one knows what avenues future seekers of leisure activity will explore.

As for the third major element of second-generation Jewishness, the "problems culture," it too faces eventual extinction. The reduction of discrimination and the breaking down of the barriers between Jews and non-Jews should soften concern about anti-Semitism, while the weakening of the Orthodox image of Jewish life may mitigate, or even eliminate, guilt feelings about assimilation. If these things happen, the "problems culture" will be compelled to concentrate on the problem of Jewish survival, over which rabbis, scholars, and community leaders will voice more and more alarm while getting less and less attention.

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On the whole, then, the third-generation Jewish community will still resemble the present one in many ways, but is likely to move in the direction of what, from present perspectives, will seem to be greater social assimilation.* This will be reflected in changes that should come to fruition in the fourth generation, especially with respect to the raising of children.

Those third-generation Jews whose attachment to Judaism or whose reaction to the attitudes of the outside world inspire strong feelings of Jewishness will, of course, bring up their children within the Jewish community. But for those who have no deep attachment to Judaism, the desire for self-segregation seems bound to fall off as opportunities develop for Jews to live without being differentiated as Jews. This situation, already apparent today in the biggest cities and among intellectuals, artists, and in the entertainment world, could become more typical in the years ahead. In that case, some third-generation Jews might decide not to give their children a Jewish education—nor would the children ask for one. While this by itself cannot extinguish the children's sense of Jewish identity, it can affect their relation to the Jewish community when they become adults. Similarly, more third-generation parents may be led by their own milder feelings of Jewishness to approve intermarriage when their children desire it—with obvious consequences for fourth-generation Jewry as a whole.

WHAT then, are the chances for ultimate Jewish survival in America? Of course, it is impossible to say with any certainty. All we can do is to isolate the most important trends, and continue to project them into a future America which, we must remember, is likely to bear no more resemblance to the contemporary one than our age does to the early industrial United States. But in the long run, the cohesiveness of the Jewish community is a function of two things—attachment to Judaism and the minority status of the Jews, each of which affects the other. I have suggested that both these factors are growing progressively weaker and could conceivably disappear altogether in the distant future. This would mean the virtual disappearance of a Jewish community from American life. But, as always, the continued existence of Jews depends at least as much on the non-Jewish world as on the Jews themselves, and I have implied that in the case of most American Jews, it depends far more on the former than on the latter.

If social barriers of any significance continue to be imposed on Jews by American society, the Jewish community of the future may not be much different from the one we know today, although the chances are that it will be smaller and retain only as many "separatist" codes and institutions as are required by external barriers on the one hand, and Jewish reactions against them on the other.

Concomitantly, however, these very institutions would probably continue to respond to changes in American society, becoming Americanized according to the fashion of the day. Jewish religious practice, for ex-

*This account of the third generation is at variance with the well-known thesis of Marcus Hansen that "what the son [the second generation] wishes to forget, the grandson [the third generation] wishes to remember" (see his "The Third Generation in America," COMMENTARY, November 1952). Hansen evolved his theory of "third generation return" from his studies in cultural and literary history, and illustrated it mainly with examples of reviving interest in Swedish, Scotch-Irish, and Confederate historiography. These revivals, however, involved a relatively minor aspect of the culture, and at best a small minority in the ethnic groups concerned. While Hansen's thesis is undoubtedly broader than his illustrations suggest, it seems to me unlikely that it could be extended to the more fundamental elements of a culture, that is, those shared by a large proportion of its members. Hansen saw evidences of a dialectical "return" in what I should regard—for instance, in the case of his Swedish example—as a step in the "objectification" of ethnic culture; it was not a casting back, but another point along what in my view is a more or less straight line of cultural and social assimilation. Therefore, recent suggestions by Jewish writers that the third generation will "return" to adopt some form of the ethnic tradition as a living culture seem to me to be unlikely.

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ample, might follow in the path of the non-denominationalism that more and more characterizes American middle-class religion, with emphasis on only a few services a year. Moreover, it might re-define religious concepts somewhat in line with what seems to me to be an increasing affinity for humanist credos. What remained of traditional Jewish culture in that case would probably coalesce into a set of themes and symbols reserved for expression at periodic festivals and pageants recalling the past. This, at least, has been the experience of earlier immigrant groups.

But if the barriers between Jews and non-Jews are eliminated, so that the two are able not only to mix freely in all respects but to give up the distinction between Jew and non-Jew itself, the Jewish community would almost certainly lose its present cohesive power. A considerable number of those now calling themselves Jews would disappear into American society at large, there to be sorted under whatever classifications would then obtain for categorizing the members of society at large.

Some Jews, of course, in order to retain their religion, and the social functions associated with religion, may choose to remain separate, at least to some extent, and thus a new and smaller kind of Jewish community might evolve that included only those who considered themselves religious. If so, its organization would perhaps resemble the then current form of a contemporary liberal, Protestant middle-class denomination, and its religion might be much like the one I have described in preceding paragraphs, the most important difference being that it would probably eliminate any beliefs and codes reflecting the past minority position of the Jews.

Yet whether the barriers between Jews and non-Jews persist or fade away, there is likely to be a small Jewish group that will seek to uphold and continue traditional Judaism. Its rabbis and scholars may very well devote much time and energy to the preservation of the traditional culture—or at least its theological and intellectual elements—through publications, libraries, and museums, and through extensive scholarship.

At what point in time this picture might be realized cannot even be surmised. These speculations—both about the third generation and beyond—are a projection of current trends into an uncertain future, not a prediction. And the future is all the more uncertain when we consider that the deciding factors lie more in what happens to American society as a whole than in the independent efforts of the Jewish community. Moreover, projections must by their very nature ignore the effect of trends yet unapparent and of events that are unpredictable. For example, the immigration of a large number of Jews, such as those now living in Russia, might create a recurrence of the situation that followed upon the arrival of East European Jewry in the late 19th century: a large new group in American Jewry could spring up almost overnight, and perhaps even alter the relations between Jew and non-Jew once again.

ANY hypothesis suggesting the thoroughgoing assimilation of Jewry and the virtual disappearance of present Jewish culture argues against history; in the past no degree of assimilation has ever been able to eliminate the role of the age-old traditions. Large-scale assimilation has taken place before, but later events, and even catastrophes which brought death to many Jews, served in the end to strengthen the cohesion of the remnant, and enabled them to re-group around the ancient religion. But the situation of American Jewry differs considerably from that of Jewries in other countries and times. In America, the Jews are but one of several minorities, and despite widespread anti-Semitism they have not been persecuted enough to prevent them from sharing in the general socio-economic rise. Rarely have Jews settled in a society which, despite its obvious inequalities, is less stratified, or more propitious to social, economic, and cultural mobility—that is, to assimilation. Nor have they ever before lived in a place where the standard of living and the

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attractions of the dominant culture (and intellectual sub-cultures) have held out greater temptations to surrender the more confining traditional Jewish culture. Moreover, the rapid social and technological change that is distinctive of our age would sorely test the staying power of any set of traditional norms. For all these reasons, extensive cultural assimilation seems much more likely than ever before in Jewish history.

But even apart from these considerations, it should be pointed out that the "age-old traditions" of Judaism are not nearly so stable as one might suppose. Popular and exhortatory thinking about Jewish history—perhaps because it serves the same need as symbolic Judaism—stresses the idea of unbroken ancient traditions and is inclined to neglect the equally pertinent fact that over the past four thousand years many changes have overtaken the people who call themselves Jews. Jews have lived as nomadic tribesmen, farmers, merchants, and financial specialists employed by theocratic or feudal rulers; they have worked as artisans, shopkeepers, entrepreneurs, and innovators in a consumption-oriented society. This by no means exhausts the list. Certain major ideas, symbols, and texts may have persisted over the centuries, but the everyday religion, culture, and communal life of Jews (which are our subject here) have undergone great transformations in accordance with their varying social and economic roles. Even the interpretation of the major theological concepts and the distribution of religious emphases have probably varied from period to period, depending on the conditions and needs of the time. In these articles, I have suggested that further changes are to be expected, and that these may eventually lead to a different kind of Judaism and Jewish community. Like the sacrificial religion of the Hebrews of the Temple, the Orthodoxy of the ghetto, and the symbolic Judaism of today, the Jewish religion and culture of the third and fourth generations, and of the more distant future, will be a combination of old and new elements adapted to the needs of the Jews of that time.

COMPARED with current conceptions of what a Jewish community *should* be like, my speculations may call up images of decline and disintegration, but I intend no such picture myself, and would observe that such evaluations are relative to the larger *Weltanschauung* of the observer. For example, to the Orthodox Jew the contemporary Jewish community has long seemed in a lamentable state of disintegration, whereas to the third-generation Reform Jew who feels no urge to measure it against the Orthodoxy of the past, it may seem to be vital and, indeed, growing. How the future I have attempted to sketch—and the present as well—should be interpreted is an extremely difficult question, and one which will require much self-searching for an answer.

If these articles have a "moral," then, it is that the future of American Jewry—or that area of its future not shaped by events in the larger society—will be determined by the needs and desires of the average Jew. The ideas of even the most thoughtful defenders of past or present traditions will fall on deaf ears unless these ideas also respond to the real needs and objectives—as distinguished from merely verbalized ones—of the rank and file. This means that the oft-demanded rethinking of the goals of Jewish religious, cultural, and communal life in America cannot take place without considerable research into the present conditions of the total community. Unless we understand the present, we cannot hope to be able to state the goals that will help shape the future.

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FROM THE AMERICAN SCENE

THE JEWISH WAR VETERANS: KEW FOREST POST 250

They Served

WALTER GOODMAN

THE resolutions passed at the sixtieth annual convention of the Jewish War Veterans of the U.S.A., held in Miami Beach in October 1955, read like a mixture of random excerpts from the yearly policy statements of the American Legion, Americans for Democratic Action, and any one of a number of merely Jewish organizations. This mélange provides a serviceable platform for men who like to identify with what they call their "brother veteran organizations"; who are customarily on the liberal side of an argument; and who remain forthrightly, indeed militantly, Jewish.

The first forty or so resolutions are devoted exclusively to defending and seeking to enhance the privileges of former soldiers and sailors: the burial allowance for veterans must be increased from $150 to $200; any disabled veteran who wants a copy of his discharge should get it gratis. Fair enough for a group set up to represent ex-servicemen—although the American Veterans Committee, "Citizens First—Veterans Second," would be likely to spurn such proposals as crassly parochial.

But the JWV's line in politics as such is directly on the AVC track, far, far to the left of American Legion territory. In 1955, for instance, JWV opposed enactment of the Bricker Amendment; congratulated the UN on its tenth birthday, and called on the Senate to ratify the Genocide Convention; urged liberalization of the McCarran-Walter Immigration Act; declared its faith and trust in the patriotism of Harvard University; and commended the Ford Foundation for establishing the Fund for the Republic.

JWV's specifically Jewish interests were expressed in its call for a Congressionally chartered "National Shrine for the Jewish War Dead"; its condemnation of the American Council of Judaism for "impugning the loyalty of the American Jewish community because of . . . its continued support of a national homeland"; and its pledge to promote the sale of Israeli Development Bonds. The veterans explain their participation in "Save Israel" rallies along with other American Jewish organizations "as a basic expression of solidarity on the part of the Jewish community with respect to Israel."

FOR a closer look at the liberal Jewish veteran represented by this platform, one goes, naturally, to his neighborhood JWV post—in this case Kew Forest Post No. 250, located in an area of Queens which has been growing rapidly more Jewish, less rich, and closer to Manhattan since the war. Post No. 250 currently has eighty paid-up members, mostly small to middling retailers, manufacturers, salesmen, and lawyers, the children of parents born in Eastern Europe. The membership is divided about equally between veterans of World War I—some of

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WALTER GOODMAN, who here visits a Jewish War Veterans post, is a young free-lance journalist whose work has appeared in the *New Republic*, the *Reporter*, *Esquire*, and other magazines. Born in New York City, and educated at Syracuse University and Reading University in England, Mr. Goodman has also worked as an editor and information specialist for the United States government. He last appeared in COMMENTARY with "The Hasidim Come to Williamsburg" (March 1955).

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whom are naturalized citizens themselves—and of World War II.

Inquiries about the Kew Forest post at JWV's New York office are instantly referred to Herman Jaffe, the post's founder and first commander as well as a former county vice-commander. "Like Ben Franklin, I'm a printer. You can call me a creative salesman." Large and voluble Mr. Jaffe, secretary of the Benjamin Franklin 250th Anniversary Committee and publisher of a book, with pictures, celebrating his renowned predecessor, has adopted Franklin as his favorite American. His enthusiasm was aroused years ago by a penurious great-great-great-grandson of Ben Franklin who, in exchange for regular financial assistance, initiated Mr. Jaffe into the Franklin family lore. "Here you are, Herman Jaffe," he reports having told himself, "born in Brownsville of immigrant parents, in a position to help a descendant of Ben Franklin!"

To the Jewish War Veterans, Herman Jaffe has brought the same wonder, gratitude, enthusiasm, and salesmanship that he has lavished on Benjamin Franklin. "We are the patriotic voice of American Jewry," he says at the outset of any discussion of JWV. "We have a positive job of preaching Americanism. A salesman must sell, not knock, competing printers. I like to say that America is the best example of living ever conceived by any group of men. If Communism is a better product, it'll get there."

It was in 1942 that Mr. Jaffe set up a JWV post in his home community of Forest Hills. A graduate of Dale Carnegie's course ("the cheapest investment a young man can make"), he shows a vast capacity for the pleasures of organizational life. Just now he belongs to the FDR lodge of B'nai B'rith, the Thomas Jefferson Democratic Club, the Forest Hills Jewish Center and Men's Club, the Masons, Post 209 of the American Legion, the Floyd Gibbons Post of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the New York Advertising Club, and some dozen other assorted groups. As a life member of the Jewish War Veterans, he carries a gold-plated card. "I'm an extrovert," says Mr. Jaffe. "Absolutely."

In his own opinion, Mr. Jaffe's most significant contribution to JWV came when he served as co-chairman of the Historical Pageant and All-Star Show staged in Madison Square Garden in 1946 to celebrate the organization's fiftieth anniversary. The Pageant, which has since become an annual affair, was entitled "The Fighting Jew." It is in this role that sixty-year-old Mr. Jaffe, who enlisted in the army in 1916 and was wounded at St. Mihiel, would have himself accepted by other Americans. "As a member of the Anti-Defamation League, I'm a Jew—and 'anti' is a negative word. As a member of JWV, I'm a veteran, with an honorable discharge to back me up. The discharge opens doors to us. People say, 'He's coming as an American who is a vet—and also a Jew. He has served'."

As a vet, Mr. Jaffe is accepted by American Legion posts, and marches in the Decoration Day parade every year. "We go into a church to honor the dead and lay a wreath. Then we go to the green and put up a flag and the speakers make appropriate patriotic statements. I'm a veteran along with everybody else. So when JWV speaks for Israel in the State Department, we're speaking as Americans who have proved our patriotism on the battlefield. We are the patriotic voice of American Jewry through the good fortune of having been soldiers."

THE eleven members of the Kew Forest Post who gathered in Room M2 of the big, modern Forest Hills Jewish Center for their monthly meeting on April 4 made small talk while their newly installed commander, slight, twenty-nine-year-old Kenny Brown, hastened in and out, clutching a manila folder and wearing a distracted expression beneath his overseas cap. "The rabbi says no more bingo," Kenny notified two of his fellows in a breathless voice. "Everybody's been on his neck. 'If JWV can have bingo, why not us?' Even for free." He vanished out the door.

"We only run the game to draw people," explained past Post Commander Irvin Loitz, a thickset World War II veteran now engaged in importing wrist watches. "There's no charge, and the prizes are contributed by members." He held up a box of metal watchbands. "You know, you have a card game, three guys sit down to play. With bingo everybody gets in."

Kenny was back, telling someone about a promising fund-raising idea passed on to him by the women's auxiliary, now meet-

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ing in Room M3. A moment later he shot through the door again.

"Me, I come every week," said Irvin Loitz. "It gets in your blood." Irvin began coming because his uncle, one of the post's founders, presented him with a six-dollar year's membership on his discharge from the army. In the Kew Forest post, he says, he has discovered friendship and a chance to serve. "We take amputees to Broadway shows, to the fights, to football games at the Polo Grounds, to beach parties."

Irvin's current project was a raffle being run by the Queens County JWV. "Everybody who buys a dollar raffle gets a Banker's Pen, retail value ninety-eight cents, for keeps." Furthermore, the purchaser had a chance at a Plymouth sedan or a Waring Blendor or a Bissell carpet sweeper or a Roto Broil "400," among other useful things. Irvin had already sold thirty-six books.

At 9:15, Kenny took his place behind the desk up front and tapped his Banker's Pen. "Comrades . . ." he declared.

The door opened and a man entered with extensive apologies for being late. He had been trying, unsuccessfully, to persuade a friend to forego his B'nai B'rith meeting that night in the interests of JWV.

"Comrades," resumed Kenny, "this is a meeting of the Kew Forest Post No. 250 of the Jewish War Veterans of the United States of America."

The veterans rose to salute the colors. Irvin Loitz stepped forward, opened a Bible and, with the assistance of surrounding voices, delivered an extemporaneous invocation. Next came the reading of the minutes, in which it was revealed that Herman Jaffe had criticized the post at the previous meeting for undertaking to sell certain theater tickets, and Jesse Schwartz had criticized Herman Jaffe, and a number of condolences had been expressed. It appeared, too, that several potential officers had resigned at the last meeting, but the situation was cleared up when Kenny explained that he had meant to type "declined." The post treasurer now read his financial report, which included $11.15 for Kenny Brown's post commander's pin.

These preliminaries out of the way, the commander started to explain something about a $32.20 food bill at McGinnis's restaurant, but notified that he was out of order, he read letters from available candidates for national JWV office instead.

The next item on the agenda, somebody called out, was "Committees." "We don't have any functioning committees at the present time," Kenny said, whereupon Irvin arose, called himself a one-man committee, and gave a brief talk on his raffle books and Banker's Pens and appliances. Then the commander, notified that the agenda called for "Correspondence," read some more letters on applicants for national office.

After a while, Kenny got to "the most important thing" on the agenda, and slouching shoulders straightened somewhat. He revealed that the post owed the county office $107 on unsold tickets to "Pipe Dream." Here was the subject that had parted Comrades Jaffe and Schwartz at the last meeting. The post had held its tickets until the very night of the county-sponsored theater party and then had not been able to get rid of them. Now County wanted its $107.

A tall pipe-smoker named Sid rose to explain that County had gotten the tickets tax-free and had tagged on the tax as profit. Sid felt strongly that County should not make money on Kew Forest's loss. The same thing had happened last year, when the post got stuck with "House of Flowers" seats and Sid had had to race around Times Square trying to find twelve servicemen willing to accept them for nothing. The membership was clearly in sympathy with Sid, and it was agreed to support Jamaica Post 90—which had also been left holding several unsold tickets to "Pipe Dream"—in its forthcoming resolution against paying County.

Kenny used the ensuing lull in debate to slip in his explanation of that $32.20 food bill. That was the price, he swore, of treating six amputees and one blind Wac to dinner. He assured his comrades that the sum did not include himself, his wife, or Augusta Feinstein of the women's auxiliary, and that the tip had been pro-rated.

This led into "Good and Welfare," and Vic Perls, a sixty-two-year-old World War I vet, rose to remind everybody that the baseball season was upon them. He thought he could get thirty or forty seats for paraplegics to the opening game, but needed four men to take care of the boys. Two volunteered, and the matter was left unsettled.

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Sid now took the floor again to report that tickets for JWV's annual All-Star Show at Madison Square Garden were available to members at cost. Irvin reminded Sid that nobody had taken any tickets to this gala since Herman Jaffe relinquished his paternal interest in it some seasons back. "I propose we buy up a bunch of cheap seats at a quarter apiece and give them free to kids," said Irvin. "It's good public relations and only kids can walk up that far anyhow."

A wistful-looking fellow in a khaki shirt and JWV cap got up to report that the chapter's annual high school poster contest was not progressing well. "Mr. Barrett, our contact, got sick in January, went to the hospital in February, and was convalescing in March." Irvin told him he should have dealt direct with the principal, and he subsided ruefully.

While women's voices from Room M3 cascaded against the folding doors behind him, Kenny tried to read a list of proposed delegates and alternates to the upcoming county meeting. Some confusion resulted from Vic Perls's announcement that he would probably be away during the convention, but this was satisfactorily cleared up by switching Vic to the alternate list.

A dispute now developed over whether the election of new members was "New Business" or "Committee Business." Irvin at length carried the day with a firm declaration that it was neither: it occupied a special category all by itself. Kenny reported that no new members had to be voted on anyway.

The auxiliary meeting had apparently ended by this time, for women's faces began appearing at the door's glass pane. But their husbands were intent on a portion of the national news letter being read by Herman Jaffe. It had to do with a Congressman's demand for $100-a-month pensions to all World War I veterans reaching sixty-two. The Congressman was quoted as questioning the propriety of giving aid to foreigners while American ex-servicemen went without. Victor Perls reminded his comrades with spirit that the Kew Forest post had passed a resolution calling for $100 to all vets sixty-five and older.

Mumbling something about "New Business," Commander Kenny Brown brought up the matter of purchasing a $60 ad in the next national convention journal. Irvin protested vigorously against such an expenditure, and wound up with a motion that Kew Forest never take an ad in any convention journal ever again, since the money went to the sponsoring chapter and not to the national. Herman Jaffe waved him down. "Let it go. Let it go."

The commander now made several announcements. He had committed the post to join with fifteen other Forest Hills Jewish organizations to sponsor a Mass Rally on Israel and the Middle East Crisis, to be held at the Center in April. For $78.60, Kew Forest could send one hundred cartons of Chesterfields to a veterans hospital.

A woman burst through the folding doors, glared belligerently around, and swept out. "I guess the girls are ready for bingo," somebody observed.

Sid rose, removed his pipe, and earnestly requested the membership's opinion, "in view of what happened last year," on holding a dance at Lost Battalion Hall.

Kenny, clearly an opponent of the proposal, recalled that in 1955 only nine members of the post showed up for the dance.

"We realized $500 on the journal," retorted Sid. "If not for that we'd be $300 in the hole today."

"If not for three hard workers, we wouldn't've gotten the ads either," said the commander testily.

Herman Jaffe called for a little decorum. Irvin stood up and cleared his throat. After two years of serving as post commander, he had discovered that no matter what the project, the same handful of members would pitch in and do the work. "The problem is to make money. The most painless way to make money is a dance."

"We should've charged more," muttered Sid.

Irvin re-cleared his throat. Lost Battalion Hall, he pointed out, had a regular following for dances; any affair held on the premises was assured of a minimum number of ticket buyers at the door. "Anyway," he challenged, "if we don't make the money this way, how are we going to make it?"

"We could sell tickets to the Madison Square Garden All-Star Show," Kenny suggested weakly.

"You wouldn't raise twenty cents," countered Irvin.

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"I'd like to make a motion," called Vic Perls.

Herman Jaffe shut his eyes and shook his head. "You're out of order."

"A motion is never out of order," ruled Irvin. Herman Jaffe shrugged.

Vic made a motion to reserve Lost Battalion Hall for one evening during the second or third week of November.

"Are you sure that's the best time?" Kenny put in dubiously.

"You can't keep interrupting that way," Herman Jaffe remonstrated with his commander. "You've got to give the floor a chance, even if you think the majority is wrong. Be nice and judicious."

"In the fifteen-year life of this post," Mr. Jaffe went on, "it's always been a case of a very few people doing most of the work. That's the way it is everywhere. That's the way it is in the American Legion. It's up to the commander to generate the enthusiasm that will inspire the members to work for their post." Strings of hair had appeared below the commander's cap and lay damply against his forehead. His mouth opened and closed soundlessly. He tapped on his desk with his Banker's Pen. "I think you'll generate a lot of enthusiasm."

"Most dances are successful in November," Irvin put in a judicious postscript.

At 10:30 P.M., Kenny declared the meeting adjourned. Irvin delivered a brief prayer, closed the Bible, and enfolded it in the post's banner. Everyone saluted.

As THE bingo game was being organized, Queens County Commander Joe Tanenbaum and past County Commander Dan Yudow appeared in Room M2, straight from another meeting. Joe, an attorney, was born and raised in Bayside when that section of Queens had only six Jewish families. He considers JWV an organization ideally suited to fighting anti-Semitism. "Nobody can impugn the motivations of Jewish veterans who have served their country. JWV is the patriotic voice of American Jewry." Joe believes that most of his comrades look on JWV as an organization which will one day outlive its usefulness—when there will no longer be a need in America for a body of *Jewish* veterans. At the moment, Joe is running for Judge Advocate of JWV's New York Department.

Dan Yudow, also a lawyer, now in the textile business, credits a certain "Jewish consciousness" with providing the glue for the Jewish War Veterans. "We all met anti-Semites in the service. In the hell of service—and I mean hell." This reminded him of his experiences as the leader of a Jewish group at a camp in Alabama one Christmas eve, when all the Jewish soldiers were put on K.P. "So the captain calls me and tells me to explain to the boys why they all have to be on K.P. that night. 'You want me to do your job for you, captain?' I ask him. 'This is an order, Yudow!' yells the captain."

Then there were Dan's overseas experiences. "I lost three non-coms alongside me, but couldn't get promoted to first sergeant. . . . A bullet doesn't care whether it hits Jew or Gentile. . . . There were Jews on the front line; I got a hole in my head to prove it. . . . I'm a living example that Jews fought."

Dan belongs to the American Legion too—as do most of the JWV officers. "But I feel lost there. I belong because the Second Infantry Division belongs. I'm very close to the Second Infantry Division."

The Jewish War Veterans fit neither the stereotype of the Jew—which they believe they are helping to change—nor of the American Legionnaire. Within its community, the Kew Forest post cooperates with other Jewish organizations in rallies for Israel and for Israeli bonds; it marches with other veterans' organizations on Decoration Day and observes the Fourth of July in their company. But the JWV members are separated from the Jewish groups on the one side by their muscularity, and from the Legionnaires on the other by their liberalism. When a Jackson Heights member embarked on a one-man search for Communists in the PTA during the McCarthy-Cohn era, the county JWV leaders successfully squashed him.

Although the Queens County posts allied themselves with the American Veterans Committee shortly after the war, when the other veterans' organizations refused to march with the new liberal group, the JWV members remain closer in spirit to the American Legion, with its uniforms and its processions and its slogans, than to AVC with its intellectual cast and purely political interests. Last year's Miami Beach convention

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featured a parade with floats, led by a retired brigadier general on a white horse—both in full regalia. Kenny Brown, who says he joined JWV in an effort to help counteract the Legion's influence, has nonetheless joined the local Legion post as well. "The Legion's big enough and flexible enough to take in everybody," explains Herman Jaffe.

THE patriotism of the JWV members is as authentic and as innocent as Herman Jaffe's feeling for Ben Franklin. Their good works for hospitalized veterans are palpable—and a tribute to their willingness to go to some inconvenience to help men who need help. Their liberalism is unsullied by doubt, uncomplicated by nice questions of what constitutes being liberal on a given issue. Their response, when they sense duty, is to sponsor a rally, picket, boycott, or haul a malefactor into court—as they did a vehemently anti-Semitic St. Albans woman a few months ago. This lady had been waging an all-out neighborhood war of invective against a Jewish woman and her children. The victim of the abuse appealed to a rabbi who, in turn, took the matter to the Queens County JWV. The veterans advised bringing charges, and entered the case themselves as a friend of the court. The defendant was found guilty of disorderly conduct and put on probation—with the promise of a jail sentence should she resume the battle. She later moved from St. Albans. JWV members in Queens now cite the case as an object lesson in how to beat down anti-Semitism.

From time to time a JWV delegation will meet in relative quiet with State and Defense Department officials to ask arms for Israel, but by far the most popular tactic of the veterans is the public protest. Recent protests have been directed at the McCarthy-instigated army investigation of Fort Monmouth, in which JWV scented anti-Semitism, and at the shipment of U.S. tanks to Saudi Arabia. On May 20 of this year the veterans initiated a rally in Washington to demand liberalization of the McCarran-Walter Immigration Law.

A typical protest came last December when JWV demanded of Secretary of State Dulles the "immediate removal" of Edwin A. Plitt from the Board of Clemency and Parole, which had freed Sepp Dietrich, organizer of the Malmédy massacre. The National Commander wrote, in standard JWV style, that he was "confident that every American veteran also feels outraged that an American representative on such a board should participate in such a callous disregard of what any reasonable person must have known would be the reaction of any American." When Plitt was indeed removed, after widespread criticism, JWV's monthly newspaper, *The Jewish Veteran*, headlined the story: "JWV Request Brings Results."

An instinct for direct group action, a conviction that when they act they act for America, combined with a very high estimate of their effect on the course of things, a feeling of solidarity with those who shared the experience of war, and a weakness for ceremony—this much these veterans seem to have taken home with them from the army. To which is added the customary political orientation of the American Jew and, perhaps, some Jewish tradition of charity. The resultant mixture is the common element that distinguishes our Jewish War Veteran.

VIC PERLS remembers JWV's action against the rabble-rousers who held rallies in Yorkville in the 30's. "We sent Joe McWilliams to the hospital six times." And he remembers the "Shirts Off Your Backs" campaign of 1947, when the veterans collected uniforms for Israeli troops.

"The friendship here is something special," says Irvin.

Commander Kenny Brown notes, before being whisked away by an older member, that in addition to all its non-sectarian efforts, JWV sees to it that Seders are held at the veterans hospitals.

"We're the militant arm of American Jewry," declares Dan Yudow. "Who shipped arms to Israel *sub rosa?* Who picketed Gieseking and made him turn around and go home? Nobody else had the nerve to do it. The next day my father calls me up. 'Danny boy,' he says. 'What are you doing on the front page of the *News*, holding a swastika?'"

"We represent you," Herman Jaffe points a finger. "With our honorable discharges to back us up, we've taken on the responsibilities and duties of representing American Jewry. No one has ever challenged us."

And from the next room: "Twenty-four. Seventeen. Nine. BING-O!"

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THE FEAR OF TREMBLING

JOHN HOLLANDER

For George Kateb

If it is true that we no longer seek
To avoid the three peculiar trees that grow
At the edge of the wood, it is because we know
That even the wood itself can hold no terrors.
If, without fear of falling, we can speak
Three times of the devil, ignore the fatal errors
Of leaving nail-parings and bits of hair about,
Or even our impress in wrinkles on a sheet,
It is because of too many occasions
On which the devil never appears. And suasions
That spiky crones have urged on images
Crudely depicting us too often meet
With scorn, or any of the various stages
Of nonchalance, and are put down, without

Any benefit of dramaturgy
By which to frighten the old bitches back
(To make white magic is to believe in black).
And we have lost the less accessible fear
Of pushing past seers, and the sober clergy
Of the God in his normal forms, crossing the blear
Ravines and craggy slopes to come upon
The cave of the Wolf-Zeus, where the blinding sun
Beats on the rocky wall, but where we cast
No shadow. For, likewise, when our last
Guests have departed, and the night's debris
Grows pale at dawn, the Uninvited one
Whose name we could not remember turns out to be
Someone with an identity of his own

And no real *Doppelgänger* after all.
Thus, as we lose our terror of the night,
The Sun-God's sadduccees are put to flight,
Dispersing underground, and carrying
The relics of Certainty with them, as a pall
Of unreal darkness blurs their exiting.
Their sun sets and our sky grows colder: we
Are left in the hardrock desert, bare of tree
And stripped of mirage, that Locke looked out and saw
Under the setting sunlight, faint and raw;
All the sure horrors have vanished from a world
Bathed in the twilight of Probability
That sent the heebie-jeebies down, and hurled
Them, screaming, into the fringes of mystery,

The margins of truth. Well then, we have got
Our landscape plain enough now, and the rope
Of Illusion, hung in front of us like Hope
Has been withdrawn. But, peering across the sand,
We are unaccustomed to so much nothing. What,
Then, if we tremble a little? To understand
Exactly what it means to shiver, when
We have grown used to the chilly air is, then,
Perhaps to know that our knowledge of what is true
Of the world casts doubt on what we thought we knew
About ourselves, or at least by how it was
We came to know it. And when other men
With other minds stare at our hands, it is
Because theirs tremble too, and only in

Such signs and portents do we know our fear
To lie. For only in the fear of trembling,
When all the physical spectres disappear,
Are the unknowable present dangers clear:
Watch how we shake! We cannot be dissembling,
We cannot be deceived; something resembling
Something frightening, even now, is here.

John Hollander has published verse and criticism in many periodicals. Born in New York City in 1929, he studied at Columbia, and is now a Junior Fellow in the Society of Fellows at Harvard.

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CEDARS OF LEBANON

A JEWISH BOSWELL

Rabbi Solomon of St. Goar

SOLOMON SCHECHTER

SOLOMON SCHECHTER is best known as an important Biblical and Talmudic scholar, but there was a lighter side to him as well. Before coming to this country to assume the presidency of the Jewish Theological Seminary in 1902, Schechter had been Reader in Rabbinics at Cambridge University, and like many British dons of the Victorian and Edwardian eras, he enjoyed escaping scholarly discipline from time to time by putting his learning to more fanciful uses in belle-lettristic essays. The following piece, in which Schechter compares Boswell to Rabbi Solomon of St. Goar, a scholar of the 15th century who faithfully recorded the sayings and habits of his master Rabbi Jacob the Levite ("Maharil"), is an example of this characteristically English genre. "A Jewish Boswell" is taken from Schechter's *Studies in Judaism, First Series* (Jewish Publication Society, Philadelphia, 1938).

THERE is a saying in the Talmud: "Nothing exists of which there is not some indication in the Torah." These words are often quoted, and some modern authors have pressed them so far as to find even the discoveries of Columbus and the inventions of Watt and Stephenson indicated in the Law. This is certainly misapplied ingenuity. But it is hardly an exaggeration to maintain that there is no noble manifestation of real religion, no expression of real piety, reverence, and devotion, to which Jewish literature would not offer a fair parallel.

Thus it will hardly be astonishing to hear that Jewish literature has its Boswell to show, more than three centuries before the Scottish gentleman came to London to admire his Johnson, and more than four centuries before the Sage of Chelsea delivered his lectures on Hero Worship. And this Jewish Boswell was guided only by the motives suggested to him in the old Rabbinic literature. In this literature the reverence for the great man, and the absorption of one's whole self in him, went so far that one Rabbi declared that the whole world was only created to serve such a man as company.

Again, the fact that, in the language of the Rabbis, the term for studying the Law and discussing it is "to attend" or rather "to serve the disciples of the Wise" may also have led people to the important truth that the great man is not a lecturing machine, but a sort of living Law himself. "When the man," said one Rabbi, "has wholly devoted himself to the Torah, and thoroughly identified himself with it, it becomes almost his own Torah." Thus people have not only to listen to his words but to observe his whole life, and to profit from all his actions and movements.

This was what the Jewish Boswell sought to do. His name was Rabbi Solomon, of St. Goar, a small town on the Rhine, while the name of the master whom he served was R. Jacob, the Levite, better known by his initials Maharil, who filled the office of Chief Rabbi in Mayence and Worms successively. The main activity of Maharil falls in the first three decades of the 15th century. Those were troublous times for a Rabbi. For the preceding century with its persecution and sufferings—one has only to think of the Black Death and its terrible consequences for the Jews—led to the destruction of the great Schools, the decay of the study of the Law, and to the dissolution

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of many congregations. Those which remained lost all touch with each other, so that almost every larger Jewish community had its own *minhag* or ritual custom.

It was Maharil who brought some order into this chaos, and in the course of time his influence asserted itself so strongly that the rules observed by him in the performing of religious ceremonies were accepted by the great majority of the Jewish communities. Thus the personality of Maharil himself became a standing *minhag*, suppressing all the other *minhagim* (customs).

But there must have been something very strong and very great about the personality of the man who could succeed in such an arduous task. For we must not forget that the *minhag* or custom in its decay degenerates into a kind of religious fashion, the worst disease to which religion is liable, and the most difficult to cure. It is therefore an irreparable loss both for Jewish literature and for Jewish history, that the greatest part of Maharil's posthumous writings are no longer extant, so that our knowledge about him is very small. But the little we know of him we owe chiefly to the communicativeness of his servant, the Solomon of St. Goar whom I mentioned above.

Solomon not only gave us the "Customs" of his master, but also observed him closely in all his movements, and conscientiously wrote down all that he saw and heard, under the name of *Collectanea*. It seems that the bulk of these *Collectanea* was also lost. But in the fragments that we still possess we are informed, among other things, how Maharil addressed his wife, how he treated his pupils, how careful he was in the use of his books, and even how clean his linen was. Is this not out-Boswelling Boswell?

The most striking point of agreement between the Boswell of the 15th and him of the 18th century, is that they both use the same passage from the Talmud to excuse the interest in trifles which their labors of love betrayed. Thus Solomon prefaces his *Collectanea* with the following words: "It is written, His leaf shall not wither. These words were explained by our Sages to mean that even the idle talk of the disciples of the wise deserves a study. Upon this interpretation I have relied. In my love to R. Jacob the Levite, I collected everything about him. I did not refuse even small things, though many derided me. Everything I wrote down, for such was the desire of my heart."

Thus far Solomon. Now, if we turn to the introduction to Boswell's *Life of Johnson*, we read the following sentence: "For this almost superstitious reverence, I have found very old and venerable authority quoted by our great modern prelate, Secker, in whose tenth sermon there is the following passage: 'Rabbi Kimchi, a noted Jewish commentator who lived about five hundred years ago, explains that passage in the first Psalm, "His leaf also shall not wither" from Rabbins yet older than himself, that even the idle talk, so he expressed it, of a good man ought to be regarded.'"

Croker's note to this passage sounds rather strange. This editor says: "Kimchi was a Spanish Rabbi, who died in 1240. One wonders that Secker's good sense should have condescended to quote this far-fetched and futile interpretation of the simple and beautiful metaphor, by which the Psalmist illustrates the prosperity of the righteous man." Now Kimchi died at least five years earlier than Croker states, but dates, we know from Macaulay's essay on the subject, were not Croker's strong point. But one can hardly forgive the editor of Boswell this lack of sympathy. Had he known what strong affinity there was between his most Christian author and the humble Jew Solomon, he would have less resented this condescension of Archbishop Secker.

As for the Jewish Boswell himself, we know very little about him. The only place in which he speaks about his own person is that in which he derives his pedigree from R. Eleazar ben Samuel Hallevi (died 1357), and says that he was generally called "*Der gute* (the good) R. Salman." He well deserved this appellation. In his will we find the following injunction to his children: "Be honest, and conscientious in your dealing with men, with Jews as well as Gentiles, be kind and obliging to them; do not speak what is superfluous." And wisdom is surely rare enough to render inappropriate a charge of superfluousness against the work of those who in bygone times spent their energies in gathering the crumbs that fell from the tables of the wise.

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ON THE HORIZON

"CULTURE CREEP"

Negro Folktales in the North

ROBERT GRAVES

RICHARD M. DORSON is a trained folklorist, which means that he has learned to take down stories just as he hears them—by tape recorder, if possible—from members of some old-established and backward community, and afterwards resist the temptation to improve them. I suspect, though, that in *Negro Folktales in Michigan* a certain degree of editorial censorship has been exerted by the Harvard University Press authorities—not a word of really coarse language is included, and such modest periphrases as "the hoodoo man took a nail with some of the thief's bowel-movement on it, and drove it into a tree," do not read quite right to me. (I have just been comparing Cecil Sharp's published folksongs in the *Journal of the English Folksong Society* with the unpublished transcriptions of the verses as sung to him by dirty old men in village inns. He has done a wonderful job of purifying them of erotic and filthy expressions; but is it scientific?)

The folklorist's next job is to arrange the stories in categories, and then go thumbing through Stith Thompson's and Ernest Baugham's master collections of folk tales, in search of a "type number," or "motif number," which can be used as a pin for securing each bright-winged specimen to the cork-lined cabinet.

I have nothing, in principle, against this lepidopterological technique. Folk tales are spread over an immense area, and their regional variations, or similarities, when studied carefully and related to archaeology and anthropology, often throw light on early tribal migrations, trade routes, and what is called "culture creep." Though I'm not a trained folklorist, I recently noted five Corinthian religious myths which would be given the same type number as analogous incidents recorded in the early books of the Hebrew Scriptures. The differences in detail and emphasis were so great—for instance, between Jacob's magical method of winning Laban's cattle and his daughter, and Autol-

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ROBERT GRAVES, who here reviews Richard M. Dorson's *Negro Folktales in Michigan* (Harvard University Press, 245 pp., $4.75), is perhaps the most versatile and prolific man of letters of our time. He has written poetry, novels, biographies, literary criticism, anthropological and historical studies, and has translated many works from French, Spanish, Latin, and Greek—in all a total of ninety-four books published in twenty different countries. His *Collected Poems*, brought out last year by Doubleday, established him as one of the most important contemporary English poets. Another of his recent works, *The Nazarene Gospel Restored*, done in collaboration with Joshua Podro, developed a revolutionary interpretation of the relation between early Christianity and Judaism (see Gerson D. Cohen's review in COMMENTARY, November 1955). In coming months, a number of new works by him are scheduled for publication, among them a collection of humorous stories, a biography of a Victorian poisoner and racehorse owner, and a critical study of the English poets. Mr. Graves was born in England in 1895, educated at Oxford University, and served as a British officer in World War I. In his early years (covered by a memorable autobiography, *Goodbye To All That*) he was one of the founders of what came to be called the "new criticism," and a decisive force in getting modern poetry understood and accepted by an initially hostile public. He now lives in Majorca.

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ycus's magical method of winning Sisyphus's cattle and his daughter—that they suggested a common origin in Canaan at a very early epoch, rather than trade contact. "Did Canaanites ever seize the Isthmus?" I wondered. Again the story of Ulysses in Polyphemus's cave is one of the most widely distributed folk tales of Europe: Sir James Frazer quotes thirty-two variants and traces it back to the Caucasus. And one of several cogent reasons for supposing that the *Odyssey* had a western Sicilian origin is that the nearest folk version of Polyphemus's cave to Homer's has been reported from Trapani; not from Chios, his reported birthplace. But these interesting problems cease to be quite so interesting when culture stops creeping, as it has done in the last generation or two, and puts on seven-league boots. The discovery of trained folklorists that *Cinderella* and *Red Riding Hood* are told by primitive storytellers both in Yucatan and Outer Mongolia *may* point to a slow, slow culture creep thousands of years ago eastward across the Behring Straits; or it may mean simply that early 19th-century missionaries' wives, in charge of impressionable young Indians or Mongols, supplemented their Sunday school repertoire with these sure-fire nursery favorites.

DIPPING into Mr. Dorson's rag-bag of one hundred sixty-five pieces, I pulled out several that have been familiar to me from childhood; and then, consulting the notes at the end, found that some of them have a hundred or more variants reported from the British Isles alone, not to mention America and other continents. This naturally set me comparing the European versions I knew with these Negro ones current in Michigan; because there seems to be little point in printing a thousand-times-told tale unless it happens to have a brand-new twist, or to be particularly well phrased, or to have been discovered among a hitherto unknown tribe in New Guinea or the Upper Amazon.

Here's a story that I heard as a boy in North Wales, fifty years ago, related in a slow singsong by an old Baptist minister:

A philosopher and a sailor were once seated in a little boat and sailing together over a calm ocean.

Presently the philosopher says to the sailor: "My good fellow, did you ever study ontology?"

"No, sir," says the sailor, "indeed I know nothing about ontology."

"Then one quarter of your life is lost," says the philosopher.

After a long time the philosopher asks again: "My good fellow, did you ever study eschatology?"

"No sir," says the sailor, "indeed, I know nothing whatever about eschatology."

"Then one half of your life is lost," says the philosopher.

Soon the philosopher asks once more: "My good fellow, did you ever study epistemology?"

"No, sir," says the sailor, "indeed, I know positively nothing whatsoever about epistemology."

"Then three quarters of your life are lost," says the philosopher.

And lo! even as he spoke, there came a little puff of wind, and over went the boat.

"Can you swim?" asks the sailor.

"No!" shouts the philosopher, struggling in the water.

"Then, alas," says the sailor, "all your life is lost."

And here is the Negro version:

The preacher had to go across the lake to the church, and the boy rowed him across. This Sunday morning a new preacher walked down to the boat, says: "Good morning, son. Are you the one carries 'em across the lake to the church?" Boy says, "Yessa, parson." So the preacher gets in the boat. He asks, "What do you charge, son?" "Twenty-five cents a person." So the parson gives him a quarter. Boy shoves off from the bank. Preacher says, "Sonny, you ever go to Sunday school?" Boy answers, "I hate to tell you, parson, but I never did." "Did you ever learn the Ten Commandments?" "I hate to tell you, parson, but I never did." Preacher said, "Son, you lost half your life then." Then he asks him: "Son, did you ever learn theology? Did you ever learn geography?" "No." "That's too bad, son; you lost half your life."

About that time the boy paddled on a snag up there in the lake and capsized the boat. Out went the parson. Boy, he commenced swimming off. Parson went down. When he come up the boy hollered to him, "Say, parson, you ever learn swimology?" Parson said, "No, son, I never did." "Well, parson, I hate to tell you but you lost all of your life."

I find the Welsh version chaster, more classical, more universal—and more truly ludicrous. *"Can you swim?"* is poignantly practical. "Say, parson, you ever learn swimology?" is simply un-Christian.

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HAVE the Michigan Negroes improved on the European folk tale of the hog at the customs house? I doubt it. This is how they tell it in Majorca:

The customs duty on every hog brought into Palma market from the country used to be a peseta a score, a tax which the country folk greatly resented. But Palma was a walled town and the customs officers were posted at each gate. Early one Saturday, a peasant killed a pig which weighed fifteen score, shaved its face, dressed it in an old skirt and shawl of his wife's, concealed its head and ears with a lace head-dress, and seated it beside him on his market cart, supporting it with one arm. When he reached the gate, the customs men asked him whether he had anything to declare.

"Only a sack of sweet potatoes," he said, adding: "Have the kindness to drag it out, gentlemen. My wife has fainted, and I must support her."

So they dragged the sack out, weighed it behind his back, and overcharged him half a peseta.

"Pass on!" they cried, grinning.

"But Jesus Maria!" said one customs man to the other afterwards. "Did you see that fellow's wife? She looks more like a pig every time she comes through here."

This is the Negro version: more modern, less dramatic, with no "double take," but given a certain verisimilitude by its very untidiness and unnecessarily circumstantial detail, which seems to be the Negro habit.

One time there was a colored guy running a café, and he sold out all of his meat one day, when he had a large crowd of peoples. And they was steady asking for a barbecue. He went to get some meat, and all the stores were closed. And so he said: "I know what I will do. I will get my Winchester and a blanket, and drive to where there's some hogs always in the road, and will kill me one."

So off he went, and sure enough a big hog came across the road. He said, "No, I won't shoot the hog; I will put this Cadillac in low gear and run over him right quick. And no one will hear me." So he ran over the hog and put him in the back seat of his car, and put the blanket over everything but his head. By being in a hurry coming back to town he ran the light, and the cops chased him and caught him at the next light. Axed him where he was going in such a hurry. He said, "Officer, I have a sick brother in the back of the car." The officer said, "Okay," and looked in the car and shook his head. He said, "Go on, but if you ever run another light in this town I will put you under the jailhouse."

As the colored fellow started the car, the cop said, "Just a minute," and he looked again. He said, "Go ahead, but tell your brother he is the blackest and the ugliest bastard I ever saw. Tell him he has a mouth just like a damn hog."

Mr. Dorson's learned note on this version runs:

Hog in Cadillac: Motif K 406: "Stolen animal disguised so that thief may escape detection." The present type-variant should follow right after Motif K 406, 1 and Type 1525: "Stolen sheep dressed as person sitting at helm of boat."

We are then given the name, age, and condition of Mr. Dorson's informant, Mr. Johnny Hampton:

Lives in Benton Harbor. Born in Holly Springs, Mississippi, in 1921. Came to Detroit in 1946 and to Benton Harbor in 1956. Works for Auto Specialties Manufacturing Company.

Then we are given cross references to another story:

John stole a pig from Old Marsa. He was on his way home with him and his Old Marsa seen him. After John got home he looked out and seen Old Marsa coming down to the house. So he put this pig in a cradle they used to rock the babies in in them days (some people called them cribs), and he covered him up. When his Old Marster come in John was sitting there rocking him.

Old Marster says, "What's the matter with the baby, John?" "The baby got the measles." "I want to see him." John said, "Well, you can't; the doctor said if you uncover him the measles will go back in on him and kill him." So his Old Marster said, "It doesn't matter; I want to see him, John." He reached down to uncover him.

John said, "If that baby is turned to a pig now, don't blame me."

Here the note runs:

Baby in the crib: This is the Mak story from the Second Shepherd's Play in the Towneley Cycle (see *The Towneley Plays*, Early English Text Society, Extra Series No. 71, 1897, repr. 1925, pp. 116ff., and pp. xxxi-xxxiv for a parallel two centuries later in the ballad of Archie Armstrang's Aith). Baughman adds to Motif 406,2, "Stolen sheep dressed as baby in cradle," five references from Southern states, two Negro and three white. For a related

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variant, see Chapter V, "Hog in the Cadillac," which also employs the general motif K406. . . .

The informant is Mr. E. L. Smith of Calvin—

born in Oglethorpe County, Georgia, in 1886. He came to Chicago in 1921 after the boll-weevil began destroying the cotton crop. His present wife induced him to come to Calvin in 1933. He farms a little and works in his son-in-law's hoisting-machinery plant.

Call me stupid, but I can't see the point of this *megillah* about Motif K406, when we have no means of knowing whether Mr. Johnny Hampton heard the "Hog in the Cadillac" story from his cousin Sam Whitaker way down in Pond, Mississippi, or from the white sales clerk in the Auto Specialties Manufacturing Company who read it in a joke-a-day tear-off calendar published in Trenton, New Jersey, and compiled by a displaced Esthonian lawyer, with a Scottish mother, educated in Honolulu. Mr. E. L. Smith may equally have heard the story of the "Baby in the Crib" from a traveling hog-gelder back in Georgia, or in Chicago from one of Al Capone's more literary gun-men to whom his son-in-law paid protection money. Culture creeps every which-a-way in the States, and these Michigan Negroes, unlike those of Bolivia County, Mississippi (where Mr. Dorson collected a neat packet of folk tales in 1954), do not form an old-established, backward community. They are casual immigrants from several different Southern states, and have been subjected to so many linguistic influences that even the dialect is not homogeneous.

BESIDE folk tales, two or three of them in the "Brer Rabbit" African vein, there are dozens of old-fashioned comic-but-clean stories about stupid Irishmen, or clever Jews, or thievish hired men, or famous liars, or hypocritical preachers; a few second-hand accounts of multiple murders, cannibalism, and "hants"; and at least one ordinary white man's smoke-room yarn that has been going the rounds ever since Clark Gable was Rudolph Valentino, and Joe Louis was Jack Johnson. Walter Winfrey, the narrator, has played professional baseball, served in the army, and worked in the transmission line at Ford's factory. He does not reveal the source of "Three Wishes," but it is no more a Negro folk tale than "The Wreck of the Hesperus."

This was a cowboy, and he wanted to be a strong man. So he saddled his horse and went down the street riding along. A snake crossed the path before him, and he taken his gun out to shoot it. So the snake says, "Mr. Cowboy, don't shoot me, and I'll make you any deal that you want me to." So the cowboy says: "All right. Make me three wishes." The snake tells him. "Go ahead and wish." So the cowboy says: "I wisht I had muscles like Joe Louis. And I'd like to have features like Clark Gable." And he says, "I'd like to be as strong as this stud I'm riding."

So the snake says, "Okay, you go home, go to bed early, get up in the morning and see if you've got your wishes."

So the cowboy got up the next morning; he throwed his bathrobe back; he says, "I got the muscles like Joe Louis." He looked in the mirror, and he says, "I got the features like Clark Gable." Then he pulled his bathrobe back again and looks down. He says, "Well, I'll be durned; I forgot I was riding a mare."

What I enjoyed most in the collection was the small residue of admirable real-life narrative—not mixed up with Motif C. 1492 or X.120 A. Thus Katy Pointer remembers every word of her father's simple story as he told it her seventy years ago: how he escaped from slavery in 1859 at the instigation of his owner's charitable wife and got clean away to Canada:

. . . He got on the railroad and started walking. He walked along the tracks, and hid in the daylight. Only once in all the time did he stop in the daylight to wash and shave in a little river, and two white men stopped and asked him where he was going and where he was from. He told them he was going to Michigan City, and that he would sell his life dear, though they was two against one. . . . He laid out his razor—it was a long blade with a handle—and his revolver. And they said they wasn't going to bother him.

He walked to Ypsilanti on the railroad. (He was walking three weeks.) His shoes was all wore out, and his socks, and his feet got all swelled up, and his legs all swelled up. . . . When he got to Ypsilanti he met a colored man going to work; he had his dinner pail with him. And he asked my father, "Are you a runaway slave?" And my father said, "It's none of your business what I am." He was wore out with people asking him questions. The

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other man said, "I can see from your shoes that you've come a long way. You see that house up the railroad a ways—that's where I live. You go there and tell my wife to give you breakfast, and then you go to bed and stay there till I come home; I'll be home at six o'clock."

. . . That night the house couldn't hold all the colored people that came there. And they gave him carpet slippers and socks, and took up a collection and gave him quite a lot of money. In the morning one old fellow took him down to the railroad and said, "You get a ticket for Detroit, and when you get there take a ferry to Canada, just about a mile across the lake, and then you'll be under the lion's paw."

When he got to Windsor he looked up Aunt Celia Flenoy, a little black woman who was Albert Campbell's aunt. She got him a room with a colored man, and he got work on the street, at fifty cents a day. "I'm a free man now," he said.

Those were the bad old days; but these good new days are not behind them in drama. Sarah Hall's life story, after she came up to New Bethel, Michigan, from Gould, Arkansas, is a pretty tough one and hardly seems to be heading for happiness:

William Brown Lee was my husband. That house where you met him, the other side of Town Line Road, I bought that house at Sodus for one hundred dollars, and had it moved here for seventy-five. And then he'd never do any work, just lay around, and buy light bread and peanut butter for hisself and eat it in front of us. And during the winter he'd make his children carry his mess outside, he'd do it in the house, just too lazy to go out. And call me names! I birthed his baby fighting him.

He had my boy put in the reformatory in Lansing, and my daughter Odessa in the Adrian reform school. She was going to school and had a baby; so they took her and put her in prison, said she was too young to have a baby. She was fourteen, and lots younger girls around here had babies. Brown Lee gave my two youngest children, seven and eight, to his daughter, and she's living with another man; they go out and play pokina at night, and leave the young ones fastened at home. When the Church at Benton Harbor was going to help me, Brown Lee stopped them, and called me a whore.

Year before last two of my kids, Barbara and Effie Dean here, were playing around his house, and they found some stuff in a bottle in the toilet. He'd put a piece of my bloomers and skirt and some roots and something like water, but red, in the bottle. That was to hoodoo me. The kids brought it back and poured it out. But it killed my father and my uncle.

Papa came down from Muskegon, and offered me a home with him, after I broke up with Brown Lee. Brown Lee told my papa he'd never see my face alive again. My father went back to Muskegon to build our house, and died in less than three months. My uncle, Cole Young in Benton Harbor, came out to visit me, and Brown Lee said, "You'll never see his damn face again." My uncle died a month later, loving his wife. Then William Brown Lee told me, "You'll be the next one to be buried."

And ever since I been having fits.

But is unhappy personal reminiscence, or even an old woman's account of what happened to her father, long ago, a folk tale? Especially when it can find no motif number in either *Thompson* or *Baugham?*

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THE STUDY OF MAN

THADDEUS STEVENS: AN AMERICAN RADICAL

Architect of the Reconstruction

T. HARRY WILLIAMS

AMERICANS like to classify their politicians under simple labels that seem to explain completely their motivation and their philosophy. A man is put down in the books as a liberal, a conservative, or a radical: he represented the people or the interests; he was on the side of the angels or of the forces of evil. Just get the label affixed, the idea seems to be, and you understand the individual. Actually, the nature of our political system is so complex that no facile polarism can be imposed on either American political life or American history—especially when, as is often the case, the polarism is really drawn from European political life. For example, it is widely assumed (one encounters the statement constantly) that since Reconstruction the planters of the South, more than any other class in the region, have opposed enlarged rights for Negroes. The apparent basis for this assumption is that the planters, being members of a propertied minority, were conservatives and hence must have been against measures to benefit a laboring group of another color. But the truth is that the planters were more disposed—for economic and political reasons—to grant concessions to the Negroes than were the white masses. The strongest and bitterest opposition to the Negro came from the "common whites." Almost every upsurge of white democracy in the South, from Tillman to Talmadge, has been accompanied by race-baiting and some attempted repression of the colored minority.

Other examples of the impossibility of explaining American politics according to a tidy, nicely wrapped-up schematicism can be chosen at random from our history. What about the protesting farmers of the 1880's and 1890's? Usually depicted as the heralds of Progressivism, were they not, in attempting to turn back the clock to an older and simpler agrarian economy, really conservatives? And if agents of great change are radicals, were not the big business tycoons, who were remaking America while being denounced by the agrarians, radicals? And was not the first Progressive program (1900-1912), usually considered to be the first ray of liberalism in recent American history, enacted under the auspices of the Republican party, usually considered to be the protector of plutocracy? Probably the most confusing difficulty encountered by practitioners of the easy classification is in evaluating the personalities and significance of that type of politician in our national life represented by men like Benjamin F. Butler, Thaddeus Stev-

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ELSEWHERE in this issue C. Vann Woodward, writing about today's desegregation movement from the perspective of Southern history, calls it the "New Reconstruction." In this portrait of Thaddeus Stevens, who was the architect and moving spirit of the Old Reconstruction, T. HARRY WILLIAMS takes issue with Ralph Korngold's conception of that arresting figure (*Thaddeus Stevens,* Harcourt, Brace, 460 pp., $6.00) in an attempt to provide a realistic appraisal of the man who led the Republican Radicals in Congress during Lincoln's and Johnson's administrations. A noted historian and the author of *Lincoln and the Radicals, Lincoln and His Generals,* as well as a biography of the Confederate general P. G. T. Beauregard, Mr. Williams occupies the Boyd Chair in History at Louisiana State University. He last appeared in COMMENTARY with an account of the principal schools of interpretation of the Civil War (August 1954).

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ens, and perhaps, in our own time, Senator McCarthy. The politicians of this model have usually been arch-conservatives, but on occasion they have been capable of bursting forth with liberal or even radical ideas. In their combined contradictions they represent, in varying degree with each individual, the best and the worst elements in our political tradition, and they defy polarism.

Perhaps the best example of the genus is Thaddeus Stevens, the grim master of the Republican machine during the Reconstruction period, who is currently enjoying a historical revival. Here is a man who simultaneously served the interests of business by plugging for a high tariff and enraged the bankers by advocating a fiat paper currency, who opposed slavery and fought for Negro rights, but played along with the Know-Nothings who wanted to deny rights to aliens. The Stevens story suggests that American politics and politicians cannot be fitted into any familiar or rigid pattern.

THE spirit of Thaddeus Stevens in whatever afterworld it resides—the hell to which Southerners of the Civil War and Reconstruction period consigned him, or the heaven for which his Northern Republican admirers were certain he was destined—must be amused as he contemplates the efforts of historians and biographers to assign him a neat, definite niche in history, and as he watches their shifting attitudes on what that place should be. For long years he has been labeled in the history books as a nasty villain, and now he seems on the point of emerging as a saint. One can almost hear the ghostly sardonic laughter of the old man, who in life was always conscious of human inconsistencies and always cynical of the motives that determine the opinions of men.

The Stevens story is a fascinating case history of what may happen to a man's reputation when the historians get to working him over. In many respects his career is a typical American success tale. Born in 1792 in Vermont of farm parents of very moderate circumstances, he secured a college education, taught school, and read for the law. Admitted to the bar, he began his legal practice in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, and shortly became one of the best, and one of the most sought after, lawyers in the state. Eventually he entered into various business enterprises, including the ownership of an iron manufactory, and became also a man of solid economic substance. It was inevitable that he should go into politics. Most ambitious young men of that period did. And with him there was another impelling factor. Politics seems to have been in his blood; his normal environment was the legislative hall. If there be such a person as a natural professional politician, he was one.

Stevens won election to the Pennsylvania legislature as a candidate of the Anti-Masonic party, that organization which arose briefly to power in some states as the enemy of secret societies. After the Anti-Masonic movement flickered out, he joined the Whigs, the party of the conservative business classes. In his legislative career, he usually followed the normal Whig line, introducing and championing measures designed to benefit the corporate interests. But sometimes he got out of line. A notable example was his stand on the public school issue. In the 1820's and 1830's the public school advocates were striving in state after state to secure acceptance of the principle that the community had an obligation to maintain schools for its children. A law authorizing the expenditure of tax monies for schools hung in the balance in Pennsylvania. By a remarkable display of oratory and political pressure Stevens drove it through to passage. Not all men of property wanted to be taxed to educate other people's children.

As a legislator, Stevens demonstrated a superb talent for organizing and managing his party, which, whether a majority or a minority, followed wherever he led. He developed terrible skills in debate, specializing in sarcastic sallies and slashing jibes that either collapsed an opponent or left him too angry to reply effectively. In the records of Stevens's speeches in the legislature and later in the accounts of his remarks in Congress, the word most frequently inserted in parentheses by the stenographic reporter is "laughter." All of the techniques that made him a great legislative leader and boss he had formulated and tested on the state level before he entered national politics.

In 1848 he was elected to the House of Representatives, running as a Whig with support from the American, or Know-Nothing, party, the first nativist organization in American politics. Defeated for re-election in 1852, he returned to the practice of law and the pursuit of wealth. When the Whig party fell to pieces on the slavery issue, Stevens joined

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the new Republican party, that aggregation of factions that represented the idealism of the anti-slavery movement and the economic aspirations of Northern capitalism. Stevens was a perfect embodiment of Republican doctrine. He was anti-slavery and pro-high tariff, and no historian can say with finality which of the two principles was dearest to his heart. But how could he have been for a tariff without also opposing slavery? The power that prevented industry from securing a tariff was the slave-holding South. Stevens's combination of interest and idealism was, under the circumstances, a natural one for him to make, and other Northern politicians negotiated similar adjustments. As a Republican, he won back his House seat in 1858, and held it with practically no opposition until his death in 1868.

UNTIL the Civil War began, Stevens's reputation was largely local, but with the advent of war he suddenly emerged as a national figure. By exercising his talents as an organizer and debater, he became the leader of the Republican machine in the House, holding the immensely powerful chairmanship of the Committee on Ways and Means, and commanding a dominant influence in the caucus of the Congressional Republicans. As the "dictator of the House," he squared off almost immediately in a battle with President Lincoln that lasted for the remainder of the war. The conflict was no mere contest between clashing personalities, but a struggle between Stevens and Lincoln as leaders of opposing factions in the Republican party, with Stevens heading the group known as the Radicals and the President the one called the Conservatives.

The great issue that divided the two factions was slavery. On most questions, including economic matters, they were in fundamental agreement: both favored legislation to benefit Northern industry and agriculture. They differed, and violently, on the disposition of slavery to be made as a result of the war. The Radicals wanted to seize the opportunity of the war to strike the institution down—suddenly and finally. The Conservatives, who were also anti-slavery, wanted to accomplish the same result in a different way—easily and gradually. They were perhaps temperamentally opposed to abrupt change, and they were extremely conscious of the effects that might follow a wrenching change in race relations. They urged, therefore, a program of gradual emancipation to be accomplished over a period of years. In short, the Radicals were determined to make the abolition of slavery an objective of the war; they would restore the Union without slavery. The Conservatives hoped to avoid turning the war into an experiment in social change; they preferred to restore the Union with slavery—but with a plan worked out for its ultimate extirpation.

In the bitter struggle between the two factions, the Radicals won out. Time and the logic of the situation were on their side. If, as most people believed, slavery was the primary cause of the war, why should the Northern people fight and sacrifice to preserve an institution that had brought on the war? The longer the war continued the more certain Northern opinion was to demand the end of slavery. And finally the North did demand that abolition be made an objective of the war, and Lincoln, the supreme political realist, accepted the will of the majority. The Emancipation Proclamation and the Thirteenth Amendment registered the victory of the Radicals. Thus the destruction of slavery as a result of the war was the policy of Thaddeus Stevens, and not of Abraham Lincoln.

From the struggle with Lincoln, Stevens moved into a fight with another President, Lincoln's successor, Andrew Johnson. Here the issue was Reconstruction—the terms on which the seceded Southern states would be permitted to return to the Union, the degree of punishment to be meted out to the South, the lengths to which the national government should go in fixing the civil and political position of the former slaves. Without going into detail, it may be said that the Reconstruction policies of Stevens and Johnson embodied the differences between, to use modern terms, a hard peace and a soft peace. Stevens, backed by the Radicals (who constituted a decisive majority of the Republican party), demanded a punitive peace settlement. Johnson, supported by some Conservatives and the Democrats, championed a mild and forgiving adjustment; in particular, the President and his followers would have left the determination of race relations in the South largely to the Southern whites. Again Stevens defeated a President. The Reconstruction program, as it was worked out, was largely of his making. Not that he had his way in everything. No longer, as in the war years, could he always whip an obedient majority into line with his fierce barbs; on numerous

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occasions younger Republicans defied his will. Not as extreme as he sometimes sounded, he probably would have preferred that the Negroes not be granted the suffrage immediately. Nevertheless, he was still the chieftain of the Republican Congressional machine, and he well deserves the title of "architect of Reconstruction."

WHAT does the Stevens record add up to? Support of public schools, encouragement of business, opposition to slavery, support of nationalism and the Union, punishment for the secession leaders who had tried to divide the nation, and advocacy of Negro rights. Now suppose that an intelligent observer from another planet who knew something of our history were to examine the story of this man. What would he conclude? Would he not think that on most issues Stevens had been on the side of the angels and had played a great and honorable role in the development of the nation? Would he not decide that in the American Valhalla Stevens must occupy a high and honored place? Pity the poor observer if he arrived at such conclusions and voiced them. He would have reckoned without the historians, and he would have to get out fast before they exposed him as a naive ignoramus who did not understand the deeper meaning of American history.

The truth (the strange truth, our imaginary observer might conclude) is that in the national historical record, and in the national historical consciousness, Stevens occupies one of the lowest places ever assigned to a political leader. The usual picture of Stevens, the one that has been presented in the textbooks to generations of students, is something like this: he was a mean and malicious man who hated Lincoln and Johnson and opposed their policies; above all, he hated Southerners, and used his vast power in Congress to fasten an unjust peace upon the prostrate South. Sometimes the sketch is varied to make Stevens a hypocrite. He did not really hate the slaveholders but only pretended to in order to break their power and thus prepare the way for the triumph of industry over agriculture—and this was bad because the industrial age brought with it glaring economic inequalities.

In the face of the record, why should Stevens's reputation be what it is? How did he acquire it? It is to these questions that Ralph Korngold addresses himself in a big and belligerent biography, *Thaddeus Stevens, A Being Darkly Wise and Rudely Great*. Mr. Korngold seems to have set himself up as a rescuer of misunderstood extremists, having previously written studies of Robespierre, Toussaint L'Ouverture, William Lloyd Garrison, and Wendell Phillips. Stevens has had admiring biographers before (Callender, McCall, Singmaster), but none who went as far as Mr. Korngold.

Because he himself is in spirit a 19th-century Radical, Mr. Korngold does not quite succeed in finding the answers to the Stevens riddle. He sees the issues of Stevens's time through Stevens's eyes, and he is more interested in attacking his hero's enemies than in explaining his political personality or in understanding the historical perspectives that have created his reputation. There is an important and an interesting relation between Stevens's status in history and his standing as a politician. He exercised great power, but for a brief period, and the highest office he ever held was that of Representative from a Congressional district. He was never mentioned seriously for the Presidency, and he did not even attain the Senatorial and Cabinet posts to which he always aspired.

WHY did Stevens go no higher than an office that was essentially local in nature? Just where did he fall short? A partial answer would seem to be that, while he conformed largely to the normal political pattern, in significant respects he departed from it. For one thing, he refused to adjust his private life to suit prevailing American mores. He was a bachelor, and was suspected, without much evidence, of maintaining a Negro mistress in his home; he seemed to enjoy giving the impression that the woman was his paramour. He liked to gamble, and openly frequented the most notorious halls of chance in Washington. Not content with flouting the Victorian moral standards of his time, he violated some of the most revered canons of political behavior. In a country that expected its politicians to act—at least in public—with a becoming degree of hypocritical cant and ponderous pomposity, he played the part of a sardonic humorist, a relentless puncturer of stuffed shirts, and an amused and cynical disbeliever in human righteousness. Entering the House on one occasion and being informed that a debate was in progress between "two damned rascals," he inquired

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very genially, "Which is our damned rascal?"

He was, in fine, a rough, brusque, and difficult man, and definitely not a gentleman in the genteel meaning of the word. Whatever effects his personality had on his political fortunes, it has certainly helped to determine the way the historians have dealt with him. It is surprising how scholars have been influenced by the genteel tradition. Probably without being aware of its influence, they have tended to assume that the "nice" people in history have been on the right side. This attitude is partly responsible for the favorable treatment accorded General George B. McClellan in Civil War writings. McClellan was a thoroughgoing incompetent. But he was a gentleman, while his enemies, including Stevens, were not.

But Stevens disregarded the political conventions in more important areas than personal conduct. He was not "regular" in the party sense. In the salad days of his career he was a member of a third party, the Anti-Masons, and after joining the Whigs he flirted with another third party, the Know-Nothings. Although he became a leader of the Republican organization, he spent most of his legislative time and energy in opposing the titular head of his party. He seemed to consider the Republican party as the personal vehicle of Thaddeus Stevens. He belonged to a party that represented the interests of business, and for the most part he faithfully served those interests. But on occasion he could get completely off the reservation, as on the greenback issue, and voice extreme denunciations of the masters of finance and exaggerated professions of his love for the masses. Another Radical leader, Benjamin F. Wade of Ohio, sometimes indulged in the same tactics. The business backers of the party were often puzzled and dismayed by the actions of Stevens and Wade. Usually they proceeded like proper conservatives, but at intervals they performed like radical demogogues. Definitely they were not reliable custodians of property rights.

THE lone-wolf course that Stevens sometimes took in politics and the apparent contradictions in his economic views are to be explained by his experience in the Radical Republican movement. The Radicals, it needs to be emphasized, were not radical in the modern economic sense. Indeed, in that sense they were conservative, being committed to a program of legislation to foster and protect industrial capitalism. They were true radicals, as they well realized, in the sense that they wanted to accomplish a significant change in American society: to destroy slavery and at the same time to strike down the political power of the slavocracy that was blocking the development of Northern free enterprise. They thought of themselves as architects of a revolution that was bringing a new class and a new social philosophy into the seats of American power.

They were genuine radicals, too, in the methods they employed to achieve their objective. They proposed to effect a great change suddenly and without much regard for the opinions of those who opposed them, and without much thought of the problems that an abrupt change might create; in describing their techniques, they like to use phrases like "remorseless and revolutionary violence." Inevitably, some of them acquired revolutionary temperaments. They became willing to use short-cuts to reach their goals, to resort to techniques that skirted around the edges of the law or of custom; they talked about the end justifying the means.

Stevens, for example, defended his Reconstruction policy by maintaining that the country was divided into two extreme camps: patriotic, pure Republicans versus unrepentant rebels and evil Democrats. (It is a weakness of Mr. Korngold's book that he seems to accept this division as being true.) Radicals like Stevens developed a kind of personal instability that often appears in revolutionary leaders: a certain lack of restraint, a tendency to break out with a new and completely individual idea, and to take off after it regardless of the effect on party discipline. This highly personal concept of party leadership characterized a number of the original Radicals. It was a fatal personal weakness, but for democratic government a fortunate one. Without it, politicians like Stevens and Ben Butler, authentic geniuses who played the political game by ear, would have been dangerous men. But the Stevens-Butler type never secure the highest offices. Somewhere along the line they stumble. Lincoln took their measure. Somebody told him that Butler was the material of which dictators were made. Lincoln said that Butler reminded him of Jim Jett's brother: Jim always said his brother was the damndest scoundrel in the world but in the infinite mercy of Providence he was also the damndest fool.

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MR. KORNGOLD is right when he says that the Radicals have not received their fair due from the historians. In the years between 1920 and 1940 American historical writing was dominated by a number of concepts that were the product of the social and intellectual forces of those decades. Most historians active in that period had what may be termed a liberal, agrarian, anti-nationalist philosophy of history. They saw great values in the agricultural culture that flourished before the Civil War and great evils in the industrial society that came into being as a result of the war. They thought that the Republicans should have averted the war by compromise, and they doubted if the Union was worth preserving by force. Influenced by the aftermath of World War I, they believed that the victor should be magnanimous to the defeated; they stigmatized Reconstruction as one of the blackest episodes in our history. As the Radicals were the architects of the changes which they deplored, the historians consigned them to outer darkness. Occupying the most prominent place in their scholarly limbo was Thaddeus Stevens.

During the decade since the close of World War II, a reappraisal of the American past, particularly of the Civil War and Reconstruction period, has taken place. Partly a reflection of the recent trend toward conservatism in American thought, this process has challenged many of the conclusions reached by the scholars of the 1920's and 1930's. The writers in this new school, influenced by the immediate past and by present conditions, see great values, particularly for national security, in an industrial society. For the same reasons, they place a high premium on nationalism and think the Union was worth saving, even by war. As to Reconstruction, while admitting that it brought with it some evils, they believe that it was a natural postwar process and that, given the situation, the South was due a degree of punishment. The result of their investigations has been to put the Radicals, the champions of industrialism and nationalism, in a more favorable light. Mr. Korngold's life of Stevens is in the new departure. A defense of Stevens was in order; his career and his program needed to be placed in a fresh perspective. In some respects Mr. Korngold has said the right things, but in his eagerness to justify Stevens he has swung the pendulum too far over to the other side.

Fundamentally, the Radicals were a necessary part of the historical process involved in the Civil War and the Reconstruction. Despite their unlovely personal qualities and their narrow intolerance, they contributed a valuable and a vital service to the development of the modern American nation. They furnished the driving force that destroyed slavery and sustained the Union. They were the last-ditch Unionists, the men who would never give up the nation no matter how badly the war went. Lincoln, who opposed them and used them, understood them perfectly. He said, "They are utterly lawless—the unhandiest devils in the world to deal with—but after all their faces are set Zionwards."

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LETTERS FROM READERS

"The National Review"

To the Editor of Commentary:

I was surprised and chagrined at Dwight Macdonald's "Scrambled Eggheads on the Right" article in the April issue. I would not have expected political agreement with *National Review;* but I have come to expect from Commentary incisive penetration and responsible discussion. Mr. Macdonald's hackneyed, stereotyped, hatchet job was not worthy of Commentary's high standing among our journals of opinion. . . .

Mr. Macdonald is apparently anxious that none of his readers develop the urge to go and read *NR* for themselves. So he must reiterate that *NR* is dull, ineptly written, etc., etc. One of his favorite criticisms is that *NR* is "vulgar." Also "brutal." Well, let's take some of Macdonald's own comments: "the half-educated *lumpen*-bourgeoisie . . . intellectually underprivileged . . . crackpot . . . the Joan of Arc of . . . the aura of Count Dracula's castle . . . merrily chases its tail . . . weird . . . sleazy . . . Buckley tribe. . . ." And finally this gem (which Mr. Macdonald is so proud of he quotes from himself): "the effect of a brief . . . on behalf of a pickpocket caught in the men's room of the subway." I challenge Mr. Macdonald to find any vulgarism of that caliber in *NR*. . . .

Mr. Macdonald basks in the aura of his supposed intellectual superiority, and the intellectual inferiority of (a) everyone on the right, and (b) everyone on *NR*. This of course is essential in a hatchet job; to admit that the people on *NR* had something to say would mean that every responsible intellectual would be obliged to read it, and this would not do at all. Who knows how many conversions might take place? But isn't it strange that among this unintelligent lot, Mr. Macdonald seems to have considerable difficulty in knowing what's going on? Thus we have Willmoore Kendall, whom Macdonald calls "abstruse," "abstract," etc., etc. Apparently it is difficult to satisfy Macdonald. The writers are either too simple or too intelligent, too scanty or too documented (witness his indictment of *NR*'s "grim thoroughness" on the subject of Presidential disability). . . . When a subject becomes a little complex, Mr. Macdonald calls it abstruse, or grimly thorough, or indirect. And when Buckley mentions such polysyllabic words as "premises" or "postulates," Macdonald indicts *NR* for being "opaque." If the high and the low confuse or annoy Macdonald, is he only content somewhere in the middle? Has Dwight Macdonald become at last "middlebrow"?

Macdonald's brief article is filled with inconsistencies and inner contradictions, of which the above is but a sample. There are errors of commission and omission. First, John Chamberlain is conjured up as a truly professional journalist who must be clearly disgusted at the goings-on; in the very next paragraph, we find that the old Chamberlain *Freeman* committed the very same sins. Second, Macdonald often uses the word "egghead," but *NR* does not. Let Macdonald point to examples. He says definitely that *NR* denounces "eggheads" vociferously; I state flatly that he is completely wrong. . . . And, by the way, I will pit the intellectuality and literateness of Frank Meyer (or of Erik Kuehnelt-Leddihn, or of Robert Phelps, or of Roy Campbell, or of Wilhelm Röpke) against a dozen assorted Dwight Macdonalds. None of these men, of course, are mentioned in Macdonald's article, even though they play a considerable role in the magazine.

It's unfortunate that Macdonald, whom I remember as a pleasantly anarchistic editor of *Politics,* adopts the sterile conformism of the current left views on the extreme right. So he holds up Russell Kirk as the true conservative amongst all the pseudos. Kirk, the professed opponent of individualism, the derogator of individual liberty, the worshipper of power, is hailed as "the only consistently humane and civilized voice on the magazine." If Macdonald has heard of John Stuart Mill or considers him important, I suggest that he turn to the debate on Mill between Kirk and Frank Meyer in recent issues of *NR*. And let him turn to Meyer's column. After he finishes, perhaps he will be able to recognize a truly consistent, civilized voice. . . .

Macdonald, alas, finds the editorial board of *NR* "obscure." Perhaps the obscurity is a reflection of a deficient education on Macdonald's

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part. I invite him to become acquainted with the writings of the other contributors. Let him read Frank Chodorov's *One Is a Crowd,* or even go back to the files of his old magazine *Analysis;* let him at least try to read Richard Weaver's *Ideas Have Consequences;* let him read the erudite Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn's *Liberty or Equality* or his novel *Black Banners;* or the numerous works of Wilhelm Röpke. Forrest Davis is co-author of Lindley and Davis's *How War Came,* a nationally famous book; John Abbot Clark is the author of a very interesting, lengthy New-Yorker type profile about the *New Yorker,* which Macdonald unaccountably omitted to mention, etc., etc.

Perhaps the most unfortunate aspect of this unfortunate article is the sterile conformity of its thinking, so unlike what we used to expect from Dwight Macdonald. From his Olympian height of majoritarian conformism, along with Riesman, Hofstadter, *et al.,* Macdonald looks down and sneers at the "isolated minority group," the handful of extremists battling a world of enemies. What has happened to the doughty champion of individual non-conformity, of rights of minorities? I guess it all depends on whose minority group is being gored.

A very good article could have been written in criticism, even hostile criticism, of *NR.* But Dwight Macdonald did not write it. His customary urbanity and insight have given way to cliché and mud-slinging. Evidently his hatred of *NR* (note his unwillingness to concede any principles at all to the right), became for him the overriding consideration.

Surely it is misleading to the reader not to inform him of Dwight Macdonald's personal vendetta against some of the staff of *NR.* What were the relationships between Macdonald and William Schlamm within the Luce empire? And what of the famous dispute between Macdonald and Burnham when the latter first broke with the Trotskyist movement?

MURRAY N. ROTHBARD

New York City

MR. MACDONALD *writes:*

Mr. Rothbard seems to be a typical *National Review* reader. He has the touch of paranoia: he sees a "hatchet job," a plot to discourage "responsible intellectuals" from even opening the magazine lest they be converted, and he sees me as a conformist liberal; in fact, I haven't been a liberal since 1936, I cannot imagine any intellectual, responsible or irresponsible, being converted by *NR,* and the reason I called *NR* dull, inept, crude, unprincipled, etc., etc. (and copiously documented the adjectives) is just that I think it is. He is also obtuse, complaining of my "unwillingness to concede any principles at all to the right," when I make precisely the point that a true conservative *has* principles (and give examples) whereas *NR* doesn't (ditto) and hence is not a conservative organ, as it claims to be, but rather is subversive in the sense its patron demagogue, Senator McCarthy, is—*i.e.,* it is undermining our traditions.

To reply to a few other points. . . . He objects that my own style is as vulgar as I allege *NR*'s to be. Leaving aside the fact that *tu quoque* never proves anything (maybe *both* styles are low), I'd say there's nothing intrinsically vulgar about my phrases and that the context, which he doesn't give, shows they are either humor (as the Dracula crack, which, incidentally, ribs the liberals rather than the Buckleys) or else are justified (Mr. Schlamm's man-of-the-world pose *is* sleazy). . . . I see no difficulty in complaining both about *NR*'s "intellectual inferiority" and the turgid, laborious nature of some articles—in fact the latter illustrates the former. My critic confuses the solemn with the profound and thinks five-dollar words add up to intellectual riches. . . . I still think "obscure" is the word for most of the *NR* "Associates," including those so triumphantly listed by Mr. Rothbard. I did have a paragraph on the Clark series on the *New Yorker.* It was cut for space. I wondered why *NR* gave 10,000 words to a garrulous commentary on the pre-1940 *New Yorker,* and I wondered why Mr. Clark, who admired the magazine so much (that is, the old, old *New Yorker,* not the present one, of course), hadn't learned anything about writing from it. . . . The fact that *NR* speaks only for an isolated minority doesn't make it ridiculous, of course. What struck me as comic was that a journal of the ultra-nationalist right, battling for free enterprise and property rights, should show the same paranoiac traits as a Marxist splinter group. I apologize for any implication that the magazine's isolation is reprehensible; on the contrary, it's the nicest thing about it! . . . I've had no vendettas with any of the *NR* staff; I've always rather liked Buckley personally; Burnham and I exchanged political insults in *Partisan Review* years ago, and we certainly don't admire one another, but we have never been on unfriendly terms; Schlamm came into the Luce empire after I had left and we have never met. . . . Finally, I'm sorry not to have been able to take *NR* seriously—some of my liberal friends have also objected to the article on that ground, from the opposite viewpoint to Mr. Rothbard's—and I promise that when and if it improves enough to make it worth attacking in earnest, I'll do so.

Incidentally, I was wrong when I stated

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"Buckley has nine brothers and two sisters, give or take a couple." In fact, he has three brothers and six sisters, according to an article of my own in the *Reporter* of May 27, 1952.

Jewish Music

To the Editor of Commentary:

It is not my habit to jump at mistakes, but there were several errors in Albert Weisser's review of my *Anthology of Jewish Music* (January issue) which I feel are too important to ignore.

Nissye Belzer-Spivak, whom Mr. Weisser cites as representative of composers who "played down Hasidic influence" was in fact the personification of the Hasidic *hazan*. (He bore the name "Nissye Belzer" because he was a Belzer Hasid.) I left him out of the book along with other equally important figures whom I still hope to include in future volumes.

As for Mr. Weisser's objection to the Schoenberg piece as being out of place in the *Anthology*, I should like to say that if the piece possesses any of the qualities which he himself attributes to it (a relation to the Biblical cantillation and an echo of the congregation at prayer), it most certainly belongs in the book. What is more, if I could convince a man like Schoenberg, whose musical thinking has left its mark on every modern composer, to write a piece which he himself referred to as "approximately a similar expression" of the original liturgical motif that I sent him, I felt it was important enough to be included in an *Anthology of Jewish Music*. Schoenberg felt that his piece conveyed the approximate mood of the original motif. Mr. Weisser thinks the Schoenberg piece is "as far from Eastern European Jewry as expressionist Vienna was from Hasidic Vitebsk." But Vitebsk was never Hasidic. . . .

Chemjo Vinaver

New York City

Mr. Weisser *writes:*

Nowhere did I say that the great Nissye Belzer was *not* a Hasidic cantor. I was speaking of Belzer, and some other composers not found in Mr. Vinaver's anthology, who "*either* played down Hasidic influence *or* strove to emphasize . . . the older and perhaps more universal sacred chants of the synagogue." This is certainly somewhat different from what Mr. Vinaver implies that I said. Belzer may very well have been, in doctrine, a Hasidic cantor, but I think it equally demonstrable that in portions of his best works he broke out of the Hasidic mold and summoned up a tonal art much more analogous to the older traditions.

Nor does Mr. Vinaver quote me accurately on Schoenberg's piece. I wrote that "in certain motives and their subsequent development a kind of *vague* relation to the melodic organization of Biblical cantillation may be recognized and one may even hear if one tries hard enough a kind of idealized representation of a congregation at prayer. . . ." No one is questioning Schoenberg's position in modern music. That seems quite plain. We are concerned here with his setting of the 130th Psalm: we must applaud Schoenberg's endeavor, but cannot be blind to the fact that his was a wholly personal and private idiom totally foreign to the musical temper of Eastern European Jewry. To put his piece in a volume whose subtitle reads "The Sacred Chant and Religious Folk Song of the Eastern European Jews" still strikes me as somewhat capricious.

Politicians

To the Editor of Commentary:

I have just received a letter from an old friend in New York—Morris E. Moskovitz—pointing out an error in my story "The Politicians" (March 1956), and he is correct.

Mr. Chauncey Depew, whom I call in my story a Sachem of Tammany Hall and its greatest orator, was really a power in the Republican party of that era, and the attorney for the Vanderbilt railroad empire. However, since the Republican party of Thomas Collier Platt was on a par with the Tammany Democratic party of Richard Croker, there is no need to apologize to Mr. Depew's descendants for defamation of character.

It just goes to show that when one gets old one cannot trust one's memory.

S. L. Blumenson

El Cerrito, California

To the Editor of Commentary:

I just finished reading "The Politicians" in the March issue of your magazine, and I must tell you that I experienced a rare thrill. . . . It brought back to me a feeling of pride in the strength of character of our people of that era on the East Side of New York. But above all I was delighted by the episodes and their actors, as presented by the talented and humorous Mr. Blumenson. . . .

My heart goes out to Yussel Tunick. I know exactly how he feels. The only consolation I can offer him is that he is not alone. There were thousands of these so-called "betrayals" and "betrayers." Most of them managed to live it down. I hope Yussel did also. . . .

S. Kortchmar

New York City

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BOOKS IN REVIEW

Closing the Gates

STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM, 1860-1925. By JOHN HIGHAM. Rutgers University Press. 431 pp. $6.00.

Reviewed by NATHAN GLAZER

JOHN HIGHAM'S book deals with the background of one of the most important decisions in American history—the decision, made thirty-five years ago, to limit immigrants to this country to a relatively small and carefully selected number. Mr. Higham has done an impressive job. He has studied an enormous volume of letters, newspapers, organizational records, monographs, and has extracted from them a clear and convincing account of the major shifts in public opinion which made possible the reversal of an immigration policy that had been in effect for a hundred years. His book is to my mind a major contribution to American history.

The story Mr. Higham relates was not, I think, generally known even to historians before he undertook to tell it. *Strangers in the Land* opens in the 1860's, on an America which has been absorbing great numbers of immigrants for decades, and in which the dominant social and economic, as well as intellectual elements take it for granted that this is the natural and proper course for the country. It is a period when economic self-interest and democratic ideology combine to support the historic policy of the open gate. There had been, in the 1850's, an outbreak of "nativism," generally based on Protestant resentment of heavy Irish Catholic immigration, but it had never become more than sporadic and local, and left no mark on legislation. In the country as a whole, during the 1870's and 1880's, there was hardly any feeling that immigration posed a problem for the nation.

But, Mr. Higham goes on to show, beginning in the late 1880's, American opinion, as reflected in organized groups and in regional sentiment, underwent a transformation that was complete by 1914. The labor unions had originally opposed only the immigration of contract laborers, but by 1896 the American Federation of Labor had followed Gompers in his hostility to immigration, and American workers continued to stand against free immigration until the restriction movement finally triumphed.

Even Progressives and Socialists, with their strong democratic orientation, were eventually to support immigration restriction. In 1916, the *New Republic* declared: ". . . the new democracy of today cannot permit . . . social ills to be aggravated by excessive immigration." In 1918, a quota scheme which was relatively liberal gained the backing of such people as Norman Hapgood, Robert F. Park, James Harvery Robinson, Oswald Harrison Villard, and Lillian Wald.

Of the various regions in the country, the South and West, because they had always been anxious to increase their population, had consistently favored free immigration. As late as 1903, the representatives of these two sections in Congress voted against the literacy test whose main purpose was to restrict immigration. But in 1907, both sections swung around and came out for restriction.

If we turn to the region that has the best right to be considered the home of a distinctively American culture and intellectual tradition, New England, we find a shift among leading intellectuals around the turn of the century from democratic egalitarianism to an exclusive and restrictive racism. True, a rather benign feeling in favor of the Anglo-Saxon race had long been part of the New England temper. But this was really a romantic regard for one's ancestors, and was not inconsistent in the minds of those who held it with the belief that one of the virtues of the Anglo-Saxon race was its assimilative power. Toward the end of the century, however, this kind of feeling about race was replaced by "scientific" notions stemming from physical anthro-

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pology and biology, and those who now spoke of the Anglo-Saxon race began to suggest the need to exclude "lower" races.

Thus by 1905-6, the South, the West, the native-born working class, and the upper-class intellectuals had become especially strong supporters of immigration restriction. But Mr. Higham tells us that "it also received support in public opinion, and whenever restriction came to a vote in Congress it rolled up overwhelming majorities. . . ." From this point on, it was only "strategically situated minorities" who prevented the sentiment from being translated into law. Two such minorities were particularly influential: big business, which wanted cheap and plentiful labor even more than it feared foreign agitators, and lobbied vigorously through the National Association of Manufacturers and other organizations to maintain free immigration; and the immigrant groups themselves, led mainly by the Jews. The leaders of both parties, also, conscious of the importance of the vote of the foreign-born and their children, were wary about supporting immigration restriction. But in the end the demand for it became too strong for the opposition, and the gates were closed in the early twenties.

This is the main outline of Mr. Higham's story. He shows us *how* the gates came to be closed, but what he barely touches on—though he provides all the material to permit us to speculate on our own—is why one section after another, one social and intellectual and economic element after another, should have swung over to restriction. The only large thesis he suggests is that in times of economic crisis the opponents of free immigration waxed strong, while in times of prosperity their strength waned.

Restriction, Mr. Higham intimates, was successful after the First World War in large part because of the severe economic crisis—though an increase in nativist feeling arising from the war also helped. During the war, both parties had joined in denouncing hyphenated Americanism, in proclaiming "100-per-centism," and in insisting on the forced abandonment of foreign traits; a strong residue of this anti-foreign bias persisted after the war was over. Then came the Bolshevik revolution, and the exaggerated fear of foreign radicals that accompanied it. There was also the racism of Madison Grant and Lothrop Stoddard, for a brief moment enjoying some success in American intellectual life. Finally, there was the Ku Klux Klan, capitalizing on the strong suspicion of foreigners, radicals, and Catholics in small-town America. But one gets the impression from Mr. Higham's account that dominating this combination of factors, and lending power to each, was the economic crisis.

Yet I do not feel that this goes far enough. My own belief, based on Mr. Higham's book, is that what we had in the twenties was not only another wave of nativism—even if more persistent, complex, and successful than the others—but one reflection among many of a fundamental change that had taken place in the point of view of the American people.

The defenders of free immigration in the early twenties could argue quite effectively that immigration had greatly aided America economically and politically, and could still do so. This argument was completely in line with that clear and simple pursuit of self-interest, unhampered by traditional considerations (it was always a moot point anyhow what was traditional in America), that had been so striking a characteristic of 19th-century America. Farmers were happy to leave their farms and city-dwellers their houses purely for the sake of commercial advantage. By the same token, to bring in willing workers of other ethnic groups seemed a self-evident benefit: hardly anyone worried over the consequent loss of America's "traditional" ethnic homogeneity. But other countries, like Australia, with almost as much open land to be developed, had sacrificed a measure of wealth and political power for cultural and ethnic homogeneity.

Around 1900 America too, it seems to me, began to sacrifice economic self-interest for certain of the values that have always been associated with a fixed and stable society, and which involve such matters as status, traditional culture, and the like. It was about this time, for example, that in the South the last efforts to work together politically with the Negroes were abandoned and a policy of strict segregation was adopted, despite the real economic and political disadvantages of Jim Crow. The South had decided that Jim Crow was worth more than wealth and political power.

The rest of the country seems to have made a similar decision. Scarcely aware of what it had done, it tried to explain its feeling against foreigners in whatever terms were available—they were radicals, they were of inferior races,

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they could not be absorbed, and what not. But these complaints and rationalizations only served to conceal the basic fact that America no longer wanted to endure the violent and uncontrolled change that a full commitment to the principles of liberal capitalism demanded. To my mind, the end of free immigration was a reflection of this change, showing itself as a desire to maintain America as it was, regardless of economic or political advantage.

Any discussion of the "change of mind" of a nation is, of course, perilous. Yet, in effect, the subject of Mr. Higham's book is such a change of mind. He has done a remarkably good and stimulating job in recording the change. One hopes that, in some future book, he will go further in considering its full meaning.

Gentleman George

KEEP THE ASPIDISTRA FLYING. By GEORGE ORWELL. Harcourt, Brace. 248 pp. $3.75.

Reviewed by ISAAC ROSENFELD

IT IS strange that the fair, bland, decent, fresh-butter wholesome Orwell of the essays should have been such a terror in his fiction. One after another, the heroes of his novels come in for a thorough shellacking, a savage going-over hideous to behold; such, at least, is the lot of the central characters of *Burmese Days, Coming Up for Air, 1984,* and *Keep the Aspidistra Flying.* This violence is quite uncalled for; his Florys, George Bowlings, Winstons, and Gordons are ordinary men, neither conspicuously noble nor *sale type.* As far as I can see, his only grievance against them was that they did not measure up to the old-school definition of a gentleman. This remark may seem a bit unfair, as Orwell was always riding charges against old-school stuffiness—not in the manner of a St. George, but in a casual and unpretentious way, flying only the colors of human decency.

But he was ahead of his age in being conservative, and this quality of his went largely unnoticed during his lifetime; he combined the gentlemanly with the democratic, an oxymoron typical of conservatism. Orwell detested the snobbery and class ground on which the definition of the gentleman stood, but the concept itself was a different matter, and in the greater part of his literary career he behaved in perfect accordance with it. Hence the fairness, the unassuming and disarming honesty of the writing, which we have come to regard as characteristic. Nor was the gentlemanly, as Orwell entertained it, such a narrow notion. The gentleman was for him the private citizen and irreducible unit of social life, more or less as John Stuart Mill thought of him, the free man of free mind and cultivation, whose continued existence was essential to the health of a democracy. Taken in this larger sense, the idea was by no means inconsistent with Orwell's socialism.

In *Keep the Aspidistra Flying,* Gordon Comstock, thirty-ish, a poet with a "slim volume" to his credit entitled *Mice* (good press, bad sales, soon remaindered), chooses the life of poverty and failure in preference to a career in copywriting (for which, unfortunately, he has more talent than for poetry). He makes this choice for the sake of his writing, to keep himself free of the success drive, but in so doing he also stages the usual young man's rebellion against the middle-class expectations of his family. To his disgust, he discovers that it was all in vain. If success is a swindle, so is failure.

Living in furnished bedrooms, under nosey landladies, working at miserable jobs in dusty bookstores, he is too demoralized, too tired and lonely at night to do his writing, and too poor for beer and cigarettes, let alone amusements. His life is in no way more liberal than that of his drab, dull, penny-pinching family, and the same gloom hangs over him as hangs over his self-sacrificing spinster sister, off whom he sponges. Short on principles, he makes himself a martyr for his living conditions, and blames all his misfortunes on money. The literary world snubs him because he is a pauper, women are indifferent for the same reason, and if his own girl, Rosemary, has been holding out on him for years—for what other reason can she refuse him than his poverty? When she finally does sleep with him, it is out of pity and disgust for the hopelessly roach-ridden, torn-shirt, dirty-neck, who-gives-a-damn condition into which he has fallen. But as the result of this single act (and him too poor to buy contraceptives!) she becomes pregnant. Then Gordon, backed into a corner, takes the job in the advertising agency and does right by the girl. But his first official step as a husband is to buy an aspidistra. This house-plant had always

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been to him the abhorrent symbol of middle-class domesticity—as much as to say, "He loved Big Brother."

I HAVE heard it said that this is a false interpretation; that Gordon, far from being the sniveler and weakling I take him to be, must be understood as something of a hero of our time. At the last moment, just as he is teetering on the brink of the inane, with the cliff crumbling away at his feet, he rights himself, comes to his senses, puts away childish things and chooses life, responsibility, and maturity. This is an attractive interpretation, and I am tempted to agree with it because it fits so well my own point about the conservative element in Orwell. Moreover, one of the central symbols of the novel, Rosemary's pregnancy, does yield up such a meaning (among other meanings, however). But the reasons for withholding consent seem to me too strong to allow such a reading. The preliminary indictment of Gordon is too heavy, and the evidence against him is presented without mercy. We see him in every last, sickening detail of his folly, without a single ambiguous touch that one might interpret to his credit. Nor does Rosemary's pregnancy carry much hope for him. He does the right thing, but his decision is not the result of right thinking—he never has, and never acquires, the courage or intelligence to understand himself. His style of living will improve, he will wear clean shirts and eat well-balanced meals, but the regenerative meaning cannot reach him. He has been presented as the sort of creature who not only invites but deserves his misfortunes; it is too late to save him. The pattern is so well established that the life symbol of the pregnancy is wasted on him—the child is the final springing of the trap. Not only success, not only failure, life itself is a swindle.

I return to my first observation, that Orwell was always mauling his characters. Here, I believe, lay his failure as a novelist; not that he was brutal, but that he did not justify his brutality in fictional terms. There is no good reason for walloping Gordon, or Flory, or the others. Their only offense, as far as I can see, is that they were not gentlemen. They lacked the grace, strength, resourcefulness, dignity, good sense, and clear understanding; neither nature nor society would bend to them or receive them among the elect. Modern fiction is full of such types, but Orwell, evidently, was unable to leave the shabby, poor bloke alone; I suspect he felt put on the spot when he confronted him. The reminiscences which Orwell's friends have published show him forever struggling with, and striving to kill off, his own gentlemanly ideal. The contradiction in himself is matched in the characters. He deliberately chose the bloke, the sniveler, the man who cannot make it, and to hell with the gentleman—and then punished them cruelly for not being gentlemen.

But why pick on Gordon? Many a dead horse has been flayed, this one was skinless to begin with. Because he makes all the better a carcass for his author's self-destructive appetite to feed upon.

BECAUSE such a procedure is unjustified in fiction, Orwell soon leads us out of bounds; and I, for one, could never resist speculating on his self-destructiveness. I know very little about him, and I can't say how accurate my impression is, but under the bland, fair, mild, empirical, and fair-minded manner which he perfected in the essays, I feel he was full of self-hatred, rage, spite, and contempt. This is no reason for disapproving of a novelist, so long as the personal motive is well covered. In Orwell it was usually uncovered, it showed through the devices of his fiction and called attention to himself when he should have been most in control to direct attention to his characters. Their undoing became an obvious substitute for his own, and one smarted and felt uncomfortable—a relationship to an author which it is hard to pass off as literary.

Even so, this would not have mattered—and in *1984* it was of little importance—if only he had been able, more often, to find an appropriate fictional object to stand in for himself and receive the assault. For there are ways of conducting the flagellation so that the ego, to all appearances, is spared; one can, for instance, turn the self inside out and convert it into a world, or find cause, among public objects, for one's secret discontent. This he succeeded in doing in *1984*, where a world is present; Winston goes down, but the totalitarian mystique goes with him. In the other novels, too little of the world is involved in the destruction of the hero. And in *Keep the Aspidistra Flying* he drags down the drain with him nothing more than a few dried pips and peels of a somewhat off-center anti-bourgeois tirade: a desiccated family, a spinsterish sister,

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a sisterish girl friend, and a wealthy and therefore uneasy socialist and literary patron, one Ravelston, who befriends Gordon and makes him feel all the more disgusted with himself. It is Gordon all the way, and therefore Orwell all the way. And wherever Gordon can't quite completely symbolize his author's *Selbstmord* (after all, Orwell *was* a gentleman, and no Gordon by a long shot), Ravelston fills in for him. Anything that won't fit Gordon will slip easily and without pinch onto Ravelston's foot.

Now this is nonsense, and terribly dated, like the old adolescent rebellion against shoe polish. In a much sounder and more honest investigation of poverty, *Down and Out in Paris and London,* Orwell told the truth about the self in the middle-class world, how one lives in it under the threat of starvation and resorts to devices to outwit the wolf—devices, more often than not, shameful and desperate, but still part of the dirty business of staying alive in a dirty world. He did not have to wear a stinking shirt by way of a Gordon in false pride, and even falser self-punishment, for his ability to come to terms with this world (this is, however, an accurate touch in the characterization of Gordon, since nothing galls the writer in advertising more than the recognition that he's good at it). No, he would have loved a clean shirt, clean linen, a bath, a decent living, and a circle of his peers. But in *Down and Out* Orwell was writing in his characteristic mien of fairness to all, himself included, and he made no bones about his reasonableness. He condoned his own failure to be a gentlemen or—it comes to the same thing—managed to forgive himself for being one.

Judaism and Islam

JEWS AND ARABS. By S. D. GOITEIN. SCHOCKEN BOOKS. 257 pp. $4.00.

Reviewed by RAY ALAN

OF ALL the societies with which Jews and Judaism have come into contact through the centuries, none has borne their imprint or itself marked them more profoundly than the great medieval civilization which, for want of a more precise term, is best labeled "Islamic." As Dr. Goitein puts it, Islam "is from the very flesh and bone of Judaism. It is, to say, a recast, an enlargement of the latter, just as Arabic is closely related to Hebrew." Because of this close kinship, Judaism, for its part, "could draw freely and copiously from Muslim civilization and, at the same time, preserve its independence and integrity far more completely than . . . in the modern world or in the Hellenistic society of Alexandria." How comes it then that, for the modern headline-reader, the very title of this book will seem to epitomize racial and even religious incompatibility and strife? Is there no prospect of a new Jewish-Arab symbiosis—or, at least, reconciliation—coming into being in the 20th-century Near East?

Dr. Goitein, chairman of the School of Oriental Studies in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and author of a number of works on Arab-Jewish social relations and Oriental Jewry, is well placed to tackle these questions, but the reader who, misled by the tabloid, eye-catching title, seeks a direct, black and white, journalistic answer to them in this book is likely to be disappointed. My guess is that the publisher chose the present title, whereas the author would probably have preferred something like "A Study in Jewish-Arab Contacts Through the Ages." Goitein's method is essentially "to let history speak for itself"—to provide the reader with the factual raw material from which to produce his own answers to basic questions. Political and military considerations are excluded. The result is a book of permanent rather than merely topical value, in which Arabs and Jews are discussed for their own sakes and not as pawns in someone else's geopolitical chess game.

DR. GOITEIN rejects with something like asperity the 19th-century myth that the Jews were, in origin, a pastoral Arabian folk, but he fails, to my mind, to make a convincing case for his own dogma that they were from earliest times "an entirely agricultural people whose whole life, both secular and religious, was centered in agriculture." History suggests, surely, that the earliest "Jews" and "Arabs," like most other Near Eastern peoples who were, primarily, neither riverine peasants nor urban traders and craftsmen, lived in a mixed economy that was part agricultural and part pastoral, and whose internal balance varied from area to area and year to year at the whim of climate and geography—until two important and roughly contemporaneous, if incongruous, developments gave a firmer orientation to their lives: the crystallization of Hebrew monotheism and the

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domestication of the camel. It was these developments which led "Jews" and "Arabs" along different paths, strengthening sedentary impulses among the former and "Beduizing" the latter (by extending the range over which pastoralism was possible), and stamping both with an identity and sense of cohesion which enabled them to survive when other Near Eastern peoples were absorbed or simply destroyed by successive invaders.

The two rediscovered their family relationship through Islam, which in turn established new bonds between them. Unfortunately, however, the local exigencies of Mohammed's quarrel with the Jews of Medina colored parts of the Koran with a fanatic-seeming tinge which, while uncharacteristic of the Prophet's teachings as a whole, has cost Jewish communities dear during Islam's occasional relapses into intolerance. These occurred with increasing frequency from the 9th century on, when the Arabs themselves were ill used by non-Arab rulers and sought to work off their anger and humiliation on a community weaker and poorer than themselves. But at no time were the Jews or any other minority in the Islamic world the victims of barbarism comparable with that they encountered in 20th-century Germany.

THE only really tragic chapter in the long story of Jewish-Arab relations is the one now being written. It was opened by the remarkable coincidence of the interacting national revivals of the two peoples. "The year 1922, which saw the establishment of the first great Arabic-speaking kingdom, Egypt, witnessed also the international endorsement of the Jewish National Home in Palestine. In 1925 both the University of Cairo and the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, were solemnly opened, both after preparations lasting for many years. Israel became an independent state only a few years after its northern neighbors, Lebanon and Syria, and had the opportunity to vote in the United Nations Assembly for the creation of another Arab state, Libya."

Acts like Israel's vote for Libya and her sponsorship of social reform and technical advancement in the areas occupied by her Arab minority, and the welcome emulation her social policies have directly inspired in neighboring Arab states (for example, the emancipation and enfranchisement of Arab women in Israel led the Syrian government to give its educated womenfolk the vote, and Jordan and Egypt to announce that they were considering the possibility) could, in the long run, if not endear her, at least make her acceptable to progressive Arabs. I myself have been told by Jordanian and Lebanese border villagers of their desire for normal trading relations with Israel and have heard an educated Palestine refugee lecturing other refugees on the need to copy Israel's methods of agricultural organization. It is obvious that, backed by oil revenues and 20th-century technology, a new association of the two peoples and the devotion of their talents and resources to pacific purposes could bring both to a new level of prosperity and even spiritual satisfaction.

Unfortunately, a simple Arab-Jewish rapprochement is no longer sufficient. Near Eastern history is made, in 1956, not in Jerusalem and Cairo but in Washington and Moscow, and by harassed officials with little or no intimate knowledge of or concern for Arabs and Jews. Dr. Goitein writes, in one of his rare incursions into the topical scene: "Peace or strife in the Middle East depends largely on forces outside it. Those who lived in Palestine in the mid-twenties of this century, when British prestige in Arab Asia was almost unchallenged, will remember how peaceful the world appeared at that time. If there is once more to be a power able to exercise a stabilizing influence, there may be a prospect for conditions leading ultimately to peace." This is a vital point. One power acting alone or a group of like-minded powers working closely together could stabilize the Near East. But the Western powers frittered away the precious years during which they enjoyed an effective hegemony of influence in the region, and now, having opened the door to Soviet intrigue and intervention by their puerile pact-mongering, no longer have even the remnants of a policy. For this ineptitude the best interests of Israelis and Arabs, as well as of the West, must inevitably suffer.

Reportage vs. Analysis

THIS IS OUR WORLD. By LOUIS FISCHER. Harper. 522 pp. $5.00.

Reviewed by GEORGE LICHTHEIM

ALTHOUGH dedicated to "the Gandhians of all countries," Mr. Fischer's latest volume is more likely to appeal to admirers of Mr. Nehru, not

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all of whom are as enamored of Gandhi as is the author. There is indeed an unresolved tension between Mr. Fischer's professional preoccupation with daily happenings in the political sphere and his half-suppressed yearning for a metapolitical standpoint leaving the world-weary traveler free to brood over the spiritual meaning of the events jotted down in his case-book. This may account for the obvious fascination Nehru has for him, and his liking for the Indians generally. Unfortunately, most of the book is cast in the form of a travel diary which takes the author away from his favorite haunts to uncongenial places such as Berlin, London, and Washington, though here and there—in Paris, talking to Sartre and Malraux, in Belgrade, arguing Communism with Djilas—he is able to operate simultaneously at both levels. Not surprisingly, the accounts of these discussions are more satisfactory than either the travel notes or the purely political digressions that interlard them.

The difficulty in reviewing Mr. Fischer—or indeed in reading him—is that the conflict is never resolved to the author's own satisfaction. *This Is Our World* has a Guntheresque theme, but Mr. Fischer lacks John Gunther's passion for detail. He is more interested in ideas than in facts. This may explain why his generalizations on France ignore economics and population statistics, while giving prominence to the views expressed by that baleful trio, Sartre, Camus, and Simone de Beauvoir. There are similar lacunae in the chapters devoted to Germany and Britain. If a less blurred image of Yugoslavia emerges from his conversations in Belgrade, the reason may be that the local politician-intellectuals were able to ply him with statistics, while generalizing about doctrine to their (and his) heart's content. If only Malraux had been Premier during the week when Mr. Fischer paid one of his hurried visits to Paris, instead of having to expound Gaullism at a café table, the French scene would perhaps have come out almost as richly colored as the Yugoslav.

INSTEAD of a consistent theme, *This Is Our World* presents something more personal and impalpable: an attitude. Mr. Fischer has carried into maturity the democratic idealism of his youth, enriched by the experience of watching the Soviet experiment go sour. "Travel Notes of a Disillusioned Idealist" would not be a bad subtitle to the volume. The book is clearly

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addressed (consciously or not) to what has come to be known as the "homeless Left," an audience roughly definable as comprising all those who saw their early hopes wither during the 1933-53 Hitler-Stalin epoch. Here and there, however, something tougher and more clearly definable emerges, and it is on these occasions that the non-American reader, metaphorically speaking, pricks up his ears. Mr. Fischer is on terms of personal familiarity with Mr. Acheson and General Clay, as well as M. Sartre and Mlle. de Beauvoir, and he is able to throw light, if not on state secrets, at least on the atmosphere in which important political decisions were taken on some crucial occasions during the postwar period. His description of the flurry in Washington which accompanied the sudden promulgation of the "Truman Doctrine" in 1947 is particularly illuminating, and—casting back twenty years—it is useful to have a reminder that as early as 1927 Stalin talked to American visitors in terms of a "two worlds" concept implicitly pointing to the later Soviet-American antagonism.

These are not the only nuggets brought to light by Mr. Fischer's exploratory globe-trotting among the shambles of our world. Unfortunately, the book is too diffuse to do justice to its theme. It contains numerous good things, such as Mr. R. H. S. Crossman's remark, "If we were part of a united Europe, all the unemployed Italians would come here," and the author's own explanation of why dentists tend to become Communists (to compensate their boredom); but these casual jottings do not add up to a coherent whole, and the total impression is one of a rather unsatisfactory compromise between reportage and analysis.

Jewish Art

JEWISH CEREMONIAL ART. Edited by STEPHEN S. KAYSER. Foreword by Louis Finkelstein. The Jewish Publication Society of America. 168 pp. $3.00.

Reviewed by ALFRED WERNER

THERE has never been an intrinsically Jewish art—not even in antiquity, when the Jewish "style" was actually a combination of Middle Eastern, Greek, Roman, and other elements haphazardly blended to produce what individual kings, priests, and elders considered the most practical and most pleasing articles to be used in religious services. And in modern times the vast majority of Jewish ceremonial art objects executed in Western and Central Europe were not even the work of Jewish craftsmen. Whereas the church often forbade the practice of commissioning ecclesiastical art from talented non-Christians, the pre-emancipation Jew, lacking an aesthetic tradition of his own, necessarily relied on Gentile artists.

Stephen S. Kayser, the editor of *Jewish Ceremonial Art* (which was originally published as a soft-cover catalogue for the Tercentenary exhibition held last year at the Metropolitan Museum in New York) and his collaborator, Professor Guido Schoenberger (who compiled the ample notes for the two hundred items in the catalogue), are aware of the difficulties created by these historical circumstances. Their principle of classification is to consider Jewish anything made for a Jewish purpose, whoever the maker may have been (often he did not sign his work, though we know with certainty from the hallmarks, and with reasonable as-

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surance from stylistic analysis, that he usually was a Gentile). It is a good principle, and along with the excellent photographs, it makes this book a useful introduction to the subject.

THE collaboration of Jewish patron, who specified in great detail what he wanted, and Gentile craftsman, who executed the work, resulted in some curious productions. Looking through the plates in this book, one can see how Jewish motifs, some perhaps traceable to ancient Palestine, are blended with decorative features from Christian ecclesiastic art innocently thrown in by the silversmith and as innocently accepted by his Jewish patron. The latter might specify the shape of an object and, if inclined toward ostentation, permit his own *horror vacui* to mar a piece by his insistence on flourishes; he might even (as was surely done) forbid the craftsman to work on an object on the Sabbath or a Jewish holiday. But since he had no artistic training or traditional standards, he would accept a vessel distinguishable from church silver only by its Jewish uses.

Dr. Kayser points out that very few extant Jewish religious articles are older than four hundred and fifty years (apart from illuminated manuscripts, we might add). Virtually, every object pictured in this book is either Baroque, or was fashioned under the influence of the Baroque spirit long after that had given way in Christian Europe to later trends.

Why did Baroque, long after its decline, never really lose its attraction for the Jewish people? It lingers on, at a low level, to this very day. Dr. Kayser does not explore this interesting question, but it may have something to do with the fact that Gothic had unfortunate associations for the Jewish mind. The Jew must have felt an aversion to images of an age that spelled the intensity of the faith by which he was persecuted. And there is a possible theological reason as well. The medieval Christian sought the infinite, wanted his house of worship to point to heaven; hence the preponderance of vertical features: tall, narrow windows, high vaults, and awe-inspiring towers. The Baroque church, however, discarded height and—like the synagogue—extended horizontally, clinging to the physical rather than the metaphysical, concentrating man's thoughts on life rather than death.

WHILE Jewish ceremonial art is even less "original" than one would like to believe, it does exhibit features, some of them mentioned in this book, that cannot be found in Christian art. Among others, there are: the Sabbath lamp formed, under the influence of Roman oil lamps, in the shape of a star; the seven-branched candlestick; the Chanukah lamp; the container for the *ethrog*; and the Seder plate with three tiers. The book makes clear that figural representations of animals, and even of humans, were not eschewed, though in most cases the nose was chipped to make the figure incomplete and hence permissible.

Similarly, we learn from Professor Schoenberger's notes that the pre-emancipation Jew was not altogether artistically barren. We know definitely that certain of the ritual objects were made by Jews, as, for example, a Torah Ark curtain of 1772, a superb piece in red brocade embroidered in silver and showing a seven-branched candelabrum flanked by columns reminiscent of the two sacred columns of the ancient Temple in Jerusalem; above the candelabrum two rampant lions of Judah hold a crown, and below it stands a double eagle. The curtain is inscribed with the following words in Hebrew: "Work of my hands, in which I

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take pride, with the help of God, Jacob Koppel Gans, son of Judah Leb, *goldsticker* [embroiderer], Hochstadt, Bavaria." We know also of at least one East European Jewish silversmith who signed his work "Ze'eb, son of Abraham," from Pietrokov. In 1766 Ze'eb made one of the Torah breastplates mentioned and illustrated in the book; it shows two gryphons on columns holding a crown placed over the Tablets of the Law. Several of the brass Chanukah menorahs are also by Jews. Two lavishly illustrated Scrolls of Esther are referred to, and the illuminator of one is known to us by name—Salomone d'Italia. Professor Schoenberger points out that "in the Book of Esther the word for God does not occur. The artists could therefore feel at greater liberty to illustrate and decorate it, thereby making it the only biblical book in Judaism in which the text is traditionally accompanied by pictures but, curiously enough, only when it has the form of a scroll."

In several cases, we might be inclined to attribute a work to a naive Jewish folk artist, but on close examination we reverse our judgment. For instance, in a 17th-century burial society cup the procession of the *chevrah kaddisha* was painted on glass by a Gentile—no Jew would have put the inscription upside down. In other cases, one is startled by the introduction of Hebrew script and a Jewish motif in an object otherwise entirely lacking connection with Judaism—as in an old English three-piece coffee set of salt-glaze Staffordshire china decorated with Hebrew sayings and a scene from a Jewish wedding ceremony!

WHAT is lacking in *Jewish Ceremonial Art* and in most recent catalogues of similar character is, of course, a critically aesthetic approach. Curiously, the first and largest exhibition of this kind, the 1887 Jewish historical exhibition at London's Royal Albert Hall, set a standard of critical honesty in its catalogue that this book does not match. It was conceded that the efforts of the creators (or purchasers) of this art were "less directed for the production of things of beauty, for the sake of their beauty, than to the illustration of the affection or reverence in which they held particular persons or things." Hence "the mere richness of the gift was sufficient. . . . [and] design . . . a minor consideration. . . . [They] borrowed freely from the art types of the nations among whom they dwelt or from the more obvious methods of costly decoration." To say as much today in America would probably be considered heretical.

Farewell to Politics

THE TRAIL OF THE DINOSAUR AND OTHER ESSAYS. By ARTHUR KOESTLER. Macmillan. 1955. $3.50.

Reviewed by HANS MEYERHOFF

LIKE everybody else, Koestler is sick and tired of politics. "The errors are atoned for, the bitter passion has burnt itself out; Cassandra has gone hoarse, and is due for a vocational change." The language is apocalyptic, but the contents of this book are not. Koestler is not, as he would like to believe, the lone prophet crying in the wilderness; he is like the rest of us. His talent has always been to dramatize his own life as if it were the march of history. That is not a negligible talent and fulfills an important public function, but it has its limits. It puts the dramatist into the show; he is one of the actors—and not Cassandra who stood aloof and above the folly of her city.

Insofar as Koestler is one of us, it is easy for us to identify and sympathize; but it is also easy to see that his "insights and outlooks" are common property. The essays collected in the present volume (a sequel to *The Yogi and the Commissar*) express *current* attitudes, sentiments, and ideas; they do not probe beneath the surface of political phenomena; they do not transcend the public forum. They are "timely" in that they are produced and consumed for a timely occasion—for the Sunday magazine of the New York *Times*, for *Life* or *Look*, or some less popular periodical. There is nothing wrong with this; but it is a mistake to believe that Koestler does more than write as an observer of the surface—that he is really the voice of history.

What makes the gesture of farewell so dramatic in Koestler's case is his long and passionate involvement in politics. Now, after having been so conspicuous a symbol of the political man in our age, he is abdicating in favor of private life. He has got nothing more to say and, even if he had, it wouldn't do much good anyway. One can sympathize with these two strains of thought which run through Koestler's essays, because we have seen them operate in ourselves.

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After the disaster and disillusionment which followed the First World War, Koestler found himself and his political god in the Communist movement. But Communism turned into Stalinism, the Weimar democracy into the Nazi dictatorship, and the Spanish Civil War—which brought Koestler face to face with death—was but a prelude to more horrible things to come. After his break with Stalinism, Koestler re-entered the political arena with the same passionate intensity as of old, only with the passions now being discharged against "the God that failed"—and he made the most of this opportunity, as the political articles, speeches, and manifestoes collected in this volume testify.

But atonement and rehabilitation seem to have produced but another sense of disillusionment; for as Koestler puts it in defense of Whittaker Chambers: "It is not to be expected that the public should like the runaway priest—even if the church from which he has run away happens to be devoted to worshipping the devil." Yes, there is a great deal to be said for a spirit of resignation.

And there is a good deal to be said for silence—partly because one has earned the right to be silent, partly because the political vocabulary is exhausted. The deterioration or systematic destruction of political language is surely one of the most conspicuous phenomena of our age. The key terms of political discourse, "left" and "right," "capitalism" and "socialism," "democracy" and "totalitarianism," "freedom-loving" and "peace-loving," are "rapidly becoming . . . antiquated and meaningless." Communists defend property rights; reactionaries are staunch defenders of civil liberties—alas, it has become increasingly difficult to orient oneself in the maze and jungle of political verbiage. Words and concepts seem to be used to confuse, rather than to clarify, the issues; to cover, rather than discover, the facts; to conceal, rather than reveal, some truth about men and society.

Koestler is aware of this trend, but unlike Orwell (to whom he devotes an appreciative essay) he does not inquire into its deeper causes. If he had looked farther, I think, he might have discovered that bigger issues are at stake than emotive language and neurotic behavior patterns. Behind the failure of words—or the neurotic response to political symbols—lies a failure of theory. To be sure, politics has become a "science," but one whose theoretical as well as moral foundations have been in a bad way for quite a while. Political science has become a predominantly technical discipline that trains people for participation in the decision-making processes of government, but not for the questioning of the validity of the decisions themselves. This leaves considerable room for practical politics, but little for a theoretical analysis which would come to terms with the radical changes in the reality of the political situation.

The paucity of political theory is directly related to its distance from political reality. The preoccupation with short-range problems, or piecemeal engineering, may temporarily obscure this distance; but it cannot ultimately assuage the theoretical anxiety which stems from a recognition that one's whole frame of reference is out of joint. The basic political (or social) manifestations of our age—totalitarianism and terror, anxiety and the escape from freedom, authoritarianism and conformity, alienation and apathy, indoctrination and manipulation, violence, and the overriding desire for security, national, material, or emotional—these and other political phenomena

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are not, and cannot be, comprehended by traditional concepts. There are serious and searching studies which have shown that these characteristic aspects of the political situation make sense only if they are defined and understood within a context *beyond* politics. Koestler does not take cognizance of any serious efforts to bring political ideas closer to political reality. Hence his own insights and explanations remain invariably within the domain of persuasive or propagandistic discourse; in short, they do little to purge political language of its notorious deficiencies.

Koestler's withdrawal from the scene of action is a common phenomenon. Most everybody has kissed politics goodbye and turned to cultivate some sort of private garden. "What's the use?" is the prevailing mood in theory and practice. Koestler does not ask why, or what factors have contributed to this mood; he does not even attempt to go to the roots of his own withdrawal. He seems to be satisfied with the dramatic exit as such, for he concludes his farewell to politics (as he began) with an apocalyptic vision. It is the familiar specter of the giant mushroom clouds. They now pose, after the end of politics, the final alternative of either following "the trail of the dinosaurs," or going down on one's knees and praying for a "spiritual" mutation. "Once we hoped for Utopia; now, in a chastened mood, we can at best hope for a reprieve; pray for time and play for time; for had the dinosaur learned the art of prayer, the only sensible petition for him would have been to go down on his scaly knees and beg 'Lord give us another chance.'"

That may again be true; but if it is, it is surely time to close our books on politics and read something else. Or, as Freud put it more aptly: "If a man is willing to come to this, he could probably have arrived there by a shorter road."

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Armchair Tourists

A JEWISH TOURIST'S GUIDE TO THE U.S. By BERNARD POSTAL and LIONEL KOPPMAN. The Jewish Publication Society of America. 705 pp. $5.00.

Reviewed by OSCAR HANDLIN

THIS is a handsome, well-constructed book. Its seven hundred double-columned pages are filled with information. It has been compiled with care and is relatively free of factual error. It has a good index and copious illustrations. Yet one is puzzled by the scope and character of the volume, which is not really a tourist's guide at all, but a kind of pseudo-history that attempts to impute specifically Jewish interest to anything and everything remotely touching American Jewish life. Of course, the *Guide* lists the names and addresses of the local synagogues and even the kosher restaurants of some towns and cities. But since these listings are never evaluated, the traveler learns nothing from them that he could not learn more easily by consulting the yellow pages of the telephone book.

The Jewish tourist envisaged by the compilers of this book can find Jewish interest in virtually anything he looks at. He will travel to Birmingham, Alabama, to visit the Birmingham Conservatory of Music because it houses the Edna Gockel-Gussen Library of Chamber Music, which was established to memorialize the "non-Jewess who was Temple Emanu-El's organist." In a visit to the Bureau of Printing and Engraving in Washington, what concerns him is that the one-dollar bills printed there exhibit "the Great Seal of the United States, showing the 13 stars grouped in the form of a perfect *Magen David*." And he is disappointed to learn that the brass six-pointed star in the main portico of the Alabama state capital building "has no Jewish connotation, but is merely a curious item."

Such items of information, all too liberally sprinkled through the book, show that it was intended to be something other than a conventional tourist guide. Indeed, the authors in their preface put as their first objective that of providing "pleasurable reading to armchair tourists." Or, as the foreword points out, the appropriate subtitle for the book should have been, "The History and Institutions of American Jewry in One Easy-Reading Volume." But what manner of history is it that is organized like a gazetteer, alphabetically by places, rather than according to subject matter or chronology? Well, for one thing, it is a history which is absolved of the requirements of consistency or symmetry. For some states the narrative comes down to the recent past; the history of Alabama, on the other hand, stops at 1870. It describes the development of trade and department stores in California, but not in Massachusetts.

It is also a history in which repetition becomes a virtue. If the armchair tourist misses the account of Judah Monis on page 222, he will find almost the same account on page 236. If he misses the description of the Black Code under "Alabama," he will find almost the

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same description under "Arkansas," "Louisiana," and "Mississippi." In such a history little contradictions pass unnoticed. On page 561, the reader is told that one of Washington's original battle flags "consists of 13 six-pointed stars, the familiar Stars of David." Unless he remembers to turn back to page 530, where, strangely enough, there is a picture of that very battle flag, he will never know that these particular six-pointed stars are not the Stars of David.

Such a "history" offers no interpretation and adds nothing to the understanding. But then, if the book gives no answers, it has at least the inestimable virtue of asking no questions, and, without questions or answers, it will surely offend no one. Except, possibly, those interested people who take the trouble to notice on the flyleaf that it is published in the Jacob R. Schiff Library of Jewish Contributions to American Democracy.

Book Reviewers in This Issue

Nathan Glazer is the author of a forthcoming book on American Judaism.

Isaac Rosenfeld is currently working on a book about the great Chicago fire.

Ray Alan's "Stirrings in Araby" appeared in our April issue.

George Lichtheim's political analyses appear often in Commentary and other periodicals.

Alfred Werner is an art critic and author of *Dufy* and *Utrillo*.

Hans Meyerhoff teaches philosophy at the University of California.

Oscar Handlin, author of *The Uprooted* and other works, teaches history at Harvard University.

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This *I Believe*

JUDGE not, that ye be not judged.

2 For with what judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged; and with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again.

3 And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye?

4 Or how wilt thou say to thy brother, Let me pull out the mote out of thine eye; and behold, a beam is in thine own eye?

5 Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam out of thine own eye; and then shalt thou see clearly to cast out the mote out of thy brother's eye.

6 Give not that which is holy unto the dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine, lest they trample them under their feet, and turn again and rend you.

7 Ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you:

8 For every one that asketh, receiveth; and he that seeketh, findeth; and to him that knocketh, it shall be opened.

9 Or what man is there of you, whom if his son ask bread, will he give him a stone?

10 Or if he ask a fish, will he give him a serpent?

11 If ye then, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your Father which is in heaven give good things to them that ask him?

12 Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them: for this is the law and the prophets.

13 Enter ye in at the strait gate: for wide is the gate, and broad is the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there be which go in thereat:

14 Because strait is the gate, and narrow is the way, which leadeth unto life; and few there be that find it.

15 Beware of false prophets, which come to you in sheep's clothing, but inwardly they are ravening wolves.

16 Ye shall know them by their fruits. Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles?

17 Even so every good tree bringeth forth good fruit; but a corrupt tree bringeth forth evil fruit.

18 A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit.

19 Every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit is hewn down, and cast into the fire.

20 Wherefore by their fruits ye shall know them.

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

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